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UNITED STATES v. BARRY BONDS v. BRONSTON :
CAN SECTION 1503 HANDLE THE TRUTH?
DONALD K. KAZEE*
EDITOR’S NOTE: As this article went to press, the Ninth Circuit
reversed the conviction of Barry Bonds for obstruction of justice.
The per curiam opinion rested the reversal upon the lack of evi-
dence that the statement for which Bonds was convicted was mate-
rial, but occasioned four conflicting concurrences and a dissent.
Professor Kazee’s original article is presented here to provide con-
text and critique for the vigorous debate brought forth by the
Bonds trial and appeals.  He has appended Extra Innings to his
article to explain the implications of the divided en banc opinions
and to show the continued threat to the liberty and justice despite
the reversal.
I. INTRODUCTION
Barry Bonds is the iconic player of his age in the national pas-
time.  He embodies at once America’s sincere devotion toward su-
perhuman feats and cynical detraction of superhuman
achievement.  He treads an idol’s path between deity and doubt.  It
is the least of wonders that he appears above the fray, annoyed at
the tumult that would doubt his entitlement to wear the dignity of
another Giant, his father.
Barry Bonds shares with his father, Bobby Bonds, the distinc-
tion of achieving five seasons with at least 30 home runs and 30
stolen bases.  But the totality of Barry’s achievement is shared with
no one: 14 All-Star appearances, eight Gold Gloves, National
League MVP seven times, Major League Player of the Year three
times, twelve times Silver Slugger, and the Hank Aaron Award three
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of the first six years it was awarded. These honors but summarize
the towering hits, the larcenous speed, and fielding miracles of 22
years.
Even for those unimmersed in the true believers’ liturgy of sta-
tistics, Barry Bonds owns two certain signs of anointing from on
high, which make him not just Bobby’s son, but heir to the Babe
himself.  His 71 home runs in 2001 far surpassed Ruth’s record of
60 home runs in a single season, cared for in turn by Roger Maris at
61 and Mark McGwire at 70.  His 762 career homers surpassed
Ruth’s 714 and Hank Aaron’s 755.
But a third sign of immortality is uncertain.  Barry Bonds’ oth-
erwise automatic induction into the Baseball Hall of Fame is
plagued by a widely shared suspicion that he stole more than bases.
Allegations of taking superdrugs for superhuman strength have fol-
lowed Bonds and other competitors from that thrilling and other-
wise inexplicable upsurge in human prowess at the turn of the
millennium.
Baseball was hardly the only sport mired in the suspicion and
investigation of cheating by elixir.  In San Francisco, a federal
grand jury investigated the Bay Area Laboratories Cooperative
(BALCO) for distributing performance enhancing drugs. The
Grand Jury subpoenaed the testimony of high-profile athletes from
cycling, track, and, of course, Major League Baseball.  Their names
had been discovered in connection with the investigation of Victor
Conte, the owner of BALCO, and Greg Anderson, a BALCO em-
ployee and personal trainer to Barry Bonds.  Anderson ultimately
pled guilty to having distributed steroids without a prescription and
to money laundering.  In December 2003, Barry Bonds gave testi-
mony to the grand jury.  The questioning focused on Bonds’ long-
time relationship with Anderson and on Bonds’ alleged use of
substances obtained from BALCO or Anderson. Among the sub-
stances Bonds was asked about were human growth hormone, or
HGH, and the steroid tetrahydrogestrinone, or THG, also called
“the clear” for its having been designed to escape detection.
Barry Bonds was indicted in November 2007 on several counts
of perjury before the grand jury under 18 U.S.C. §1623 (2006), and
one count of obstruction of justice under 18 U.S.C. § 1503 (2006).
During the lengthy pretrial process, the indictment was replaced by
a “superseding” indictment three times, and ultimately three counts
of perjury were presented to the trial jury. The three counts speci-
fied three passages in Bonds’ testimony for which the grand jury
found probable cause to charge that Bonds had made false material
2
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statements.  The trial jury failed to convict on any of the perjury
counts, and the perjury counts were subsequently dismissed.  The
inference from this process is not at all the same as an acquittal.
Rather, trial jurors were unable to unanimously agree one way or
the other on a guilty or not guilty verdict.  Such results do, however,
indicate that one or more jurors believed that the prosecution
failed to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
In the obstruction of justice count, the grand jury charged that
Bonds corruptly impeded the due administration of justice by giv-
ing testimony that was “intentionally false, evasive, and mislead-
ing.”1  The obstruction count specified, but was not limited to, the
passages upon which the perjury counts were based.  In pretrial
proceedings to propose jury instructions for approval by the trial
judge, the prosecution isolated a number of additional passages of
testimony which allegedly exemplified Bonds’ endeavor to obstruct
justice.  The trial judge allowed four such exemplars to go to the
jury, as well as the three passages already specified in the perjury
counts.2  The trial jury returned a guilty verdict for obstruction
under Section 1503 on only one of the four exemplars submitted,
denominated Statement C.  Statement C is the underlined portion
of the trial court’s jury instructions, in the context of the prior
question.
[6. Statement C:]
Q: Did Greg ever give you anything that required a
syringe to inject yourself with?
A: I’ve only had one doctor touch me.  And that’s my
only personal doctor.  Greg, like I said, we don’t get
into each other’s personal lives.  We’re friends, but I
don’t –we don’t sit around and talk baseball, because
he knows I don’t want–don’t come to my house talk-
ing baseball.  If you want to come to my house and
talk about fishing, some other stuff, we’ll be good
friends, you come around talking about baseball, you
go on.  I don’t talk about his business.  You know what
I mean? . . .
Q: Right.
A: That’s what keeps our friendship.  You know, I am
sorry, but that–you know, that–I was a celebrity child,
1. See Third Superseding Indictment at 6, United States v. Bonds, No. 3:07-cr-
07-0732-SI (N.D. Cal. Feb. 10, 2011), ECF No. 213.
2. See Instructions to Jury at 10-12, United States v. Bonds, No. 3:07-cr-07-0732-
SI (N.D. Cal. Apr. 6, 2011), EFC No. 356.
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not just in baseball by my own instincts.  I became a
celebrity child with a famous father.  I just don’t get
into other people’s business because of my father’s
situation, you see . . .3
Statement C, then, was the sole basis of Bonds’ obstruction
conviction after eight years of investigation and four years of prose-
cution.  The significance of Bonds’ conviction reaches every witness
stand in the United States, for Bonds is the first to be convicted for
obstructing justice under 18 U.S.C. Section 1503 for testimony that
the government conceded before the trial court to be true. Were
Statement C false, Bonds’ conviction would be an unremarkable ex-
ample of a lie by a witness under oath having been proven to have
the potential to impede, obstruct, or influence the due administra-
tion of justice, as was the companion BALCO case, United States v.
Thomas.4  But Bonds’ conviction is a landmark if we take the govern-
ment at its word, first as reported by Bonds’ attorneys, and then by
the government itself.
Bonds’ Reply Brief in Support of Motions for Judgment of Ac-
quittal and/or a New Trial quotes the government at trial:
In summing up its argument for submitting all of the let-
tered statements to the jury, the government declared:
“[W]e would have charged him as a 1623 count if we were
saying these are all false.  These are in the evasive and/or
misleading category.” (RT 1588).5
This last statement requires some qualification, because the
government on occasion has also claimed Statement C to be false.
Nonetheless, the trial court rejected the government’s alternate ar-
guments that Statement C is false, in part because “there are other
ways to understand defendant’s testimony” so that Statement C was
not “necessarily” false, and in part because “the government did not
argue this reading to the jury.”6  The verdict was thus sustained by
the trial court on the basis that it consisted of true statements.
On appeal, the government maintained the arguments that
Statement C was false, or perhaps false because it was true: “Even if
3. Instructions to Jury, supra note 2, at 11 (alterations in original).
4. See United States v. Thomas, 612 F.3d 1107, 1110 (9th Cir. 2010).
5. Defendant’s Reply in Support of Motions for Judgment of Acquittal and/or
a New Trial on Count Five at 8, United States v. Bonds, No. 3:07-cr-0732-SI (N.D.
Cal. Aug. 8, 2011), ECF No. 408.
6. Order Denying Motion to Acquit and for a New Trial at 11-12 n.5, United
States v. Bonds, No. 3:07-cr-0732-SI (N.D. Cal. Aug. 26, 2011), ECF No. 412.
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Bonds actually considered his relationship with Anderson to be a
friendship, and truly did not generally ‘get into other people’s busi-
ness’ as a result of growing up with a famous father, these stitches of
truth were used to construct a lie.”7  The Ninth Circuit panel
agreed: “[T]he cases interpreting § 1503 support our conclusion
that  misleading or evasive testimony that is factually true can ob-
struct justice.”8
The foregoing chain of argument and decision is sufficient for
this article to take Statement C as true.  Even if it were now argued
or proven to be false, there is a clearly marked trail leading to but
one destination, that factually true statements may be a basis for
culpability under 18 U.S.C. § 1503, at least, for the moment, where
those truths are “evasive” or “misleading.”  Testimonial obstruction,
i.e., obstruction of justice based on the testimony of a sworn witness
in court, had evolved only in early 1970s with antecedents in docu-
ment tampering cases in the 1950s and 1960s.  Heretofore, culpa-
bility for testimonial obstruction under Section 1503 had been
applied to only three categories: (1) false denial of memory, consid-
ered tantamount to refusal to testify, e.g., United States v. Cohn,9
United States v. Alo,10 (2) false denial of knowledge, likewise tanta-
mount to refusal to testify, e.g., United States v. Williams,11 and (3)
other false material statements, e.g., United States v. Thomas.12  The
three have in common falsehoods which conceal avenues for fur-
ther inquiry.  As of Bonds, true statements are newly subject to Sec-
tion 1503 if the sum of those truths may be characterized as
“evasive” or “misleading.”
This development under the obstruction statute is squarely at
odds with the Supreme Court’s clear instruction as to “misleading”
or “evasive” true testimony, albeit in a case arising under the per-
jury statute, Bronston v. United States.13  The unanimous Bronston
court held that true but intentionally evasive or misleading state-
ments are not a basis for culpability under the perjury statutes, pro-
vided that the literally true answer is “non-responsive” to the
7. Brief for the United States as Appellee at 29-30, United States v. Bonds, 730
F.3d 890 (9th Cir. 2013) (No. 11-10669).
8. United States v. Bonds, 730 F.3d 890, 895 (9th Cir. 2013).
9. See, e.g., United States v. Cohn, 452 F.2d 881, 884 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
405 U.S. 975 (1972).
10. See, e.g., United States v. Alo, 439 F.2d 751, 754 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 850 (1971).
11. See United States v. Williams, 874 F.2d 968, 981 (5th Cir. 1989).
12. See United States v. Thomas, 612 F.3d 1107, 1129 (9th Cir. 2010), cert.
denied, 131 S. Ct. 1836 (2011).
13. See Bronston v. United States, 409 U.S. 352 (1973).
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question.  A re-examination of Statement C above reveals that
Bonds’ true statements did not in fact respond to the question
asked by the Assistant U.S. Attorney, “Did Greg ever give you any-
thing that required a syringe to inject yourself with?”14 A non-re-
sponsive answer has not heretofore been a crime, especially since it
is a partial condition of the Bronston defense to a perjury charge.
Even though both Bonds’ attorneys and the government have
been inconsistent as to whether Bonds’ answer was responsive, this
article will take the position that not only is Bonds’ Statement C
true, it does not respond to the question.  The reader may judge
the basis for that assumption, but it should be noted that following
Statement C, the AUSA re-asked the question more specifically:
“Did either Mr. Anderson or Mr. Conte ever give you a liquid that
they told you to inject into yourself to help you with this recovery
type stuff, did that ever happen?”15, to which Bonds answered
“No.”16  The renewed question is at least one indicator that the
questioner considered Statement C non-responsive as contem-
plated in Bronston.
Under Bronston, evasive truth is not criminal, but is the cue for
the questioner to redouble efforts to bring the whole truth to light:
“If a witness evades, it is the lawyer’s responsibility to recognize the
evasion and to bring the witness back to the mark, to flush out the
whole truth with the tools of adversary examination.”17  Truthful,
non-responsive, but misleading statements are not perjurious under
Bronston for two reasons: First, the texts of the perjury statutes,
which proscribe either a “false material statement,” 18 U.S.C.
§ 1623, or a material statement that the witness “does not believe to
be true,” 18 U.S.C. § 1621, do not on their terms cover true state-
ments. Second, and more importantly for Bonds and for every wit-
ness, asking a jury to discern whether a truthful answer is intended
to be misleading is at most a guessing game that undermines our
adversary system for want of an ascertainable mark by which to de-
cide, regardless of the statute under which the charge is brought.
In Bronston, “[t]he Government does not contend that any mislead-
ing or incomplete response must be sent to the jury to determine
whether a witness committed perjury because he intended to side-
14. GJ Investigation No. 2002R01596: Reporter’s Transcript of Proceedings
Testimony of Barry Bonds, December 4, 2003 at 42 United States v. Bonds, No.
3:07-cv-00732-SI (N.D. Cal. Feb. 22, 2008) [hereinafter Bonds Testimony], ECF No.
35.
15. Id. at 43.
16. Id. at 42.
17. Bronston v. United States, 409 U.S. 352, 358-59 (1973).
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track his questioner. As the Government recognizes, the effect of so
unlimited an interpretation of §1621 would be broadly
unsettling.”18
It is unsettling because it amounts at most to conjecture:
It is no answer to say that here the jury found that peti-
tioner intended to mislead his examiner.  A jury should
not be permitted to engage in conjecture whether an un-
responsive answer, true and complete on its face, was in-
tended to mislead or divert the examiner; the state of
mind of the witness is relevant only to the extent that it
bears on whether “he does not believe [his answer] to be
true.”19
This is as true of obstruction as it is for perjury.  Truth and
falsity represent marks that a jury of peers readily understands and
conscientiously applies.  Tasking twelve persons to second-guess a
witness’s motive for telling a truth on the stand requires a degree of
speculation that is forbidden to witnesses themselves.  To quash
conjecture, Bronston requires that the questioner persist in the in-
quiry.  “The burden is on the questioner to pin the witness down to
the specific object of the questioner’s inquiry.”20
Of course, the text of Section 1503 makes no reference to ei-
ther truth or falsity, and the Omnibus Clause of that statute is read
by the government to include any “corrupt” “endeavor to influence,
obstruct, or impede, the due administration of justice” without limit
or without regard to the truth or falsity of any testimony.21 Yet a
process without the truth at its heart and goal can be neither due
nor just.  It can be readily seen that so broad an application of Sec-
tion 1503 to unresponsive truthful testimony spells the end not only
of the Bronston doctrine, but of Congress’s express will toward
sworn testimony that Bronston upholds.  As the government con-
ceded at Bonds’ trial, “[W]e would have charged him as a 1623 count if
18. See id. at 361.
19. Id. at 359 (alteration in original).
20. Id. at 360. Id. at 360 (citing United States v. Wall, 371 F.2d 398 (6th Cir.
1967); United States v. Slutzky, 79 F.2d 504 (3d Cir. 1935); Galanos v. United
States, 49 F.2d 898 (6th Cir. 1931); United States v. Cobert, 227 F. Supp. 915 (S.D.
Cal. 1964)).
21. United States’ Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Judgment of Acquit-
tal and/or a New Trial on Count Five at 4, 17, United States v. Bonds, No. 3:07-cr-
07-00732-SI (N.D. Cal. July 27, 2011), ECF No. 407.
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we were saying these are all false.  These are in the evasive and/or mislead-
ing category.” (RT 1588).22
In other words, Bronston prevented the government from
charging Statement C as perjury, because the statement is true.  But
an obstruction indictment of Bonds’ testimony generally, specified
only in the proposed jury instructions, achieves an end run around
both Bronston and the grand jury.  The Statement C charge evades
the Supreme Court’s systemic instruction as to questioning by coun-
sel throughout our adversarial process, and it evades the grand jury
itself  by substituting the trial judge for specific grand jury delibera-
tions on the specific passage.  This article will not gainsay the consti-
tutionality of the latter, but assuming that a charge of obstruction
may be so brought by indirection via proposed jury instructions, it is
all the more essential to mind the Supreme Court’s admonition
against criminalizing truthful non-responsive testimony at all:
To hold otherwise would be to inject a new and confusing
element into the adversary testimonial system we know.
Witnesses would be unsure of the extent of their responsi-
bility for the misunderstandings and inadequacies of ex-
aminers, and might well fear having that responsibility
tested by a jury under the vague rubric of “intent to mis-
lead” or “perjury by implication.”23
That confusion would be a special threat for a class of witnesses
not heretofore described by the courts. Bronston posits that the
Three Witches on the Heath are as guiltless as they are evasive be-
cause MacBeth failed to press on with his inquiry.  The Bonds courts
would find them guilty of obstruction.  Yet not every witness who
gives a truthful, non-responsive answer is so malicious.  If the truth-
ful non-responsive answer becomes under Section 1503 a short-
hand for being misleading as well, witnesses innocent under either
statute may become burdened with proving that they were not stall-
ing, or misdirecting, or trying to be too clever by half.  These are
the witnesses who in everyday life or especially on the stand feel
duty-bound to give contextual testimony in an effort to give the
whole truth, or the precise truth amidst a sea of contradictions, or
explain why the answer is unavoidably ambiguous because that’s the
way life is, or their knowledge is, or because that’s the way they talk.
22. Defendant’s Reply in Support of Motions for Judgment of Acquittal and/
or a New Trial on Count Five, supra note 5, at 8.
23. Bronston, 409 U.S. at 359.
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The reader is invited to review Statement C as to whether it
may be considered conscientiously contextual were it spoken by an-
yone without the notoriety of Barry Bonds. If so, Bonds risks becom-
ing one of Holmes’ great cases that make bad law, “because of some
accident of immediate overwhelming interest which appeals to the
feelings and distorts the judgment.”24
Even were we to assume that Barry Bonds is in Statement C as
devious as the government contends or as the jury found, crossing
the line into finding concededly true statements to be felonious
opens wide a prison door for many an ordinary person without the
resources of Skadden Arps.  As an example of the potential reach of
the Bonds decision, one may consider a very similar statement far
removed from the contention over Statement C.  Statement C may
be compared in substance and length to a statement attributed on
the entertainment website Internet Movie Database (with what au-
thority or orthography, who can say?) to the British actor John
Thaw, best known in this country as Inspector Morse.
Sheila and I have had our ups and downs. But the thing
that keeps us together apart from the fact we love each
other, is having the same sense of humour and out look
on like [sic], the same beliefs about what is important,
what’s right and wrong. If you fundamentally disagree,
then when the initial romance goes, you’ve nothing to re-
place it with. You’ve got to have a solid foundation and
mutual respect. I like Sheila, I respect her, and I know its
vice-versa. That’s what kept us together. We don’t live in
each others [sic] pockets. Sheila sometimes goes to the
theatre with friends because I am working, and I go to
things that would bore her. So in that sense we are not
always together.25
Were Thaw asked under oath, “Where were you on the night in
question?” with regard to Sheila, Thaw’s quite ordinary statement
would be indistinguishable from Statement C: Non-responsive and
truthful (so far as we know) and implying that he does not know
Sheila’s whereabouts, nor she his.  Bronston makes that testimony
the occasion for adversary attorneys to do their work. Bonds makes
having to do that work the occasion for a criminal charge.
24. Northern Securities Company v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 400 (1904)
(Holmes, J., dissenting).
25. John Thaw Biography, IMDB, http://www.imdb.com/name/nm08571
77/bio?ref_=nm_ov_bio_sm (last visited Apr. 15, 2015).
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This article contends that the Bonds decisions are diametrically
opposed to the Supreme Court’s explicit and unanimous instruc-
tion in Bronston.  That opposition is apparent not only in the gov-
ernment’s theory of bringing the obstruction charge upon
Statement C, but also in the very justifications and examples used
by the Bonds courts in upholding that theory.  This article does not
argue that a doctrine from Sections 1621 and Sections 1623 should
be transferred to Section 1503, but that Bronston has already spoken com-
prehensively to all sworn testimony at the very moment that testimo-
nial obstruction under Section 1503 was in its incipiency. Bronston,
brought under Section 1621, thus applies prospectively from 1973 in
pari materia to Section 1503, just as it has also applied to Section
1623.26 More fundamentally, Bronston defines the “due administra-
tion of justice” for witnesses and their questioners, so that Section
1503 is to be read to support it, rather than undermine it.
If Bronston does not apply to Section 1503, then the very strat-
egy articulated by the Bonds prosecution will eviscerate Bronston and
extinguish the perjury statutes.  False testimony is already well estab-
lished within Section 1503, and the inclusion of true, non-respon-
sive testimony will permit any testimony whatever to be criminally
charged if the prosecutor must persist in questioning to get the de-
sired response.  Thus will the specific command of Congress as to
sworn testimony in Sections 1621 and 1623 vis-a-vis other obstruc-
tions be rendered a nullity.  In its place will be the Bonds process of
particularizing a shell indictment in the jury instruction process,
with the definition of the law, rather than its enforcement, resting
in the whim of the prosecutor and the latitude of the judge.  Every
witness may fear every question as the gate to prison.  It will not be
safe to tell the whole truth.
This article explains why Bronston applies to testimonial ob-
struction cases brought under 18 U.S.C. § 1503 generally and to
United States v. Bonds specifically, as well as the troubling conse-
quences to all witnesses and to the due administration of justice in
our adversarial American trial system.  Part II sets forth the case
against Barry Bonds, including the indictment and the grand jury
testimony at issue.  Part III sets forth the scope of the obstruction of
justice statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1503, and the genesis of its application to
false testimony just prior to Bronston.  Part IV gives the origins and
key texts of the two principal perjury statutes, 18 U.S.C. § 1621,
from which Bronston arose, and 18 U.S.C. § 1623, to which Bronston
26. See, e.g., United States v. Esposito, 358 F. Supp. 1032 (N.D. Ill. 1973);
United States v. Slawik, 548 F.2d 75 (3d Cir. 1977).
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also applies.  Part V gives the origin and rationale of Bronston and its
application to all testimonial statutes, perjury and obstruction alike,
including Section 1503.
Parts VI and VII turn to the key charge against Bonds, that his
truthful non-responsive answer in Statement C was “evasive.”  Part
VI shows how truthful, non-responsive answers are not criminal
under the perjury statutes pursuant to Bronston, even if the answer
appears calculated to mislead the questioner.  Part VII shows how
“evasive” testimony has a well-settled and particular, rather than ver-
nacular, definition in cases brought either as contempt prior to
Bronston, or under Section 1503 since Bronston.  “Evasive” testimony
has been a basis for culpability under Section 1503 when it has sig-
nified in particular a false denial of recall, a false denial of knowl-
edge, or a falsehood for which the Aguilar nexus is proven as well.27
“Evasive” testimony may well characterize Statement C under Bron-
ston, but Bronston removes it from culpability.  The “evasive” testi-
mony for which culpability under Section 1503 is well established is
false testimony, which Statement C has been conceded not to be.
Part VIII gives a Ninth Circuit prelude to the Bonds case, the
Bonds decisions’ collision with and implications for Bronston, and
the Bonds courts’ rationales therefor.  Part VIII (A) gives the adop-
tion of Bronston principles in the Ninth Circuit in perjury cases.
Part VIII (B) gives the development and doubts concerning testi-
monial obstruction in the Ninth Circuit since Bronston.  Part VIII
(C) compares the Bonds decisions concept for concept with the Su-
preme Court’s instruction in Bronston and analyzes the conflict be-
tween the two.  Part VIII (D) examines in detail the authority cited
by the Bonds courts and finds it without foundation.  Part IX exam-
ines alternate justifications for the Bonds decisions, the broad scope
of the Omnibus Clause of Section 1503 and the “endeavor” require-
ment.  Neither of these supports the Bonds decisions upon close ex-
amination.  Part X sets forth the continued vitality of Section 1503
toward testimonial obstruction, even though Bronston places truth-
ful non-responsive answers outside its ambit. In Part XI, the conse-
quences for witnesses and for our adversarial system of justice are
set forth if Bonds is allowed to undermine Bronston with its challenge
of quality to the people’s counsel as we seek truth for justice in the
practice of law.
27. See United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593, 599 (1995).
11
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II. BONDS’ INDICTMENT AND TESTIMONY
The Third Superseding Indictment on February 2, 2011,
charged Barry Bonds with four counts of perjury (Counts One
through Four) under 18 U.S.C. § 1623, and Count Five for obstruc-
tion of justice under 18 U.S.C. § 1503.  Count Four was not submit-
ted to the jury after trial, so that the jury only considered the
following counts.  The offending testimony is underlined.
Count One:
Q: I know the answer–let me ask you again.  I know
we kind of got into this.  Let me be real clear about
this.  Did he [Anderson] ever give you anything that
you knew to be a steroid?  Did he ever give a steroid?
A: I don’t think Greg would do anything like that to
me and jeopardize our friendship.  I just don’t think
he would do that.
Q. Well, when you say you don’t think he would do
that, to your knowledge, I mean, did you ever take
any steroids that he gave you.
A: Not that I know of.28
Count Two:
Q: Did Greg ever give you anything that required a
syringe to inject yourself with?
A: I’ve only had one doctor touch me.  And that’s my
only personal doctor.  Greg, like I said, we don’t get
into each others’ personal lives.  We’re friends, but I
don’t – we don’t sit around and talk baseball, because
he knows I don’t want – don’t come to my house talk-
ing baseball.  If you want to come to my house and
talk about fishing, some other stuff, we’ll be good
friends.  You come around talking about baseball, you
go on.  I don’t talk about his business.  You know what
I mean?
. . . .
Q: So no one else other than perhaps the team doc-
tor and your personal physician has ever injected any-
thing in to [sic] you or taken anything out?
A: Well, there’s other doctors from surgeries.  I can
answer that question, if you’re getting technical like
that.  Sure there are other people that have stuck
28. Third Superseding Indictment, supra note 1, at 3.
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Q: –the team physician, when you’ve had surgery,
and your own personal physician.  But no other indi-
viduals like Mr. Anderson or any associates of his?
A: No, no.29
Count Three:
Q: And, again, just to be clear and then I’ll leave it,
but he [Anderson] never gave you anything that you
understood to be human growth hormone?  Did he
ever give you anything like that?
A: No.30
Count Five:
19. On or about December 4, 2003, in the Northern
District of California, the defendant, BARRY LAMAR
BONDS, did corruptly influence, obstruct, and im-
pede, and endeavor to corruptly influence, obstruct,
and impede, the due administration of justice, by
knowingly giving material Grand Jury testimony that
was intentionally evasive, false, and misleading, in-
cluding but not limited to the false statements made
by the defendant as charged in Counts One through
Four of this Indictment.  All in violation of Title 18,
United States Code, Section 1503.31
Count Five thus covers the whole of Bonds’ grand jury testi-
mony without specifying what portions obstructed justice beyond
the passages upon which the perjury charges were based. During
the jury instruction process, the government submitted a number
of exemplars of additional obstructive testimony upon which to
base the obstruction charge.  The trial judge approved seven exem-
plars: the three allegedly perjurious statements, plus four additional
testimony excerpts not charged as perjury.  These four additional
statements were labeled by letter A through D for submission to the
jury.32  By special verdict, the trial jury indicated that the guilty ob-
29. Id. at 4.
30. Id. at 5.
31. Id. at 6.
32. See Instructions to Jury, supra note 2, at 7-12.
13
Kazee: United States v. Barry Bonds v. Bronston: Can Section 1503 Handle
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2015
36774-vls_22-2 Sheet No. 40 Side B      07/27/2015   11:45:39
36774-vls_22-2 Sheet No. 40 Side B      07/27/2015   11:45:39
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLS\22-2\VLS203.txt unknown Seq: 14  7-JUL-15 13:45
416 JEFFREY S. MOORAD SPORTS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 22: p. 403
struction verdict on Count Five was based solely on Statement C.33
Statement C, quoted above, in fact comes from the testimonial in-
terval omitted but indicated by the starred gap in the Count Two
perjury charge.
Counts One and Three are relevant to this article only insofar
as no verdict was reached so that they were later dropped. There
was likewise no verdict on Count Two and it was similarly dropped,
but Statement C can only be understood in relation to Count Two
with which it is integrally intertwined.  The following transcript
gives the context for Count Two and Count Five, Statement C.  The
grand jury convened for Bonds’ testimony on December 4, 2003.
Bonds was examined by Assistant U.S. Attorneys Jeffrey Nedrow and
Ross Nadel, who exchanged questioning duties throughout the ses-
sion.  There were also questions from grand jurors, though not in
this relevant colloquy:
Questioning by AUSA Nedrow:
Q: Did Greg ever give you anything that required a
syringe to inject yourself with? (42:5-6)
A: I’ve only had one doctor touch me.  And that’s my
only personal doctor.  Greg, like I said, we don’t get
into each other’s personal lives.  We’re friends, but I
don’t –we don’t sit around and talk baseball, because
he knows I don’t want–don’t come to my house talk-
ing baseball.  If you want to come to my house and
talk about fishing, some other stuff, we’ll be good
friends.  You come around talking about baseball, you
go on.  I don’t talk about his business.  You know what
I mean? (42:7-16)
Q: Right. (42:17)
A: That’s what keeps our friendship.  You know, I am
sorry, but that–you know, that–I was a celebrity child,
not just in baseball by my own instincts.  I became a
celebrity child with a famous father.  I just don’t get
into other people’s business because of my father’s
situation, you see. . .
(42:18-23) [Statement C]
So, I don’t know–I don’t know–I’ve been married to a
woman five years, known her 17 years, and I don’t
even know what’s in her purse.  I have never looked
33. See Verdict at 2, United States v. Bonds, No. 3:07-cr-07-00732-SI (N.D. Cal.
Apr. 13, 2011), ECF No. 373.
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in it in my lifetime.  You know, I just–I don’t do that, I
just don’t do it, and you know, learned from my fa-
ther and throughout his career, you don’t get in no
one’s business, you can’t–there’s nothing they can
say, you can’t say nothing about them.  Just leave it
alone.  You want to keep your friendship, keep your
friendship. (42:24-43:8)
Q: Did either Mr. Anderson or Mr. Conte ever give
you a liquid that they told you to inject into yourself
to help you with this recovery type stuff, did that ever
happen? (43:9-12)
A: No. (43:13)
Q: Okay.  At his time, Mr. Bonds, the grand jury has–
(43:14-15)
AUSA Nadel: If I could just go back to Mr. Nedrow’s
question a few moments ago. (43:16-17)
AUSA Nedrow: Okay. (43:18)
Questioning by AUSA Nadel:
Q: I wasn’t sure if I heard the answer to the question.
Other than your own personal doctor that you re-
ferred to – (43:19-23)
A: Well, the team – you know, you have to have a
physical.  I’m sorry. Forget about the team. You have
to have a physical, they take blood from you then.
But I wouldn’t let no one, no.  That’s why my per-
sonal doctor drew the blood for BALCO to begin
with. (43:24-44:3)
Q: So no one else other than perhaps the team doc-
tor and your personal physician has ever injected any-
thing in to [sic] you or taken anything out? (44:4-6)
A: Well, there’s other doctors from surgeries.  I can
answer that question, if you’re getting technical like
that.  Sure there are other people that have stuck
needles in me and have drawn out – I’ve had a bunch
of surgeries, yes. (44:7-11)
Q: So – (44:12)
A: So sorry. (44:13)
Q: – the team physician, when you’ve had surgery,
and your own personal physician.  But no other indi-
viduals like Mr. Anderson or any associates of his?
(44:14-16)
A: No, no.  [Count Two] (44:17)
15
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Questioning by AUSA Nedrow:
Q: Just to follow-up before I go on to my other thing,
have you ever yourself  injected yourself [sic] with any-
thing that Greg Anderson gave you? (44:18-21)
A: I’m not that talented, no. (44:22)
Q: Okay. We have a packet that I would like to iden-
tify as Exhibit 503.  And I have distributed copies of it.
And Mr. Bonds, this is the first page. So, we’re going
to refer to page one of that packet.  And I’d like to
give you a moment, Mr. Bonds, to look at it. And I
want to ask you a couple of questions about it. (44:23-
45:5)34
The precise exchanges among Bonds, Nadel, and Nedrow are
crucial to an understanding of the Bonds courts’ decisions and why
it is necessary to apply Bronston to testimonial obstruction cases
under Section 1503.
Barry Bonds was convicted of obstruction of justice for State-
ment C on April 13, 2011.35  His conviction was upheld by a panel
of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals on September 13, 2013.36  He
was granted review en banc by the Ninth Circuit July 1, 2014.37
III. TITLE 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1503 AND CRIMES UNDER
THE OMNIBUS CLAUSE
The obstruction of justice statute has its origin in the Act of
March 2, 1831, 4 Stat. 487.  Responding to perceived judicial abuses
of the summary contempt power, the Congress limited the conduct
which might be punished summarily by the federal courts.  Section
1 of the 1831 act limited the courts’ summary power to contemptu-
ous conduct within the presence of the court. Having observed the
conduct firsthand, the court might then directly punish the con-
temnor in vindication of its authority.38  This first section is the
predecessor of today’s 18 U.S.C. § 401.
Section 2, however, provided that contemptuous acts outside
the presence the court were chargeable only as a distinct criminal
offense by indictment with the “normal safeguards surrounding
criminal prosecutions.”39  Section 2 is the predecessor of the cur-
34. Bonds Testimony, supra note 14, at 42-45.
35. See generally, Verdict, supra note 33.
36. See United States v. Bonds, 730 F.3d 890 (9th Cir. 2013).
37. See id.
38. See Nye v. United States, 313 U.S. 33, 45-46 (1941).
39. See id. at 53.
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rent obstruction of justice statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1503.  Section 1505 is
a parallel, but distinct, statute for obstruction of administrative de-
partments and agencies and of Congress.
Section 1503(a)  consists of two parts.  The first part specifies
certain forbidden acts and the second part, or Omnibus Clause, for-
bids obstruction of justice more generally.  The first clause of Sec-
tion 1503(a) provides:
Whoever corruptly, or by threats or force, or by any threat-
ening letter or communication, endeavors to influence,
intimidate, or impede any grand or petit juror, or officer
in or of any court of the United States, or officer who may
be serving at any examination or other proceeding before
any United States magistrate judge or other committing
magistrate, in the discharge of his duty, or injures any
such grand or petit juror in his person or property on ac-
count of any verdict or indictment assented to by him, or
on account of his being or having been such juror, or in-
jures any such officer, magistrate judge, or other commit-
ting magistrate in his person or property on account of
the performance of his official duties, . . . [shall be pun-
ished as provided in subsection (b)].40
The second or Omnibus Clause of Section 1503(a) continues:
or [whoever] corruptly or by threats or force, or by any
threatening letter or communication, influences, ob-
structs, or impedes, or endeavors to influence, obstruct, or
impede, the due administration of justice, shall be pun-
ished as provided in subsection (b).41
The scope of the Omnibus Clause is at the heart of the conflict
between the Bonds decisions and Bronston.  The Supreme Court de-
scribed Section 1503 most recently in United States v. Aguilar:
The statute is structured as follows: first it proscribes per-
sons from endeavoring to influence, intimidate, or im-
pede grand or petit jurors or court officers in the
discharge of their duties; it then prohibits injuring grand
or petit jurors in their person or property because of any
verdict or indictment rendered by them; it then prohibits
injury of any court officer, commissioner, or similar officer
40. 18 U.S.C. 1503(a).
41. Id.
17
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on account of the performance of his official duties; fi-
nally, the “Omnibus Clause” serves as a catchall, prohibit-
ing persons from  endeavoring to influence, obstruct, or
impede the due administration of justice.  The latter
clause, it can be seen, is far more general in scope than
the earlier clauses of the statute.42
The first clause prohibits an act (an “endeavor” to “influence,
intimidate or impede”) upon the objects of the act (a “witness” [un-
til 1982], a “grand or petit juror,” or “officer” of any “United States
court” or “commissioner”) to a particular end (“in the discharge of
his duty”) by either a motive or means (“corruptly, or by threats or
force, or by any threatening letter or communication”).  Distilled
further, the clause prohibits a corrupt or coercive action toward ob-
structing the named persons from the discharge of official duties.
This article will on occasion refer to the first clause of Section
1503(a) as the “discharge of duty” clause.
The second or Omnibus Clause, under which Bonds was con-
victed, prohibits the act (to “influence, obstruct, or impede,” or an
“endeavor” to do so) upon the object of the act (“the due adminis-
tration of justice”) by a motive or means (“corruptly, or by threats
or force, or by any threatening letter or communication”).  While
the first clause is directed toward particular persons in the dis-
charge of duties, the Omnibus Clause is directed at the whole pro-
cess of justice, without apparent textual limits on the scope of that
protection.  The word “intimidate,” appropriate to a person in the
first clause, is replaced in the second clause by “obstruct,” appropri-
ate to the process of justice.
Prior to 1982, federal witnesses were included among the per-
sons protected from influence, intimidation, or impediment under
the discharge of duty clause, but the language as to witnesses was
excised from Section 1503 upon the enactment of the more specific
protections of the Victim and Witness Protection Act under 18
U.S.C. § 1512.43  Nonetheless, the Omnibus Clause has been con-
sidered broad enough to yet apply to witness tampering.44
With or without explicit language as to witnesses, the more fo-
cused prohibitions of the discharge of duty clause have been used
on occasion to either restrict, by ejusdem generis, or amplify, by anal-
ogy, the more general scope of the Omnibus Clause.  Early in its
42. United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593, 598 (1995).
43. See Law of Oct. 12, 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-291, 96 Stat. 1253 (1982).
44. See, e.g., United States v. Wesley, 746 F.2d 959, 962 (5th Cir. 1984).
18
Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 22, Iss. 2 [2015], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol22/iss2/3
36774-vls_22-2 Sheet No. 43 Side A      07/27/2015   11:45:39
36774-vls_22-2 Sheet No. 43 Side A      07/27/2015   11:45:39
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLS\22-2\VLS203.txt unknown Seq: 19  7-JUL-15 13:45
2015] UNITED STATES V. BARRY BONDS V. BRONSTON 421
history, the discharge of duty clause early applied to (1) jury tam-
pering,45 (2) corruptly influencing an officer of the court,46 and (3)
witness tampering.47
The Omnibus Clause  has been applied to obstructions not
specifically named in the statute, such as illicitly obtaining and pass-
ing copies of secret grand jury transcripts to targets of its investiga-
tion.48 The Omnibus Clause has also been applied to testimony-
related offenses where, for instance, the defendant refused to tes-
tify,49 where the defendant attempted to suborn the perjury of wit-
nesses in an underlying case,50 where a prospective witness offered
to alter his testimony for a bribe,51 where a lawyer schemed to pres-
sure his own client to incriminate himself on the witness stand for
the benefit of another corrupt associate,52 or where the witness per-
sisted in reading a political statement rather than answering any
questions.53
The Omnibus Clause has only been applied to a witness’s
sworn courtroom testimony since United States v. Cohen in 1962.54
Cohen was charged with both tampering with documentary evi-
dence and with false testimony.  As a prosecution for false testimony
under Section 1503 was a new development, the Cohen court drew
upon the reasoning that had evolved in document tampering cases
arising from the perjury trial of Harvey Matusow, a controversial
figure during the Red Scare of the 1950s.55
Harvey Matusow had been, by turns, a member of the commu-
nist party, a paid informant to the FBI, a paid anti-communist wit-
ness before the McCarthy committee, a witness for the prosecution
of an alleged communist, and an admitted perjurer who recanted
45. See United States v. Russell, 255 U.S. 138, 141 (1921) (endeavoring to in-
fluence a petit juror by seeking information from and suggesting bribery via juror’s
wife).
46. See United States v. Polakoff, 121 F.2d 333, 334 (2d Cir. 1941) (soliciting
prosecutor to recommend lenient sentence for defendant from whom bribe had
been extracted and kept).
47. See Samples v. United States, 121 F.2d 263, 264 (5th Cir. 1941) (persuad-
ing witness not to appear to testify); see also Catrino v. United States, 176 F.2d 884,
886 (9th Cir. 1949) (persuading witness to commit perjury).
48. See United States v. Jeter, 775 F.2d 670, 672 (6th Cir. 1985).
49. See United States v. Banks, 942 F.2d 1576, 1579 (1991); see also United
States v. Jackson, 2002 WL 1147559 (N.D. Ill. 2002).
50. See Falk v. United States, 370 F.2d 472, 476475-76 (9th Cir. 19671966).
51. See Anderson v. United States, 215 F.2d 84, 85 (6th Cir. 1954).
52. See United States v. Brady, 168 F.3d 574, 578 (1st Cir. 1999).
53. See United States v. Ashqar, 582 F.3d 819, 822 (7th Cir. 2009).
54. See United States v. Cohen, 202 F. Supp. 587, 588 (D. Conn. 1962).
55. See United States v. Solow, 138 F. Supp. 812, 815 (S.D.N.Y. 1956); see also
United States v. Siegel, 152 F. Supp. 370, 375 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
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his testimony.56  A grand jury convened to investigate Matusow’s
perjury.  The resultant Solow and Siegel document tampering cases
help us understand the evolution of testimonial obstruction cases.
Document tampering had been part of a witness tampering
conviction under the discharge of duty clause in Bosselman v. United
States, where the defendant had directed employees to alter busi-
ness records subject to a subpoena duces tecum.57  The witnesses who
had altered the documents were not charged. United States v. Solow
brought the intentional destruction of documents directly under
the Omnibus Clause.58  Solow was a voluntary witness who de-
stroyed, on his own initiative, four letters in the files of The Nation, a
political periodical, which he knew to be of interest to the Matusow
grand jury.59  There being no Section 1503 precedent on point,
Judge Weinfeld found a common law obstruction case for removing
business records out of state to be sufficient authority for bringing
Solow’s destruction of the letters within the Omnibus Clause of Sec-
tion 1503.60  The Omnibus Clause “is all-embracing and designed
to meet any corrupt conduct in an endeavor to obstruct or interfere
with the due administration of justice.”61
Siegel was a lawyer who had met with Matusow on several occa-
sions to discuss Matusow’s testimony as a witness.  Contemporane-
ous notes of the conversations had been dictated by Siegel and
typed by his staff from stenographic notes.  When Siegel, his staff,
and the notes were subpoenaed, Siegel and his staff destroyed the
notes, forged substitutes, and proffered these to the grand jury.62
Judge Bryan emphasized the destruction of evidence:
Thus, the matters concerning which these defendants ac-
ted or endeavored to act plainly bear a reasonable rela-
tionship to the subject matter of the grand jury’s inquiry,
or to put it another way, are relevant to the inquiry. This
being so, the defendants at least endeavored to influence,
obstruct and impede the administration of justice, if they
did not actually do so, by destroying the evidence on these
matters, creating other evidence in its place and influenc-
56. See P.J. Meitl, The Perjury Paradox: The Amazing Under-Enforcement of the Laws
Regarding Lying to Congress, 25 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 547, 554 (2007).
57. See Bosselman v. United States, 239 F. 82, 84 (2d Cir. 1917).
58. See generally Solow, 138 F. Supp. at 812.
59. See id. at 813-14.
60. See id. at 814-15 (citing Commonwealth v. S. Express Co., 159 S.W. 517
(Ky. 1914)).
61. Id at 814.
62. See United States v. Siegel, 152 F. Supp. 370, 372-73 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
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ing a witness to give false testimony concerning it.  Any
other view would hamstring grand jury proceedings on the
one hand and emasculate the statute condemning ob-
struction of justice and endeavors to obstruct justice on
the other.63
The false testimony concerning these notes was the basis of a
perjury charge under Section 1621, rather than an obstruction
charge under Section 1503.64
The cases incident to the Matusow grand jury set the stage for
the expansion of Section 1503 to include false testimony. Solow had
brought the direct tainting of documents by the defendant within
the Omnibus Clause, as distinct from persuading a witness to taint
documents under the discharge of duty clause as in Bosselman.65
Siegel’s combination of document tampering and false testimony by
a witness, though prosecuted distinctly under Section 1503 and Sec-
tion 1621, respectively, made it a ready source of authority for
United States v. Cohen, the first testimonial obstruction case under
Section 1503.66
Cohen was the admitted co-owner of a corporation that owned
the land upon which an illicit still operated.  Cohen’s indictment
under Section 1503 was for making false statements to a grand jury
and for causing a “falsely signed lease contract” to be presented to
the grand jury.67  The Cohen court premised its opinion in the all-
embracing scope of the Omnibus Clause, citing Solow and Samples,
inter alia.68  As either allegation would have sustained the indict-
ment if held within the scope of Section 1503, the District Court
focused first and primarily upon the falsely signed lease, analogiz-
ing it to the “concealment” of documents by destruction in Siegel.
Certainly it is as much an ‘obstruction of justice’ to cause
to be presented to a grand jury a false document, as it is to
destroy a document which is the subject of a grand jury
investigation.  The profering [sic] of misleading docu-
ments intended to deceive the grand jury toward a false
finding is no less corrupt than the fraudulent conceal-
63. Id. at 375.
64. See id. at 377-79.
65. See Bosselman v. United States, 239 F. 82 (2d Cir. 1917).
66. See generally United States v. Cohen, 202 F. Supp. 587 (D. Conn. 1962).
67. See id. at 588.
68. See id. at 588-89 (citing United States v. Solow, 138 F. Supp. 812, 814
(S.D.N.Y. 1956); Samples v. United States, 121 F.2d 263, 266 (5th Cir. 1941)).
21
Kazee: United States v. Barry Bonds v. Bronston: Can Section 1503 Handle
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2015
36774-vls_22-2 Sheet No. 44 Side B      07/27/2015   11:45:39
36774-vls_22-2 Sheet No. 44 Side B      07/27/2015   11:45:39
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLS\22-2\VLS203.txt unknown Seq: 22  7-JUL-15 13:45
424 JEFFREY S. MOORAD SPORTS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 22: p. 403
ment of facts by the wilful [sic] destruction of
documents.69
Cohen’s “concealment of facts” originally ascribed to the de-
struction (Solow and Siegel) and falsification (Siegel and Cohen) of
documents would ultimately become the template for why false tes-
timony falls under Section 1503.  But as for the false testimony in
Cohen itself, Judge Clarie noted only that while Section 1503 and
Section 1621 “overlap to some extent, it is not a valid reason to bar
a prosecution under either, when the facts so justify,” as trial by jury
was guaranteed under both statutes.70  Puzzlingly, the Cohen court
sought to seal this position by invoking the Second Circuit’s lack of
comment in United States v. Bufalino71 upon an indictment when
overturning a conviction for conspiracy to obstruct justice and com-
mit perjury.72  Thus, Cohen sustained, for the first time, false testi-
mony as a basis for indictment under Section 1503, as a seeming
afterthought to a document tampering case.
However, the first obstruction case involving false testimony de-
cided by a federal court of appeals reached the opposite conclu-
sion.73  In 1962, teamster leader Jimmy Hoffa was tried for
violations of the Taft-Hartley Act.  The trial ended in a hung jury.
In 1964, Hoffa and others were tried and convicted under Section
1503 for endeavoring to bribe jurors in the Taft-Hartley trial.74
Hoffa’s efforts to secure a new trial were supported by the affidavits
of four young women, including Patricia Ann Essex, claiming to
have engaged in sexual relations as prostitutes with jurors seques-
tered during the obstruction trial.75  As Essex was a minor, she was
convicted under the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act,76 predicated
upon violating the Omnibus Clause of Section 1503 by having
caused to be filed an affidavit which was “false and known to be
false when made.”77  On appeal, Essex contended that the Omnibus
Clause did not extend to filing the false affidavit.  The Sixth Circuit
agreed that “false testimony alone will not amount to contempt of
court,” and quoted Justice Black:
69. Cohen, 202 F. Supp. at 589.
70. Id.
71. 285 F.2d 408 (2d Cir. 1960).
72. See Cohen, 202 F. Supp. at 589 (citing Bufalino, 285 F.2d 408).
73. See United States v. Essex, 407 F.2d 214, 217 (6th Cir. 1969).
74. See Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 294 (1966).
75. See United States v. Hoffa, 247 F. Supp. 692, 700-02 (E.D. Tenn. 1965).
76. See 18 U.S.C. § 5031. (2014).
77. See Essex, 407 F.2d at 215-16.
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‘All perjured relevant testimony is at war with justice, since
it may produce a judgment not resting on truth.  There-
fore, it cannot be denied that it tends to defeat the sole
ultimate objective of a trial. It need not necessarily, how-
ever, obstruct or halt the judicial process.  For the func-
tion of a trial is to sift the truth from a mass of
contradictory evidence, and to do so the fact-finding tribu-
nal must hear both truthful and false witnesses.’78
The Essex court distinguished the Solow-Siegel-Cohen line of cases
as having been predicated primarily upon destroying, forging, or
falsely signing documentary evidence as distinct from presenting
false statements in an affidavit,79 even though Cohen had expressly
brought false testimony as well within the “all-embracing” language
of the Omnibus Clause.80The Sixth Circuit apparently could not
square the district court opinions with In re Michael, the only Su-
preme Court guidance available as to the application of Section
1503 as a contempt statute.81
At the end of the opinion, the Sixth Circuit turned to the
scope of the Omnibus Clause vis-a-vis the discharge of duty clause of
Section 1503:
The Government wishes to prosecute her under 18 U.S.C.
§ 1503 even though the District Court in originally re-
jecting Hoffa’s motion for new trial, the grand jury, and
the same District Court again in the present case found
that Appellant was untruthful in stating that she had con-
tact with the Hoffa jurors.  We refuse to broaden the ob-
struction of justice statute beyond the scope that Congress
gave to it.  As a criminal statute 18 U.S.C. § 1503 requires
strict construction.  The general clause at its end, moreo-
ver, must be read to embrace only acts similar to those
mentioned in the preceding specific language.  Neither
the language of Section 1503 nor its purpose make the
rendering of false testimony alone an obstruction of jus-
tice.  If appellant committed any offense at all, it was the
perjury charged in information against her.82
78. Id. at 217 (citing In re Michael, 326 U.S. 224, 227-229 (1945)).
79. See Essex, 407 F.2d at 218.
80. See United States v. Cohen, 202 F. Supp. 587, 588-89 (D. Conn. 1962)
(quoting United States v. Solow, 138 F. Supp. 812, 814 (S.D.N.Y. 1956)).
81. See id. at 589.
82. Essex, 407 F.2d at 218 (citations omitted).
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The Sixth Circuit thus adopted the reasoning of the Ninth Cir-
cuit in Haili v. United States.83  Haili had been charged under the
Omnibus Clause of Section 1503 for having associated with a wo-
man whose own probation was conditioned upon her having no
contact with him.  Each had a prior drug conviction.84  The trial
court had instructed the jury that the “due administration of jus-
tice” in the Omnibus Clause included the terms and conditions of
probation.85 The Ninth Circuit found this to be too far removed
from the specific terms of the discharge of duty clause to be plausi-
ble under the Omnibus Clause:
The particularly defined instances of violation of that
[Omnibus] section all relate to conduct designed to inter-
fere with the process of arriving at an appropriate judg-
ment in a pending case and which would disturb the
ordinary and proper functions of the court.  In Catrino v.
United States, this court quoted with approval the state-
ment that the statute “is designed to protect witnesses in
Federal courts and also to prevent a miscarriage of Justice
by corrupt methods.”
Interfering with witnesses, jurors and parties operates to
bring about a miscarriage of justice in specific cases.
Under the rule of ejusdem generis, the general words
which follow the specific words in the enumeration of pro-
hibited acts in the section here involved must be con-
strued to embrace only acts similar in nature to those acts
enumerated by the preceding specific words.  We are of
the opinion that neither the language of § 1503 nor the
history of its interpretation by the courts support the con-
viction of this appellant.86
Thus the Sixth Circuit chose to follow the Ninth Circuit to
limit the scope of the Omnibus Clause, just as it followed the Su-
preme Court to limit the applicability of a contempt statute to a
false statement in the form of an affidavit.  But the Solow-Siegel-Cohen
line of district court cases then received support from the Second
83. See Haili v. United States, 260 F.2d 744 (9th Cir. 1958).
84. See id. at 745.
85. See id.
86. Id. at 746 (citations omitted) (quoting Catrino v. United States, 176 F. 2d
884, 887 (9th Cir. 1949)).
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Circuit, which would eventually carry the day as to false testimony
within the Omnibus Clause.87
Vincent Alo was an attorney who represented a stockholder of
Scopitone, Inc., in negotiations with four other stockholders who
disputed the inequitable distribution of shares from an exchange of
stock with Tel-A-Sign, Inc.  Alo twice met with the disputing
Scopitone stockholders.  The Securities and Exchange Commission
investigated the transaction upon suspicions that Alo and another
had come into substantial, but undisclosed beneficial ownership of
the acquired Tel-A-Sign stock, though he was not an owner of re-
cord of either Scopitone or Tel-A-Sign stock.88
When Alo was asked about the meetings with Scopitone share-
holders in an SEC hearing, Alo “pleaded a memory lapse some 134
times in one and a half hour’s testimony.”89  He professed no mem-
ory of a corporation named Scopitone, Inc., nor “how the [dispute
among shareholders] arose,” nor how the meetings were arranged,
nor any substance of the meetings save the dissatisfaction of the
shareholders and his urging an amicable resolution.90  He was in-
dicted under 18 U.S.C. § 1505 for “false and evasive” answers to
thwart the SEC’s investigation.91
Section 1505 applies to obstruction of “proceedings pending
before any department or agency of the United States,” or any “in-
quiry or investigation” before either house of Congress or any joint
committee thereof.  Like Section 1503, Section 1505 begins with a
list of specific prohibitions against any endeavor to influence, intim-
idate, impede or injure witnesses before departments or agencies of
the United States or before Congress, or against any tampering with
documentary evidence subject to a civil antitrust demand.  Section
1505 also has an Omnibus Clause which was the basis of Alo’s in-
dictment.  While the Omnibus Clause of Section 1503 prohibits the
obstruction of “the due administration of justice,” Section 1505 pro-
hibits obstruction of “the due administration of law” by United
States departments and agencies and obstruction of “the due and
proper power of inquiry” by the Congress.
On appeal before the Second Circuit, Alo argued for the same
ejusdem generis limitation for the Omnibus Clause of Section 1505
87. See United States v. Alo, 439 F.2d 751, 756 (2d Cir. 1971); see also United
States v. Cohn, 452 F.2d 881, 884 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 975 (1972).
88. See Alo, 439 F.2d at 752-53.
89. Id. at 753.
90. See id.
91. See id. at 573, 576.
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that the Sixth Circuit had applied to false testimony for the Omni-
bus Clause of Section 1503 in Essex.92  Alo argued that since the
specific provisions of Section 1505 related to “tampering with evi-
dence extrinsic to the actor, such as intimidation of a witness or the
falsification of documents,”93 the Omnibus Clause of Section 1505
could not reach defendants’ “suppressing their own knowledge of
relevant facts.”94  The Second Circuit rejected this restriction on
Section 1505 by invoking the same analogy to “concealment” of
documentary evidence as had Solow, Siegel, and Cohen for Section
1503.
So restrictive a gloss, however, would produce the anoma-
lous result that concealing information recorded in one’s
papers would constitute, as the appellant concedes, an of-
fense under § 1505, but concealing data recorded in one’s
memory would not.  No rational basis for differentiating
between these two types of evidence has been suggested to
us, and without a clear statement of contrary Congres-
sional intent we cannot attribute such an arbitrary distinc-
tion to the legislature. . . .  The blatantly evasive witness
achieves this effect as surely by erecting a screen of
feigned forgetfulness as one who burns files or induces a
potential witness to absent himself.95
Citing Judge Learned Hand’s characterization of a witness’s
transparently false memory losses in United States v. Appel,96 Judge
Irving Kaufman found Alo’s lapses to be tantamount to a refusal to
testify:
It is true, that to convict Alo the jury had to conclude that
he was lying when he professed loss of memory, but the
gist of his offense was not the falsehood of his statements,
but the deliberate concealment of his knowledge.  The
SEC was not interested in Alo’s mnemonic powers, but in
the details of the Warwick Hotel meetings.  Alo’s profes-
sion of forgetfulness was not so much false testimony as a
refusal to testify at all.97
92. See id. at 753-54.
93. Alo, 439 F.2d at 753.
94. Id. at 754.
95. Id.
96. See United States v. Appel, 211 F. 495, 496 (S.D.N.Y. 1913).
97. Alo, 439 F.2d at 754 (citing Appel, 211 F. at 496).
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The Second Circuit drew three strands together and rejected a
fourth in Alo.  First, if the concealment of evidence by destroying
documents (Solow and Siegel), or submitting false documents  (Siegel
and Cohen), was obstruction under the Omnibus Clause of Section
1503, the concealment of evidence by feigned forgetfulness on the
witness stand was contempt under Appel and obstruction under the
Omnibus Clause of Section 1505.  Second, following Judge Learned
Hand in Appel, false denials of memory are “evasive” in that they are
tantamount to a refusal to testify, which is classically contemptu-
ous.98  Third, concealment via feigned forgetfulness is a circum-
stance “when the facts so justify” (Cohen) for prosecution under
either the “all-embracing” (Solow) Omnibus Clause of 1505 or Sec-
tion 1621.
Finally, the Second Circuit applied ejusdem generis not to restrict
the scope of the Omnibus Clause of Section 1505, but to amplify it:
“Like the specific provisions which precede it, [the general clause
of]  § 1505 deals with the deliberate frustrations through the use of
corrupt or false means of an agency’s attempt to gather relevant
evidence.”99
The Second Circuit’s holding in Alo as to Section 1505 was af-
firmed as to Section 1503 in United States v. Cohn.100  Cohn was in-
dicted under Section 1503 for “false and evasive” grand jury
testimony.  Like Appel and Alo, Cohn persistently feigned memory
loss during his grand jury testimony as he was asked to identify his
wife’s handwriting of notes on the back of an envelope, relating in
substance to organized crime activities.101  The effect of this sham
forgetfulness was again concealment: “Here, by concealing informa-
tion relating to Emmanuel’s suspected unlawful dealings in 1962
and 1963, Cohn may have hindered an investigation into Emman-
uel’s subsequent activities as a Labor Department official.”102  Judge
Kaufman rejected any applicability of ejusdem generis to limit Section
1503, drawing expressly on Alo:
Although the specific provisions of Section 1503 relate to
tampering, by corruption, threats or force, with sources of
evidence extrinsic to the actor, the final all-embracive lan-
98. See, e.g., United States v. Wilson, 421 U.S. 309 (1975); see also United States
v. Remini, 967 F.2d 754 (2d Cir. 1992).
99. Alo, 439 F.2d at 754.
100. See United States v. Cohn, 452 F.2d 881, 884 (2d Cir. 1971)), cert. denied,
405 U.S. 975 (1972).
101. See id. at 882-83.
102. Id. at 883. (footnote omitted).
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guage proscribes all conduct which corruptly . . . influ-
ences, obstructs, or impedes, or endeavors to influence,
obstruct, or impede, the due administration of justice, . . .”
Cohn would have us limit the scope of this clause only to
situations where the defendant interferes with other wit-
nesses or documentary evidence.  We rejected this argu-
ment under 18 U.S.C. § 1505, which tracks the language
of Section 1503 in the context of administrative proceed-
ings, in United States v. Alo.103
Thus as of January 1973 when Bronston was decided, there was a
split in the circuits as to whether false testimony was within the
scope of Section 1503.  The Sixth Circuit in Essex relied upon the
ejusdem generis precedent set by the Ninth Circuit in Haili and the
Supreme Court’s limitation of perjury alone as contempt in In re
Michael to limit the Omnibus Clause.  The Second Circuit applied
ejusdem generis to expand obstruction to include false testimony
(Alo) and to reject any such limitation upon Section 1503 (Cohn).
The Second Circuit drew upon the doctrine of concealment from
document tampering cases (Solow, Siegel, Cohen) to apply to evasive
false failures of memory (Alo and Cohn), tantamount to refusing to
testify (Appel).
More specifically, there were at this time only three cases which
had applied an obstruction statute to false testimony, and none was
a garden-variety perjury case.  First, since Cohen’s indictment
under Section 1503 could be sustained by either the false lease or
the false testimony, the first and primary focus of the Cohen court
was the analogy between falsifying the lease and the destruction
and falsification of documents in Solow and Siegel.  Almost as an af-
terthought, Cohen applied Section 1503 to false testimony because
of the frequently cited “all-embracing” language plus a single sen-
tence as to the overlap with Section 1621 being no reason to bar a
Section 1503 prosecution, provided that both statutes afforded jury
trials.  This is not to say that a justification for including false testi-
mony within Section 1503 was absent.  Rather, the weakness of hav-
ing nothing more than this rationale is made plain by the Cohen
court’s final stretch to cite the overturning of a conspiracy convic-
tion on lack of evidence for the Second Circuit’s lack of comment on
the indictment.104  This last was indeed an effort to make some-
thing of nothing and explains the Cohen court’s far better sup-
103. Id. at 883-84 (alterations in original) (citations omitted).
104. See id. 589 United States v. Cohen, 202 F. Supp. 587, 589 (D. Conn. 1962)
(citing United States v. Bufalino, 285 F.2d 408 (2d Cir. 1960)).
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ported emphasis on the falsification of the lease to sustain Cohen’s
indictment under Section 1503.
The other two testimonial obstruction cases as of Bronston were
Alo and Cohn, both concerning blatantly feigned denials of memory
tantamount to refusals to testify.  While the denials were certainly
false within the scope of Section 1621, it was the Second Circuit’s
equation of feigned forgetfulness to contempt that placed both
cases within Section 1503.
As late as 1979, the unsettled scope of the Omnibus Clause was
noted by the Yale Law Journal:
The circuit courts have split on how broadly to interpret
the omnibus clause.  Some courts have applied the ejusdem
generis rule, under which the specific language of a stat-
ute . . . proscribes only acts similar in manner to those
proscribed in the specific language.  Other courts have
adopted the broad rule that the statute proscribes all acts
similar in result to those specified.105
It is in this context that Bronston must be understood to speak
as to all sworn testimony, whether under the long-standing perjury
statute Section 1621, the new perjury statute Section 1623, or the
tentative incipient development of testimonial obstruction under
Sections 1503 and 1505 from document tampering and sham for-
getfulness under oath.  While the courts of appeal ultimately fol-
lowed Cohn rather than Essex as to testimonial obstruction after
1973, the post-1973 cases must, in turn, be understood in light of
Bronston.
IV. THE PERJURY STATUTES
The First Congress forbade any person to “wilfully [sic] and
corruptly commit perjury,” without further definition.106  The
Eighteenth Congress deemed any person who should “knowingly
and willingly swear or affirm falsely” in any federal proceeding to
have committed perjury.107  In 1874 and 1878, the Congress col-
lected and revised all federal statutes into the United States Revised
Statutes, and in so doing redefined perjury in U.S. Rev. Stat. 5392:
“Every person who, having taken an oath. . .that he will testify de-
clare or certify truly . . . willfully and contrary to such oath states or
105. Note, Legal Ethics and the Destruction of Evidence, 88 YALE L.J. 1665, 1671
n.38 (1979) (citations omitted).
106. See Punishment of Crimes, ch. 9, § 18(a), 1 Stat. 112 (1790).
107. See Law of MarchMar. 3, 1825, ch. 65, § 13, 4 Stat. 115 (1825).
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subscribes any material matter which he does not believe to be true,
is guilty of perjury. . . .”  This definition is operative today, having
been re-enacted in statutory revisions as 35 Stat. 1111, Ch. 6, sec.
125 (March 4, 1909), codified at Penal Code Section 125 and then
as 18 U.S.C. § 231 in 1940.
Congress amended the perjury statute as to the penalty at 62
Stat. 773, ch. 645, sec. 1 (June 25, 1948), codified at 18 U.S.C.
§ 1621.  In 1964, Congress amended the text of Section 1621 to in-
clude statements made under oath overseas.108  Subsequent revi-
sions and reenactments in 1976109 and 1994110 are not relevant
here.
In 1970, Congress enacted a parallel “false statements” statute,
18 U.S.C. § 1623, “to facilitate perjury prosecutions and thereby to
enhance the reliability of testimony before federal courts and grand
juries.”111  Section 1623 eliminated the vestiges of the “two wit-
nesses” or corroboration required and retained under Section
1621, but did permit a limited recantation defense, heretofore un-
available under Section 1621.  Section 1623 added an “inconsistent
statements” offense for making two statements under oath that
could not both be true, and which required of the government no
proof as to which inconsistent statement was false.  Most significant
for our purposes is that Congress adopted a different definition of
perjury from that used since 1873 in Section 1621 and its predeces-
sors.  While Section 1621 forbade anyone to state “willfully” under
oath “any material matter which he does not believe to be true,”
Section 1623 lowered the mens rea threshold by forbidding a witness
to “knowingly” make under oath any “false material declaration.”
Congress’s revision of Section 1621 in 1964 and enactment of
Section 1623 in 1970 indicate no perfunctory recitation of ancient
language, but a conscious consideration of the elements of the per-
jury statutes as Congress crafted its policy toward sworn testimony
in court.  When the Supreme Court had occasion to interpret the
statutes on sworn testimony in Bronston, it had contemporaneous
evidence of the Congressional will toward the prosecution of
witnesses.
108. See Law of Oct. 3, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-619, § 1, 78 Stat. 995 (1964).
109. See Law of Oct. 18, 1976, Pub. L. No. 940550, 90 Stat. 2534 (1976).
110. See Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act, Pub. L. No. 107-
56103-322, 108 Stat. 21471796, (1994).
111. See Dunn v. United States, 442 U.S. 100, 107 (1979) (citing S. Rep. No.
91-617 at 58-9 (1969)).
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V. BRONSTON V. UNITED STATES
When the Supreme Court decided Bronston in January 1973, it
spoke comprehensively on the Congressional will for all sworn testi-
mony.  Section 1621, reenacted as recently as 1964,112 had con-
demned only that testimony of “any material matter that he does
not believe to be true,” and was thus the premise for the Bronston
doctrine.  This had been corroborated little more than two years
before Bronston by the enactment of Section 1623,113 prohibiting
“knowingly” “false material statements.”
When Bronston was decided, the Sixth and Second Circuits
were split on including false testimony under the Omnibus Clause.
A total of three cases had applied obstruction statutes to false testi-
mony.  The first, Cohen, was a document tampering case with a one
sentence rationale for the attendant false testimony.  A decade
later, Alo and Cohn equated feigned forgetfulness to a refusal to tes-
tify, squarely within the ambit of contempt.  There were thus few if
any precedential fetters on the Bronston Court limiting its ability to
make plain the will of Congress, unaltered to this day, as to the
operation of the American adversary system of justice.  Samuel
Bronston was a Hollywood producer on an epic scale.  His films,
such as King of Kings, El Cid, and 55 Days at Peking, were sweeping in
scope, titanic in talent, and colossally costly.  When another of his
films, The Fall of the Roman Empire, failed to recoup its monumental
expense, Bronston filed for bankruptcy.  At the bankruptcy hear-
ing, Bronston was asked the following questions by creditor’s coun-
sel about bank accounts in Switzerland:
“Q. Do you have any bank accounts in Swiss banks, Mr.
Bronston?
A. No, Sir.
Q. Have you ever?
A. The company had an account there for about six
months, in Zurich.
Q. Have you any nominees who have bank accounts in
Swiss banks?
A. No, sir.
Q. Have you ever?
A. No, sir.”114
112. See Law of Oct. 3 § 1, 78 Stat. 995 (1964).
113. See Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. 91-452, 84 Stat. 924
(1970).
114. Bronston v. United States, 409 U.S. 352, 354 (1973).
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At the time of testimony, Bronston himself had no Swiss bank
accounts, even though he had had personal accounts with substan-
tial activity in the past.  His answer to the first question was literally
true, though, as of that moment.  Likewise, Bronston’s answers
about nominees were also true.  However, Bronston’s answer to the
second question, (“Have you ever” [had] “any bank accounts in
Swiss banks?”) did not respond to the question about his own ac-
counts as asked.  Instead, Bronston answered with a truthful state-
ment about his company: “The company had an account there for
about six months, in Zurich.”
Bronston’s answer posed a novel legal issue.  His statement
about the company was unquestionably true, but it did not respond
to the question as asked.  By answering the question about the com-
pany, he arguably implied that he personally had not “ever” had a
Swiss account.  Bronston was charged with perjury under 18 U.S.C.
§ 1621, not for making a false statement, but by implying a false-
hood with a true statement.
Bronston was indicted under Section 1621 in 1970, tried in Jan-
uary 1971, and convicted February 2, 1971.  His motions for acquit-
tal and a new trial were denied on April 15.  While the District
Court’s opinion rested for the most part on refuting standard per-
jury challenges, it amplified the scope of perjury in accepting that
“an unresponsive answer may be perjurious if tantamount to a will-
ful attempt to conceal the truth.”115  Judge Tenney’s opinion re-
jected Bronston’s arguments that the question lacked specificity or
was susceptible of multiple interpretations.116  He found no evi-
dence of the defendant’s lack of understanding or memory.117  He
found United States v. Slutzky118 inapplicable, as the testimony in
Slutzky had been both responsive and true, while Bronston’s answer
was non-responsive.  “Thus, although a truthful and responsive an-
swer may not be perjurious, a technically truthful but unresponsive
one may.  Again, the jury was specifically instructed on this
point.”119
Like Judge Tenney, the Second Circuit found the question un-
ambiguous and readily comprehensible.120 Judge Oakes, writing for
the majority, added two new points beyond the District Court’s
115. Bronston v. United States, 326 F. Supp. 469, 471 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
116. See id. at 471-72.
117. See id. at 471, 473.
118. See United States v. Slutzky, 79 F.2d 504, 505 (3d Cir. 1935).
119. Bronston, 326 F. Supp. at 472 (footnote omitted).
120. See United States v. Bronston, 453 F.2d 555, 558-59 (2d Cir. 1971), cert.
granted, 405 U.S. 1064 (1972).
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analysis.  First, the majority cited United States v. Rao for the proposi-
tion that “an answer containing half of the truth which also consti-
tutes a lie by negative implication, when the answer is intentionally
given in place of the responsive answer called for by a proper ques-
tion, is perjury.”121 This is baffling since Rao’s testimony as
presented in the final paragraph of that opinion was both respon-
sive and false.122
Second, the majority cited concerns that foreshadow the gov-
ernment’s position in Bonds: “A halftruth containing a lie, inter-
jected by a knowledgeable and interested witness, may result in
side-tracking the person inquiring into the existence of assets
known only to the bankrupt.  Or it may persuade the interrogator
to proceed on another line of questioning.”123
Judge Lumbard, dissenting, addressed those concerns by dis-
puting the majority’s premise that an answer that is all true can be
half true and therefore half false and all perjurious.  He refocused
the issue from half-truths to whether a truthful unresponsive answer
can be perjurious, even were there “a willful attempt to conceal
some material fact.”124  “It may be that this puts a burden on the
questioner to recognize when he is being led astray, but I prefer to
insist upon the questioner’s acuity than to distort the statute.”125
Ultimately, the Supreme Court expressly agreed with Judge
Lumbard.126
The Bronston case was granted certiorari127 only six weeks after
the Court had denied certiorari in Cohn.128  The Court was thus fully
apprised of the only Circuit Court case extending the Omnibus
Clause of Section 1503 to false testimony.
As Bronston was charged under Section 1621, the Supreme
Court initially and sufficiently grounded its disposition on the text
of that statute.  But the authority cited evinces clearly that the Court
had the incipient development of testimonial obstruction in mind
throughout the opinion.  From page 358 forward, it is clear that the
Court does not view Bronston as a perjury case at all, else the govern-
ment would not urge the statute’s broad construction to “reach”
121. Id. at 559 (citing United States v. Rao, 394 F.3d 354, 356-57 (2d Cir.
1968)).
122. See Rao, 394 F.3d at 356-57.
123. Bronston, 453 F.2d at 559.
124. Id. at 560 (Lumbard, J., dissenting).
125. Id. at 563.
126. See Bronston v. United States, 409 U.S. 352, 362 (1973).
127. See generally Bronston, 453 F.2d  555, cert. granted 405 U.S. 1064 (1972).
128. See generally United States v. Cohn, 405 U.S. 975 (1972).
33
Kazee: United States v. Barry Bonds v. Bronston: Can Section 1503 Handle
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2015
36774-vls_22-2 Sheet No. 50 Side B      07/27/2015   11:45:39
36774-vls_22-2 Sheet No. 50 Side B      07/27/2015   11:45:39
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLS\22-2\VLS203.txt unknown Seq: 34  7-JUL-15 13:45
436 JEFFREY S. MOORAD SPORTS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 22: p. 403
the facts “beyond the precise words of the statute.”129 Rather, the
government has brought a testimonial obstruction case under the
perjury statute, and it is to both perjury and testimonial obstruction
that the Supreme Court speaks thereafter.  In fact, the Court speaks
specifically to what the Bonds courts have termed evasion: “If a wit-
ness evades, it is the lawyer’s responsibility to recognize the evasion
and to bring the witness back to the mark, to flush out the whole
truth with the tools of adversary examination.”130
The balance of the opinion is couched in terms of Section
1621, but is equally applicable in its rationale to all federal statutes
governing testimony.  The obvious example is Section 1623, but the
rationales for the protection of witnesses, guidance for juries, and
instruction for counsel to safeguard the adversary system are
equally applicable to the far more general language of Section
1503, if only because that general language is the more ready tool
for oppression.  If the Court did not expressly refer to Section 1503,
it is because the obstruction statute’s application to false testimony
was mint new.  Nonetheless, Bronston could not more directly and
unanimously have addressed the issue only now arising in Bonds
forty years after the fact.
The Bronston Court premised its application of Section 1621 to
a bankruptcy proceeding upon the seriousness and depth of that
inquiry:
The need for truthful testimony in a § 21(a) bankruptcy
proceeding is great, since the proceeding is “a searching
inquiry into the condition of the estate of the bankrupt, to
assist in discovering and collecting the assets, and to de-
velop facts and circumstances which bear upon the ques-
tion of discharge”  Here, as elsewhere, the perpetration of
perjury “well may affect the dearest concerns of the parties
before a tribunal. . . “131
These words alone evince the Bronston Court’s cognizance of
goals and requirements parallel to those of the obstruction statute.
But the citation to Norris, regarding perjury before a United States
Senate subcommittee, makes that analogy to obstruction explicit.
The more complete language from Norris is:
129. See, e.g., Bronston, 409 U.S. at 358.
130. Id. at 358-59.
131. Id. at 357 (alteration in original) (citing United States v. Norris, 300 U.S.
564, 574 (1937); Travis v. United States, 123 F.2d 268, 271 (10th Cir. 1941)).
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Perjury is an obstruction of justice; its perpetration well
may affect the dearest concerns of the parties before a tri-
bunal.  Deliberate material falsification under oath consti-
tutes the crime of perjury and the crime is complete when
a witness’ statement has once been made.132
In the very same paragraph, the Norris Court rejected a retrac-
tion defense, citing the very same concerns as do testimonial ob-
struction cases:
[The retraction defense] ignores the fact that the oath ad-
ministered to the witness calls on him freely to disclose the
truth in the first instance and not to put the court and the
parties to the disadvantage, hindrance, and delay of ulti-
mately extracting the truth by cross-examination, by extra-
neous investigation, or other collateral means.133
The Bronston Court thus had all the ramifications of testimonial
obstruction in mind, regardless of category or forum.  Yet the Court
emphatically placed the eliciting of the truth from witnesses
through adversary questioning above threatening the witness with
jail at every turn. Short of testimonial falsehood, more truth and
clearer justice can be drawn from alert and persistent questioning
than from a train of trials to vindicate the interrogator’s frustration.
If an answer is non-responsive to the question, or in Bonds’ case
provides an excess of context when the prosecutor wants a quick
admission,134 redoubled questioning is not the wrong to be
avenged, but the remedy to be advanced.
Looking initially to the text of Section 1621, the Bronston Court
granted the non-responsiveness of Bronston’s first answer and the
deceptive implication in his second, but noted that “any material
matter which he does not believe to be true,” is not the same as
“any material matter that implies any material matter that he does
132. United States v. Norris, 300 U.S. 564, 574 (1937).
133. Id.
134. See United States’ Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Judgment of
Acquittal and/or a New Trial on Count Five, supra note 21 at 14.  In opposing
Bonds’ post-trial Motion for Acquittal or New Trial, the government complained:
But instead of giving a “yes or no” answer, the defendant evaded the ques-
tion by talking about how only his personal doctor touched him, and
launched into a distracting explanation of how a person (i.e. Anderson)
could only be friends with him because “we don’t get into each others’
personal lives . . . he knows . . . don’t come to my house talking baseball,”
and “I don’t talk about his business.”
Id.
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not believe to be true.”135  In a footnote, the Court observed why
the statute should be strictly construed to exclude any culpability by
“implication:”
Petitioner’s answer is not to be measured by the same stan-
dards applicable to criminally fraudulent or extortionate
statements. In that context, the law goes “rather far in
punishing intentional creation of false impressions by a se-
lection of literally true representations, because the actor
himself generally selects and arranges the representa-
tions.” In contrast, “under our system of adversary ques-
tioning and cross-examination the scope of disclosure is
largely in the hands of counsel and presiding officer.”136
Fully aware of the context of testimonial obstruction from the
Norris citation in the immediately preceding paragraph, the Bron-
ston Court described those arenas in which weaving a tissue of lies
from threads of truth may be punished.  Testimonial obstruction is
not among them.  Testimonial obstruction is not like criminal fraud
or extortion where the defendant is in charge of the representa-
tions.  Rather, testimonial obstruction by definition arises from “our
system of adversary questioning and cross-examination [which] is
largely in the hands of counsel and presiding officer.”137
Testimony is to be treated as Congress has specifically pro-
vided.  The Bronston Court rejected the very breadth of statute argu-
ment prosecutors’ advance in Bonds:
The Government urges that the perjury statute be con-
strued broadly to reach petitioner’s answer and thereby
fulfill its historic purpose of reinforcing our adversary fact-
finding process.  We might go beyond the precise words of
the statute if we thought they did not adequately express
the intention of Congress, but we perceive no reason why
Congress would intend the drastic sanction of a perjury
prosecution to cure a testimonial mishap that could read-
ily have been reached with a single additional question by
counsel alert—as every examiner ought to be—to the in-
congruity of petitioner’s unresponsive answer.138
135. Bronston, 409 U.S. at 357-58 (footnote omitted).
136. Id. at 358 n.4 (citation omitted).
137. See id. at 358 (citing Model Penal Code § 207.20 cmt. at 124 (Tentative
Draft No. 6, 1957)).
138. Id. at 358.
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What is true of Congressional intent in Section 1621, reaf-
firmed in Section 1623, is that the testimony to be punished is false
testimony.  Section 1503, then in its incipiency of application to tes-
timony, must be read in conjunction with the perjury statues, for
Congress could not reasonably intend the drastic action of an ob-
struction prosecution to cure a non-false testimonial mishap, that
could be, and in Bonds’ case was, “reached with a single additional
question by alert counsel.”139  Section 1503, along with Section
1505, could apply as they had been applied to false testimony in
Cohen, Alo, and Cohn, and remain consistent with Bronston.  That
consistency of application would persist for nearly forty years until
Bonds.
If the presumption of innocence is to have any practical con-
tent, its application must begin in the grand jury room rather than
at the end of the life-altering exhaustion of a trial, even where it
ends in acquittal.  The witness is a citizen at the mercy of state
power, and if lawyers are at home in a courtroom, the same is not
true of the rest of us.  The lawyers have years of education, appren-
ticeship and experience with which to either elicit the truth or trap
the unwary.Most witnesses are rookies and may fail to grasp the
complexity of the situation.  Worse yet is inept questioning, when
repetitive reformulations are cast like dice before the unlucky wit-
ness.  The Supreme Court well recognized that humans are fallible
under interrogation, and a trial for that fallibility is a drastic mea-
sure for “mishaps” beyond the Congressional writ.
Under the pressures and tensions of interrogation, it is
not uncommon for the most earnest witnesses to give an-
swers that are not entirely responsive.  Sometimes the wit-
ness does not understand the question, or may in an
excess of caution or apprehension read too much or too
little into it.  It should come as no surprise that a partici-
pant in a bankruptcy proceeding may have something to
conceal and consciously tries to do so, or that a debtor
may be embarrassed at his plight and yield information
reluctantly.140
Since the witness box is “in the hands of counsel and presiding
officer,”141  it is the responsibility of counsel to make sure that a
drastic remedy is not invoked, if it can be avoided:
139. See id.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 358 n.4.
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It is the responsibility of the lawyer to probe; testimonial
interrogation, and cross-examination in particular, is a
probing, prying, pressing form of inquiry.  If a witness
evades, it is the lawyer’s responsibility to recognize the eva-
sion and to bring the witness back to the mark, to flush
out the whole truth with the tools of adversary
examination.142
Nothing in this prescription for lawyers in the adversarial sys-
tem applies any less to any testimony which may post hoc be prose-
cuted as obstruction rather than as perjury.  Testimony is not ex ante
either 1621 or 1503.  It is at all times subject to the instruction of a
unanimous Court fully cognizant of the potential of testimonial ob-
struction under Section 1503.  The Court made no exceptions from
Bronston for any truthful declaration apart from Footnote 4,143
where, specifically, the lawyer is not in charge.  Where the lawyer is
in charge, making truthful declarations is not subject to the drastic
remedy of criminalization.  The lawyer in charge must do her duty.
To make Section 1503 the substitute for the sanction the Court for-
bids144 is to overturn Bronston by stealth.
The Bronston decision was not only premised upon the respon-
sibility of lawyers, but the relation of the lawyer’s responsibility to
the role of jurors.  The District Court, rejecting Bronston’s motion
for acquittal had observed:
To be sure the interrogation was most inept; but this only
begs further inquiry as to whether question number 2
[“Have you ever?”] was misleading or incapable of elicit-
ing a single honest answer, or whether the defendant
could consciously have taken advantage of the situation by
giving an unresponsive answer in order to avoid disclosure
of his Geneva account.145
By contrast, the Supreme Court expressly forbade sad-
dling the jury with guesswork:
It is no answer to say that here the jury found that
petitioner intended to mislead his examiner.  A jury
should not be permitted to engage in conjecture
whether an unresponsive answer, true and complete
142. Id. at 358-59.
143. See id. at 358 n.4.
144. See United States v. Tonelli, 577 F.2d 194, 198 (3d Cir. 1978).
145. United States v. Bronston, 326 F. Supp. 469, 471 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), cert.
granted, 495 U.S. 1064 (1972).
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on its face, was intended to mislead or divert the ex-
aminer; the state of mind of the witness is relevant
only to the extent that it bears on whether “he does
not believe (his answer) to be true.”146
What is true of perjury juries is true of obstruction juries.  If
Bonds’ testimony consists of true, but unresponsive statements, it is
but conjecture that it was intended to mislead or divert the exam-
iner.  It is but conjecture that the wily witness “could consciously
have taken advantage of” an “inept” or inattentive questioner.  It is
but conjecture for a jury to decide whether the questioner was inept
or inattentive as a predicate to considering the witness’s answer.  It
is but conjecture that an exposition providing truthful context, as
Bonds gave, is too long, too rambling, too evasive, too clever or too
vague.  It is for the jury to decide what Congress has told it specifi-
cally to decide–whether the witness did not believe the statement to
be true, or whether the statement was knowingly false.  These are
the limits of the Congress’s mandate, for to engage in further spec-
ulation threatens the adversary system of justice itself:
To hold otherwise would be to inject a new and confusing
element into the adversary testimonial system we know.
Witnesses would be unsure of the extent of their responsi-
bility for the misunderstandings and inadequacies of ex-
aminers, and might well fear having that responsibility
tested by a jury under the vague rubric of “intent to mis-
lead” or “perjury by implication.”147
The Bronson Court does not restrict the impact of such new
and confusing elements to perjury cases alone.  Fully aware of the
incipiency of testimonial obstruction under Section 1503, the Court
found a danger across the “adversary testimonial system we know.”
The witness’s “intent to mislead” is as vague a rubric under Section
1503 as it is under Section 1621.  One can scarcely imagine the
Court warning against such danger under the perjury statute only
to countenance that danger for the sake of the putatively infinite
reach of language from the 1831 obstruction statute.  If there were
any doubt, it is worth recalling that the 1831 reform, of which the
obstruction statute was a part, was enacted to protect witnesses from
arbitrary power, as affirmed in Ex parte Hudgings148 and In re
146. Bronston v. United States, 409 U.S. 352, 359 (1973).
147. Id.
148. See generally Ex parte Hudgings, 249 U.S. 378 (1919).
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Michael.149  The Bronston Court is of one accord with these
precedents:
The seminal modern treatment of the history of the of-
fense concludes that one consideration of policy overshad-
owed all others during the years when perjury first
emerged as a common-law offense: “that the measures
taken against the offense must not be so severe as to dis-
courage witnesses from appearing or testifying.”150
The same can be no less true of testimonial obstruction than of
perjury, either in its incipiency at the time of Bronston, or now.  The
liberty of the witness to express herself as she can, though she be
prone to explanations, excuses, or examples, is essential to ex-
tracting the facts sought by the examiner.  To that end, the Bronston
Court cited Wigmore:
[T]he English law “throws every fence round a person ac-
cused of perjury,”for “the obligation of protecting wit-
nesses from oppression, or annoyance, by charges, or
threats of charges, of having borne false testimony, is far
paramount to that of giving even perjury its deserts.  To
repress that crime, prevention is better than cure: and the
law of England relies, for this purpose, on the means pro-
vided for detecting and exposing the crime at the moment
of commission,—such as publicity, cross-examination, the
aid of a jury, etc.; and on the infliction of a severe, though
not excessive punishment, wherever the commission of
the crime has been clearly proved.”151
That protection is the more necessary under the expansive
Omnibus Clause of the obstruction statute than under the more
specific prohibition of the perjury statute.  This context under-
scored the Court’s reluctance to criminalize unresponsive testi-
mony: “Thus, we must read § 1621 in light of our own and the
traditional Anglo-American judgment that a prosecution for per-
jury is not the sole, or even the primary, safeguard against errant
testimony.”152
149. See generally In re Michael, 326 U.S. 224 (1945).
150. Bronston, 409 U.S. at 359 (citing Study of Perjury, reprinted in Report of
New York Law Revision Commission, Legis. Doc. No. 60, 249 (1935)).
151. Id. at 359-60 (citing J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE 275—-276 (3d ed. 1940);W.
BEST, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 606 (C. Chamberlayne ed. 1883)).
152. Id. at 360.
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Nothing in the words of Section 1503 makes that judgment any
less true for the newly emergent testimonial obstruction.  In fact,
the balance of the Bronston opinion reveals that the government
had brought an obstruction case about “derailing the questioner”
in the guise of the perjury statute, perhaps because the indictment
predated the Second Circuit’s opinions in Alo and Cohn. The only
Court of Appeals case on testimonial obstruction under Section
1503 as of Bronston’s indictment was Essex.  Whether denominated
as perjury or obstruction, the Bronston court rejected the prosecu-
tion of truthful declarations in favor of proficient questioning:
The cases support petitioner’s position that the perjury
statute is not to be loosely construed, nor the statute in-
voked simply because a wily witness succeeds in derailing
the questioner—so long as the witness speaks the literal
truth.  The burden is on the questioner to pin the witness
down to the specific object of the questioner’s inquiry.153
This mandate does not change post hoc because the govern-
ment chooses Section 1503 rather than Section 1621.  Indeed,
Bronston’s prosecutors themselves rejected the position advanced
in Bonds in its broad form. The reader may substitute the phrase
“testimonial obstruction” for “perjury” in the following passage to
see why that is so:
The Government does not contend that any misleading or
incomplete response must be sent to the jury to determine
whether a witness committed perjury because he intended
to sidetrack his questioner.  As the Government recog-
nizes, the effect of so unlimited an interpretation of
§ 1621 would be broadly unsettling.154
However, the government in Bronston pursued a narrower ob-
struction theory that is at the heart of the Bonds case: “It is said,
rather, that petitioner’s testimony falls within a more limited cate-
gory of intentionally misleading responses with an especially strong
tendency to mislead the questioner.”155  In Bronston this category
was truthful non-responsive statements, which might imply a false-
hood.  In Bonds, it is the non-responsive “stitches of truth”156 that
might distract the examiner.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 361.
155. See id.
156. See Brief for the United States as Appellee, supra note 7, at 29-30.
41
Kazee: United States v. Barry Bonds v. Bronston: Can Section 1503 Handle
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2015
36774-vls_22-2 Sheet No. 54 Side B      07/27/2015   11:45:39
36774-vls_22-2 Sheet No. 54 Side B      07/27/2015   11:45:39
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLS\22-2\VLS203.txt unknown Seq: 42  7-JUL-15 13:45
444 JEFFREY S. MOORAD SPORTS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 22: p. 403
Though perhaps a plausible argument can be made that
unresponsive answers are especially likely to mislead, any
such argument must, we think, be predicated upon the
questioner’s being aware of the unresponsiveness of the
relevant answer.  Yet, if the questioner is aware of the un-
responsiveness of the answer, with equal force it can be
argued that the very unresponsiveness of the answer
should alert counsel to press on for the information he
desires.157
Thus the very evil of “misleading” at the base of the potential
or effect of Statement C is rejected as a basis for prosecution.  It is,
rather, the occasion for counsel to redouble their efforts, as was
indeed the case before the Bonds grand jury following Statement C.
“[B]y hypothesis, the examiner’s awareness of unresponsiveness
should lead him to press another question or reframe his initial
question with greater precision.  Precise questioning is imperative
as a predicate for the offense of perjury.”158  Precise questioning is
imperative as a predicate for the offense of testimonial obstruction
as well, as the Court summarized its instruction for all testimonial
crimes.  We know this, for the coda of Bronston is directed to ob-
struction, not falsehood.
It may well be that petitioner’s answers were not guileless
but were shrewdly calculated to evade.  Nevertheless, we
are constrained to agree with Judge Lumbard, who dis-
sented from the judgment of the Court of Appeals, that
any special problems arising from the literally true but un-
responsive answer are to be remedied through the “ques-
tioner’s acuity” and not by a federal perjury
prosecution.159
Thus the government’s arguments and the Court’s unanimous
response demonstrate that it is not so much that the Bronston doc-
trine should be directed to testimonial obstruction, but that it was so
directed ab initio.  In so doing, the Supreme Court defined the “due
administration of justice” when the witness takes the stand.  A sur-
vey of cases based on “evasive” testimony reveals that until Bonds,
this is precisely how the federal courts have applied the law.
157. Bronston, 409 U.S. at 361-62 (footnote omitted).
158. Id. at 362.
159. Id.
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VI. EVASIVE TESTIMONY UNDER BRONSTON
Bonds’ indictment for Count Five alleged that his grand jury
testimony had been “evasive, false, and misleading.”160  The govern-
ment having conceded that Statement C is not “all false,” but  “in
the evasive and/or misleading category,”161 and Judge Illston hav-
ing ruled that Statement C’s alleged falsehood was not argued to
the jury,162 this article will take Bonds’ conviction as necessarily
predicated upon Statement C as “evasive” or “misleading” true testi-
mony.  Assuming that Statement C is also non-responsive to the
question, as claimed by the government in its brief to the Ninth
Circuit panel,163 then Statement C is in the very non-responsive,
literally truthful misleading or evasive category to which Bronston
applies.
Like truth and falsehood, the terms “evasive” or “misleading”
are not in the text of Section 1503, but are arguably included within
the terms “impede,” “obstruct,” or “interfere” in the Omnibus
Clause.  Unlike truth or falsehood, “evasive” and “misleading” are
not susceptible of so ready an understanding as criteria by which to
measure crime.  Certainly, a statutory element, such as “corruptly,”
may be quite broadly defined,164 but due process requires that the
meaning be tractable by both the citizen on the stand and the jury
measuring her mind by her words.  As Justice Scalia has observed:
What renders a statute vague is not the possibility that it
will sometimes be difficult to determine whether the in-
criminating fact it establishes has been proved; but rather
the indeterminacy of precisely what that fact is.  Thus, we
have struck down statutes that tied criminal culpability to
whether the defendant’s conduct was “annoying” or “inde-
cent”–wholly subjective judgments without statutory defi-
nitions, narrowing context, or settled legal meanings.165
Nonetheless, the terms “evasive” and “misleading” are treated
in Count Five as elements of the crime alleged which the govern-
160. See Third Superseding Indictment, supra note 1, at 6.
161. See Defendant’s Reply in Support of Motions for Judgment of Acquittal
and/or a New Trial on Count Five, supra note 5, at 8.
162. See Order Denying Motion to Acquit and for a New Trial, supra note 6, at
11-12 n.5.
163. See Brief for the United States as Appellee, supra note 7, at 31.
164. See United States v. Rasheed, 663 F.2d 843, 852 (9th Cir. 1981) (defining
“corruptly” as “having the intent to obstruct justice”).
165. United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 306 (2008) (citing Coates v. Cin-
cinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614 (1971); Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844,
870-71, 872 & n.35 (1997)).
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ment must prove beyond a reasonable doubt.  As such, the defini-
tion of these elements is all the more necessary when the terms are
judge-made or chosen by the prosecution than when the elements
are framed by the Congress, else the jury will lack a standard by
which to gauge reasonable doubt.  Fortunately, there is ample law
to narrow the context and settle the legal meanings of “evasive” and
“misleading” under the perjury and obstruction statutes.  One line
of cases follows Bronston covering “evasive” true statements that are
calculated to deceive.  The second line consists of Omnibus Clause
cases brought under Section 1503 or 1505, where “evasive” has
been applied not to literally true testimony as in Bronston, but
rather to false accounts, false denials of knowledge, and especially,
false denials of recollection.  These two lines of cases “narrow the
context” of “evasive” and “misleading” to impart meaning to these
criteria which would otherwise be far too variable in the vernacular.
Bonds is the first case in which the word “evasive” has been ap-
plied under Section 1503 to testimony other than false testimony,
and in particular, false denials of memory or knowledge.  False de-
nials are distinct from the “evasiveness” of truthful yet misleading
testimony under Bronston.
The Bronston scenario provides an even clearer example:
the critical difference between a falsehood suggested by
implication and one asserted in an outright lie is notice.
While it is impossible to detect a good lie without extrinsic
evidence, an implied answer is technically nonresponsive
and thus signals a potential problem.  The Supreme Court
emphasized this notice element in Bronston: “[T]he ex-
aminer’s awareness of unresponsiveness should lead him
to press another question or reframe his initial question
with greater precision.”166
To illustrate, we may consider as a baseline the “evasive” testi-
mony of Billy Carrigan in United States v. Earp,167 in which the
Fourth Circuit applied Bronston to a Section 1623 case.  Carrigan
was among a group of Ku Klux Klan members who had attempted
to burn a cross in the front yard of an interracial couple in North
Carolina.  As others struggled but failed to ignite the cross, Carri-
gan stood watch with a shotgun.  When the intended victim discov-
166. Note, Ethical Abuse of Technicalities: A Comparison of Prospective and Retro-
spective Legal Ethics, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1082, 1090 (1999) (footnote omitted) (quot-
ing Bronston v. United States, 409 U.S. 352, 362 (1973)).
167. See United States v. Earp, 812 F.2d 917, 919 (4th Cir. 1987).
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ered the attempt, the terrorists fled, with the unlit cross left behind.
Carrigan testified before a grand jury:
“Q. How do you feel about burning crosses at the resi-
dences of interracial couples?
A. I don’t believe in it.
Q. Have you ever done it, sir?
A. No, I haven’t.
Q. Are you permitted, then, from Alexander County to go
into Iredell County and burn crosses?
A. I don’t burn crosses anywhere.
Q. Would the Klan permit you to do that?
A. No, ma’am.”168
While the truth of “I don’t believe in it” and “No, ma’am” may
certainly be doubted, only the italicized answers, “No, I haven’t” and
“I don’t burn crosses anywhere,” were the bases for Carrigan’s false tes-
timony charge under 18 U.S.C. § 1623.
The Fourth Circuit cited Bronston’s principles as articulated
under Section 1621:
The burden is on the questioner to pin the witness down
to the specific object of the questioner’s inquiry. This con-
clusion, the Court added, is not escaped even where the
jury finds that the answerer intended to mislead the exam-
iner.  For even if the witness evades, it is the duty of the
questioner to spot that evasion and “to flush out the whole
truth with the tools of adversary examination.”169
The Fourth Circuit then applied Bronston to Carrigan’s grand
jury testimony under Section 1623:
Applying Bronston to the case at hand leads to the conclu-
sion that Carrigan’s perjury conviction must be set aside.
Like the witness in Bronston, Carrigan’s statements were
literally true although his second answer [“I don’t burn
crosses anywhere”] was unresponsive.  He did not burn a
cross at Grimes’ residence in November, 1982 as charged
in the indictment.  And, while he no doubt knew full well
that he had on that occasion tried to burn a cross, he was
not specifically asked either about any attempted cross
burnings or even whether or not he was at or near the
168. Id. at 918.
169. Id. at 919 (citations omitted) (citing Bronston, 409 U.S. at 358-60).
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Grimes home the night in question or whether he partici-
pated in the Grimes incident.170
The Fourth Circuit noted the government’s failure in its ques-
tioning and the flaws in remedying its failure through prosecution:
A review of the record demonstrates that in questioning
other witnesses, the questioner was able easily to attain the
requisite specificity by asking about specific dates and loca-
tions.  However, in questioning Carrigan, the questioner
simply did not probe deep enough to recognize any po-
tential evasion.  The government cannot now correct this
failure by a prosecution for making a false declaration.
And the district court should not have allowed the jury to
speculate whether or not Carrigan understood that the
questions regarding cross burnings included the Grimes
incident.171
Carrigan’s answers are relevant to the Barry Bonds’
testimony.
First, when asked, “How do you feel about burning crosses at
the residences of interracial couples?,” his answer, “I don’t believe
in it,” is responsive and clearly had been untrue in the past and
might have been chargeable as perjury, as were Bonds’ Counts
One, Two, and Three, or as obstruction, as in United States v. Co-
hen.172  Whether the present tense of the question and the necessa-
rily past tense of the incident in question (as in Bronston’s personal
accounts) posed a problem for prosecution can only be a matter of
speculation for readers.
Second, when Carrigan was asked, “Have you ever done it, sir?”
the answer, “No, I haven’t,” is both responsive and literally true,
and is thus not perjury under Section 1621 or 1623 on their terms.
Bronston is thus not implicated here, as the Supreme Court’s articu-
lation of Bronston applies strictly to non-responsive, but true testi-
mony.173  Responsive, truthful, yet misleading testimony has not yet
been the subject of prosecution under Section 1503, though the
District of Columbia Circuit Court rejected a prosecution under
Section 1001.174  If unresponsive yet truthful statements are
170. Id.  at 919.
171. Id. at 919-20 (citations omitted).
172. See generally United States v. Cohen, 202 F. Supp. 587 (D. Conn. 1962).
173. See United States v. Corr, 543 F.2d 1042, 1049 (2d Cir. 1976).
174. See United States v. Safavian, 528 F.3d 957, 965 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
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brought within the ambit of Section 1503 by Bonds, responsive true
testimony represents the next frontier of expansion of the Omnibus
Clause.
Third, when Carrigan was asked, “Are you permitted, then,
from Alexander County to go into Iredell County and burn
crosses?,” the question represented not an inquiry to gain informa-
tion, but a rhetorical question for the benefit of the grand jury to
which an appropriate response is difficult to imagine.  The question
appears to ask what the law permits, though that makes certain as-
sumptions about who is doing the permitting, e.g., federal law, or
North Carolina, or one of the counties, or the Klan, or something
as yet unspecified.  If answered, “Yes,” the answer would be respon-
sive, though false, and incriminating.175  Moreover, the answer
“Yes” would be false regardless of whether Carrigan had attempted
a cross-burning.
If answered “No,” the answer would be responsive, and true,
and yet leave the incriminating impression that whatever Carrigan’s
conduct had been, it was not permitted, along the lines of “Have
you stopped beating your wife?”  In any event, the true answer
would be “No” regardless of whether Carrigan had attempted a
cross-burning, because the law does not permit it.
With this question, it was the Earp prosecution, as much as Car-
rigan, who devised a false impression by implication through the
rhetorical question and created a tactical pretzel for any jury to un-
ravel.176  Given the perils through implication of either a “Yes” or
“No” answer, it is little wonder that Carrigan gave an unresponsive
answer, certainly true, but leaving a self-exonerating implication: “I
don’t burn crosses anywhere.”  The answer is nonresponsive be-
cause it does not answer whether he is permitted to burn crosses in
Iredell County.  It is factually true in that no cross burned in the
particular incident and Carrigan was not charged with cross-burn-
ing anywhere else.
“I don’t burn crosses anywhere” achieves something for the wit-
ness that the government calls “misleading” and that even a defense
175. See generally Earp, 812 F.2d at 917.  The Earp opinion makes no mention
of any grant of immunity before the grand jury for Carrigan, but notes the state’s
“failure to warn the defendants of their target-defendant status prior to their testi-
fying before the grand jury.” Id. at 918 n.1.
176. See United States v. Landau, 737 F. Supp. 778, 784 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (cit-
ing Bronston, 409 U.S. at 360).  “Read in context, it is the prosecutor’s questions
themselves, not merely Landau’s answers, that give rise to multiple interpretations.
As such, the Government must be held to its burden ‘to pin the witness down to
the specific object’ of the inquiry.” Id.
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attorney could well concede to be “calculated.”  The answer evades
the Scylla and Charybdis of the “Yes” and “No” answers, each with
its implicit self-incrimination.  It is well to remember at this point
that a witness confronted with such a dilemma is not always a Klan
member whose lack of guilt is wholly accidental.  The power of the
state’s professional interrogators takes many a witness aback who
might well perceive a trap in every question.  Carrigan’s calculation
was to give a non-responsive but truthful, if narrow, answer.  The
answer is in fact consistent with the advice that defense counsel give
their testifying clients every day, as cited with approval by the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit in Safavian, a Section 1001 case: “Attor-
neys commonly advise their clients to answer questions truthfully
but not to volunteer information.  Are we to suppose that once the
client starts answering a government agent’s questions, in a deposi-
tion or during an investigation, the client must disregard his attor-
ney’s advice or risk prosecution under § 1001(a)(1)?”177
It is for these reasons that Bronston places such non-responsive,
true answers beyond the scope of the perjury statutes, even if the
answer is misleading.  To hold otherwise would ask the jury to deci-
pher, inter alia, whether the response is too calculated, wrongly cal-
culated, calculated at all, calculated to cover up actual guilt or to
evade a question’s inescapable, but false, implication of guilt.  A
jury would be asked to sort out whether there were multiple motiva-
tions for telling the truth, and whether a true answer is obstructive
if there is one evasive motive, or whether an evasive answer is lawful
if there is but one pure motive.  As the Fourth Circuit pointed out,
a jury should not be allowed to speculate on such motivations.178
Leaving such a calculation to a jury asks the jurors to legislate
in each instance just what “evasive” or “misleading” means.  It is not
the certain standard of truth or falsehood:
[T]he state of mind of the witness is relevant only to the
extent that it bears on whether “he does not believe (his
answer) to be true.” To hold otherwise would be to inject a
new and confusing element into the adversary testimonial
system we know.  Witnesses would be unsure of the extent
of their responsibility for the misunderstandings and inad-
equacies of examiners, and might well fear having that re-
sponsibility tested by a jury under the vague rubric of
“intent to mislead” or “perjury by implication.”179
177. Safavian, 528 F.3d at 965.
178. See Earp, 812 F.2d at 919-20.
179. Bronston, 409 U.S. at 359.
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While the Bronston Court here spoke directly to the perjury
statute, its observations apply with equal force to any testimonial
statute as to the confusing effects of a “vague rubric” upon wit-
nesses, upon juries, and upon the integrity of our adversary testimo-
nial system.  This is especially so for the Omnibus Clause with its
anything goes text, quite distinct from the eminently tractable true
and false standards of Sections 1621 and 1623.  If statutory terms
need to be crafted, interpreted, and applied with precision, the
same must apply with yet greater force to judicially evolved terms
such as “evasive” or “misleading,” used at times in the vernacular, at
times as terms of art, and at times without regard to technical or
historical meanings in other contexts.  The non-statutory standards
of “evasive” or “misleading” lie on the far side of justiciability and
make the act of testifying a Shirley Jackson lottery.
Fourth, the question, “Would the Klan permit you to do that
[burn crosses]?,” narrows the third question, “Are you permitted,
then, from Alexander County to go into Iredell County and burn
crosses?”  The permitter is defined as the Klan, not the law, and
Carrigan’s answer, “No, ma’am,” is almost certainly false, perjuri-
ous, and very likely obstructive.  While it is interesting that “No
ma’am” was not the basis of prosecution, the import of the question
for the prosecution is that the narrowed fourth question substituted
in the grand jury’s mind for the more general third question and
cast doubt upon Carrigan’s irretrievable third answer, regardless of
whether that answer had been “Yes,” “No,” or nonresponsive.180
Prosecuting “No, ma’am” would have been a straightforward
perjury charge for which  the jury had a well-defined standard for
deciding whether Carrigan testified to something he did not believe
to be true.181  Prosecuting “I don’t burn crosses anywhere”  as eva-
sive or misleading invited the jury to infer from Carrigan’s false an-
swer to the narrowed fourth question that Carrigan’s answer to the
more general third question had to also be false, even if literally
true.  Regardless of whether this is a permissible inference, the
fourth question added yet another layer of complex conjecture to
the jury’s already bewildering task.  The Seventh Circuit spoke to
this conundrum in a Section 1623 case:
The one lone question for which the defendant stands
guilty of answering falsely had some of the elements of a
180. See Landau, 737 F. Supp. at 783. “And again, the ambiguity here is not
dispelled by the Government’s contention that the term “union difficulties” is re-
fined in the following question to include union picketing.” Id.
181. See 18 U.S.C. § 1621 (2012).
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trap unless the witness was sophisticated enough to do a
better job answering the question than the government
counsel did in asking it.  To be safe the defendant would
have had to recognize the various interpretations and give
two answers to the one ambiguous question. The witness
faced the grand jury alone without counsel being with
him . . . .
. . . The [trial] jury may have guessed correctly, but it is
not entitled to guess at all.  A defendant “may not be as-
sumed into the penitentiary.”182
Earp illustrates the danger of using the criteria of “misleading”
or “evasive” in testimonial cases lest the defendant be assumed into
the penitentiary. Bronston rejects them as criteria for culpability
with regard to truthful, non-responsive, but misleading testimony.
VII. EVASIVE TESTIMONY UNDER SECTION 1503
BEFORE AND AFTER BRONSTON
Earp illustrates the Bronston line of cases where “evasive” is used
to define a misleading but non-responsive truthful answer danger
of using the criteria of “misleading” or “evasive” in testimonial
cases.  With these pitfalls in mind, it is important to understand just
how the term “evasive” has been applied in testimonial cases both
before and after Bronston.  Until Bonds, courts had used the descrip-
tion “evasive” to describe false denials which concealed evidence
and shut off the opportunity for further examination.  Such cases
included not only ordinary lies, but also two specific types of false-
hoods (1) false denial of knowledge, and (2) false denial of mem-
ory.  This usage of “evasive” has been, until Bonds, wholly consistent
with the Supreme Court’s instruction in Bronston, as no false state-
ment is subject to Bronston at all.183  As the obstruction statute is
rooted in contempt of court, the contempt cases provide the foun-
dation for how “evasive” has been used in obstruction cases.
Judge Learned Hand used the word “evasive” to set the stan-
dard for criminal contempt to describe a deposition witness who
had persistently and falsely denied remembering how he had dis-
persed funds he had withdrawn in the previous two weeks.
The power of the court to treat as a criminal contempt a
persistent perjury which blocks the inquiry is settled by au-
182. United States v. Martellano, 675 F.2d 940, 945-46 (7th Cir. 1982) (citing
United States v. Brumley, 560 F.2d 1268, 1277 (5th Cir. 1977)).
183. United States v. Corr, 543 F.2d 1042, 1049 (2d Cir. 1976).
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thority in this circuit.  It is indeed impossible logically to
distinguish between the case of a downright refusal to tes-
tify and that of evasion by obvious subterfuge and mere
formal compliance.
The rule, I think, ought to be this: If the witness’ conduct
shows beyond any doubt whatever that he is refusing to
tell what he knows, he is in contempt of court.184
Appel’s evasions consisted of false answers as to how he spent
or gambled away the money, and more importantly, that he falsely
denied remembering salient events in the previous two weeks: how
much he had lost at poker on purportedly multiple occasions or to
whom he had sold a note.  These blatant and persistent lies as to
disbursement and to memory met the test of “obvious subterfuge”
in the context of criminal contempt.  Judge Hand reasoned:
The question, therefore, comes down simply to this: Is the
story of his gambling losses so obviously and apparently a
mere effort to block the examination that a court must in
protection to itself hold that it is false and that he was at-
tempting to prevent any effective examination?  One can-
not, of course, say that such a story is in all circumstances
necessarily an absurd explanation, but the inability of the
respondent to give the names of any places but one of
these where he had lost any such sum as he stated, and his
entire vagueness about matters which were so recent, and
which must have impressed themselves upon his memory
at the time to a greater extent, leaves no doubt in my
mind that he was not stating what he knew, and was at-
tempting to prevent any efficient examination.185
“Evasive” testimony has continued to signify feigned denial of
recall in criminal contempt cases.  A bank official, Lang, was ques-
tioned before a grand jury regarding transactions at the bank and
held in contempt for his answers.186  “The record of his testimony
which was read in the District Court discloses a persistent effort to
conceal facts he must have known by giving evasive answers under the
pretense of being unable to remember [emphasis added] or to inform
himself more fully as to the facts.  His conduct was plainly designed
184. United States v. Appel, 211 F. 495 (S.D.N.Y. 1913) (citations omitted).
185. Id. at 496.
186. See Lang v. United States, 55 F.2d 922 (2d Cir. 1932).
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to obstruct the administration of justice. . . .”187  This legal usage of
“evasive” signifying feigned forgetfulness is consistent through yet
more recent contempt cases:
First, if an evasive answer were not equated with a refusal
to answer, even the most transparently false assertion of “I
don’t remember” would be sufficient to avoid the recalci-
trant witness statute. . . .  A concocted evasive or false “I
don’t remember” answer would provide an easy avenue
for the reluctant witness to escape this high obligation
with impunity.188
As an example, the Second Circuit approved the trial court’s
finding that:
“Bongiorno’s answers indicating a lack of memory [were]
evasive and false and constitute[d] a refusal to testify[,] in
contempt of the court’s order.”  The court noted Bongi-
orno’s “pattern” of “sudden lapse[s] of memory” with re-
spect to discussions involving or relating to the target of
the grand jury’s investigation.189
One conspiracy to obstruct case alleged “evasive” false state-
ments by multiple parties both to police and to a grand jury, which
varied as to why dozens of alleged organized crime figures con-
vened and fled when discovered.190  Their pattern of answers (visit-
ing a sick friend, car broke down, came to a party, went for a ride)
allegedly evinced a conspiracy to obstruct justice.191  The Second
Circuit found no evidence of an agreement for conspiracy, even
granting that the statements appeared coordinated and false.192
The import of Bufalino is that the gist of “evasiveness” is an allega-
tion of lying.193
When testimony was first prosecuted under Section 1505, Alo,
and Section 1503, Cohn, the “evasive testimony” squarely described
187. Id. at 923 (emphasis added).
188. Matter of Battaglia, 653 F.2d 419, 422 (9th Cir. 1981) (citations omitted).
189. In re Bongiorno, 694 F.2d 917, 922 (2d Cir. 1982) (alterations in origi-
nal) (citations omitted).  Even where contempt convictions have been reversed for
want of proof, the courts used “evasive” particularly to describe a feigned denial of
recall. See, e.g., Ex parte Hudgings, 249 U.S. 378 (1919); Hooley v. United States,
209 F.2d 219 (1st Cir. 1954); Matter of Kitchen, 706 F.2d 1266 (2d Cir. 1983).
190. See United States v. Bufalino, 285 F.2d 408, 412-1314 (2d Cir. 1960).
191. See id. at 414.
192. See id. at 415.
193. See Richardson v. United States, 273 F.2d 144, 147 (8th Cir. 1959)
(describing denials of knowledge in a criminal case as “evasive”).
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feigned forgetfulness. Alo professed lack of memory over one hun-
dred times in ninety minutes regarding a shareholder’s meeting in
which he represented the principal shareholder.194  Cohn persist-
ently failed to remember the details of his wife’s handwriting on an
envelope.195
As of Bronston, “evasive” testimony for contempt of court and
for the obstruction of justice statute had meant but (1) false testi-
mony: Appel (criminal contempt), Bufalino (conspiracy to obstruct);
and (2), false denials of memory: Appel, Lang, Battaglia, Bongiorno,
Ex parte Hudgings, Hooley (all criminal contempt), Alo (Section
1505), and Cohn (Section 1503), equated to a refusal to testify.
Since Bronston, “evasive” has been used similarly under Section
1503.  The most influential obstruction opinion since Bronston is
United States v. Griffin.196  Griffin was questioned before a grand jury
regarding persons he had mentioned in a conversation intercepted
by the FBI relating to loansharking and currency smuggling.  “. . .
Griffin either flatly denied knowledge or relied on an inability to
recall the facts about which he was questioned.”197  Judge Wisdom’s
opinion cited examples, inter alia, of “Know anything about? No
sir”; “Not that I can recall, with him”; and repetitions of “No.”198
Griffin thus presented the same mix of false accounts and lies about
recollection as those present in Appel.
Griffin was therefore the first opportunity for a Court of Ap-
peals to consider false testimony under Section 1503 since Bronston.
Since that time, the Fifth Circuit had rejected the ejusdem generis
limitation of Essex so as to apply the Omnibus Clause with respect to
non-testimonial obstruction in United States v. Partin199 and United
States v. Howard.200  In Griffin, Judge Wisdom, writing for the Fifth
Circuit, relied on an analogy to Partin’s jury tampering to bring
false testimony within the Omnibus Clause:
[U]sing threats or bribes to prevent a grand jury witness
from testifying truthfully has the result of concealing and
altering the nature of evidence.  If such conduct consti-
194. See United States v. Alo, 439 F.2d 751, 753 (2d Cir. 1971).
195. See United States v. Cohn, 452 F.2d 881, 882-83 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. de-
nied, 405 U.S. 975 (1972).
196. See generally United States v. Griffin, 589 F.2d 200 (5th Cir. 1979).
197. Id. at 202.
198. Id.
199. See generally United States v. Partin, 552 F.2d 661 (5th Cir. 1977) (con-
spiring to procure perjury).
200. See United States v. Howard, 569 F.2d 1331 (5th Cir. 1978) (applying
limitation to sale of grand jury transcripts).
53
Kazee: United States v. Barry Bonds v. Bronston: Can Section 1503 Handle
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2015
36774-vls_22-2 Sheet No. 60 Side B      07/27/2015   11:45:39
36774-vls_22-2 Sheet No. 60 Side B      07/27/2015   11:45:39
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLS\22-2\VLS203.txt unknown Seq: 54  7-JUL-15 13:45
456 JEFFREY S. MOORAD SPORTS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 22: p. 403
tutes an obstruction of the administration of justice, as we
held in Partin, then so does testifying falsely; the result in
either case is the same.201
The analogy to Partin was fortified with Cohn, the only other
Court of Appeals case to date to apply Section 1503 to false testi-
mony, and in particular to false denials of memory characterized as
“evasive.”  Cohn’s false denials of recall were thus precisely on point
with Griffin’s testimony: “The blatantly evasive witness achieves this
effect as surely by erecting a screen of feigned forgetfulness as one
who burns files or induces a potential witness to absent himself.”202
The Fifth Circuit well understood the significance of “evasive”
to describe the “screen of feigned forgetfulness.”  When rejecting
Griffin’s argument that perjury alone was insufficient to trigger the
Omnibus Clause, Judge Wisdom first addressed garden variety ly-
ing, and then noted the significance of the “screen of feigned
forgetfulness:”
The perjurious witness can bring about a miscarriage of
justice by imperiling the innocent or delaying the punish-
ment of the guilty. Thus, had Griffin’s testimony been
merely false, it might well have come under the terms of
the omnibus clause of Section 1503, nonetheless.  Such a
case is not before us, however.203
Griffin’s testimony was not merely false, his failure to recall was
evasive, and ultimately tantamount to a refusal to testify, as had
been Cohn’s, as had been Alo’s, and as had been Appel’s:
The defendant has ignored the actual nature of his testi-
mony.  We find it impossible to differentiate a flat refusal
to testify from an evasive answer or a falsehood such as
Griffin’s: “No; I don’t know; Not that I can recall.”  By
falsely denying knowledge of events and individuals when
questioned about them, Griffin hindered the grand jury’s
attempts to gather evidence of loansharking activities as
effectively as if he refused to answer the questions at all.204
The Griffin court noted that Cohn had emphasized conceal-
ment, rather than falsehood in locating false testimony within Sec-
201. Griffin, 589 F.2d at 203. (footnote omitted).
202. Id. (quoting United States v. Cohn, 452 F.2d 881, 884 (2d Cir.
19711971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 975 (1972)).
203. Id. at 204.
204. Id.
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tion 1503: “The Cohn court, however, characterized the gist of the
defendant’s offense as the concealment of knowledge from the
grand jury rather than the injection of falsehood into the proceed-
ings.  And the indictment charged Cohn with evasive as well as false
testimony.”205 But then Judge Wisdom resolved the question as to
whether perjurious statements, including false denials of memory,
fell under the Omnibus Clause because they conceal evidence or
falsify evidence:
Whether Griffin’s testimony is described in the indictment
as “evasive” because he deliberately concealed knowledge
or “false” because he blocked the flow of truthful informa-
tion is immaterial. In either event, the government must,
and in this case did, charge in the indictment and prove at
trial that the testimony had the effect of impeding
justice.206
Griffin is thus harmonized with Cohn, consistent with the use of
“evasive” to that point.  Lies about not remembering have two na-
tures.  “No; I don’t know; Not that I recall” is evasive, in that a
feigned failure of memory conceals knowledge, as does destroying
documents.  And it is false in that it blocked the flow of informa-
tion, as does submitting a false document.  Either nature is suffi-
cient for obstruction, but neither nature applies to true unresponsive
statements.
The harmonization between Cohn and Griffin as to whether
false denials of any sort are obstructive because of concealment or
because of falsehood was noted in United States v. Caron.207  Caron
sought dismissal on multiple grounds of four counts of perjury and
obstruction of justice as to grand jury testimony given following a
grant of immunity.  The nature of his grand jury testimony is not
given in the District Court’s opinion.  In deciding whether perjuri-
ous testimony may constitute obstruction under Section 1503, the
Caron court described the Griffin court’s reasoning from Partin and
Howard forward to bring false testimony within Section 1503, Essex
notwithstanding.  In the course of that description, the Caron court
recounted:
Finally, although the indictment in the Griffin case in-
volved allegations that the defendant gave false testimony
before a grand jury, the Court [sic] found any distinction
205. Id. (emphasis added).
206. Id.
207. United States v. Caron, 551 F. Supp. 662, 668 (E.D. Va. 1982).
55
Kazee: United States v. Barry Bonds v. Bronston: Can Section 1503 Handle
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2015
36774-vls_22-2 Sheet No. 61 Side B      07/27/2015   11:45:39
36774-vls_22-2 Sheet No. 61 Side B      07/27/2015   11:45:39
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLS\22-2\VLS203.txt unknown Seq: 56  7-JUL-15 13:45
458 JEFFREY S. MOORAD SPORTS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 22: p. 403
between “false” testimony and “evasive” testimony immate-
rial to the question whether the giving of testimony of ei-
ther description could constitute obstruction of justice
under § 1503.  “In either event,” the Court [sic] stated,
“the government must, and in this case, did, charge in the
indictment and prove at trial that the testimony had the
effect of impeding justice.”208
In so recounting, the Caron court made no change nor did it
have occasion to modify Griffin’s definition of “evasive” testimony as
false denials of recollection or knowledge.  The Caron court did,
however, remark in a footnote upon the relation of “evasive” testi-
mony to other falsehoods in the context of both Griffin and Cohn.
In arguing the tension between Griffin and Essex as to whether false
testimony can constitute obstruction, the government had posited
that Cohn supported Griffin:
However, the indictment in Griffin alleged only that the
defendant gave false testimony, whereas in Cohn, the in-
dictment additionally charged the defendant with giving
evasive testimony, which more clearly obstructs a grand
jury’s investigation than does false testimony.  Neverthe-
less, the analysis employed in Cohn, does lend support to
the approach taken in Griffin.209
The observation that “evasive” testimony “more clearly ob-
structs a grand jury’s investigation” than merely “false testimony” is
original in articulation in Caron, but is undoubtedly at the core of
the feigned forgetfulness cases equating testimonial amnesia to re-
fusal to testify.  Denial of memory or refusal to answer blocks off
further avenues of inquiry, as distinct from false answers, which may
be challenged, probed, and refuted with evidence. Nothing in the
footnote’s observation challenges or alters Griffin’s definition of
“evasive” testimony as false forgetfulness.
Griffin and Caron were both cited in United States v. Perkins.210
Perkins was an attorney for a bank who had represented members
of the Hamilton family.  Ruye Marshall Hamilton opened an ac-
count under the fictitious name “Sweetie Marshall” for the benefit
of his daughter, Mrs. Hawkins, whose husband was an officer of the
bank.  After Mr. Hamilton’s death, Mr. Hawkins noticed irregulari-
208. Id. at 668, aff’d without opinion, 722 F.2d 739 (4th Cir. 1983), cert. denied
465 U.S. 1103 (1984) (citing Griffin, 589 F.2d at 204).
209. Id. at 667 n.6 (citations omitted).
210. See United States v. Perkins, 748 F.2d 1519, 1526, 1528 (11th Cir. 1984).
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ties in the “Sweetie Marshall” and other accounts.  He and Perkins
notified the FBI.  A grand jury inquired about the ownership of and
irregularities in the account.  It was alleged that another family
member had wrongfully assumed the name and control of the ac-
count for the purposes of receiving insurance reimbursement for
losses to the account.  Before the grand jury, Perkins was asked
about the identity of “Sweetie Marshall” and the details of account
transactions.  The Perkins court gave the text of the indictment for
conspiracy to obstruct justice under 18 U.S.C. § 371, which speci-
fied three overt acts, including the grand jury testimony.  A portion
of the testimony at issue concerned a failure to recall:
Q. Any 1099 that would have to go out from the bank
showing interest posted each year, were they sent to your
office?
A. The one was Sweetie Marshall’s; I knew about that
one. . . .
Q. 1099s were sent to your office?
A. Yes.
Q. What did you do with them?
A. I think they just stayed there; I believe they did, at my
office.
Q. You never forwarded them to Sweetie?
A. No, I don’t think I did.  I might have, but I don’t recall
right now, having done it.211
The Perkins court reviewed through Griffin, Alo, Cohn, and
Caron the applicability of Section 1503 to both false testimony and
evasive testimony, the latter defined by specific reference to Cohn’s
“screen of feigned forgetfulness.”212  Section 1503 thus applied to
Perkins’ false statements,213 including his evasive failure to recall:
“A.  No, I don’t think I did.  I might have, but I don’t recall right
now, having done it.”214
The Eleventh Circuit’s final observation on evasive testimony
made it the government’s burden to prove obstruction for evasive
testimony the same as for ordinary false testimony:
When false statements form the basis of the alleged ob-
struction, however, the government must prove that the
statements had the effect of impeding justice. . . .
211. Id. at 1522-23 n.7.
212. See id. at 1527-28.
213. See id. at 1528.
214. See id. at 1522 n.7.
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. . . .
We find this rationale equally applicable to allegations of
evasive testimony and thus conclude that when either false
or evasive testimony is the basis of a section 1503 charge,
the government must prove obstruction.215
The Perkins court made no modification to the definition of
“evasive” testimony as feigned forgetfulness under Section 1503.
Rather, it reinforced that understanding by explicit reference to
Griffin, Cohn, and Alo.
Any doubt about the definition of “evasive” testimony as
feigned forgetfulness was laid to rest by the Eleventh Circuit in
United States v. Williams,216 a Section 1503 case based upon flat fac-
tual denials unmixed with denials of memory.  The defendants in
Williams had testified as to any knowledge of thefts or under-deliv-
eries in the maritime refueling business in a civil antitrust action.
As a result of the testimony, the defendants were charged under
RICO and Section 1503.  The testimony across the board consisted
largely of repeated denials: “No, sir.”217 The defendants contended
that perjury alone did not constitute obstruction under Section
1503.  The Fifth Circuit revisited its decision in Griffin:
However, we did not determine in Griffin whether all
knowingly false grand jury testimony ipso facto constitutes a
violation of section 1503, although we intimated that it
might, saying “had Griffin’s testimony been merely false, it
might well have come under the terms of the omnibus
clause of § 1503, nonetheless.”  We did not reach that is-
sue because we held that Griffin’s testimony was not only
false but also “had the effect of impeding justice,” and that
“his denials of knowledge had the effect of closing off ve-
nues of inquiry entirely.”218
The Fifth Circuit then gave the relation between false denials
of fact and “evasive” false denials of memory:
As recited in that opinion, Griffin’s grand jury testimony
on which his section 1503 conviction rested consisted in
significant part of the same sort of short, flat, and whole-
215. Id. at 1527-28 (citing In re Michael, 326 U.S. 224, 227-28 (1945); United
States v. Griffin, 589 F.2d 200, 205 (5th Cir. 1979); Caron, 551 F. Supp. at 670).
216. See United States v. Williams, 874 F.2d 968, 976 (5th Cir. 1989).
217. See, e.g., id. at 977 n.26.
218. Id. at 980 (citation omitted) (citing Griffin, 589 F.2d at 204, 205).
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sale false denials of knowledge as those of our appellants
here.  It is true that some other aspects of Griffin’s testi-
mony might more accurately be described as evasive or a
mere denial of memory, rather than a flat, unequivocal denial
of any knowledge. [Emphasis added.] However, we re-
fused [in Griffin] to attach significance to that purported
distinction:
“We find it impossible to differentiate a flat refusal to testify
from an evasive answer or a falsehood such as Griffin’s. . . .
By falsely denying knowledge of events and individuals
when questioned about them, Griffin hindered the grand
jury’s attempts to gather evidence of loansharking activities
as effectively as if he refused to answer the questions at
all.”219
The Fifth Circuit confirmed this theory of obstruction more
recently in United States v. Brown,220 growing out of the Enron scan-
dal.  Brown was convicted of both perjury and obstruction on the
basis of the same grand jury testimony.  He argued that conviction
for perjury did not necessarily make him guilty of obstruction.221
Citing both Griffin and Williams, the Brown court noted that both
“evasive” answers and “denials of knowledge” were “false” in those
cases and hindered the grand jury for purposes of Section 1503 as
effectively as if the witness refused to answer the questions at all.222
Brown’s attempt to require further proof of obstruction was pre-
cluded, though, by his conviction for perjury, so that his testimony,
as in Griffin and Williams, was false.223  Unlike Brown, however,
Bonds was not convicted of perjury and Statement C was conceded
to be true.
Williams and Brown are significant not only in confirming Grif-
fin’s defining “evasive” testimony in terms of false denials of mem-
ory, but also in relating “evasive” testimony to false denials of
knowledge, where the effect again is to conceal evidence so that
further examination cannot uncover the truth.  This is consistent
with the Second Circuit’s opinion as to false denials of knowledge
in United States v. Langella.224
219. Id. at 981 (second alteration in original) (emphasis added) (footnotes
omitted) (quoting Griffin, 589 F.2d at 204).
220. 459 F.3d 509 (5th Cir. 2006).
221. See id. at 530-31.
222. Id. at 530-31.
223. See id. at 531.
224. 776 F.2d 1078 (2d Cir. 1985).
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Gennaro Langella had been taken in a raid of a meeting of
alleged organized crime figures.  In three grand jury appearances,
Langella denied knowing that anyone he knew was in the Colombo
crime family, or how he met two individuals taken at the gathering,
or what Carmine Persico, his friend of 30 years, did for a living,
among other outright falsehoods.225 The Second Circuit confirmed
his convictions for perjury on the basis of his false testimony, and
confirmed the obstruction charges as well:
The obstruction count of the indictment did not charge
Langella only with making false statements. It also accused
him of concealing evidence concerning Carmine Persico
and the Brooklyn meeting. Several of Langella’s answers
on these topics were obviously evasive and constituted con-
cealment of evidence. That the false testimony concerning
Persico’s presence was also a lie did not remove it from
the scope of Section 1503.226
The Second Circuit described Langella’s false denials and
other falsehoods as evasive and obstructive in that they concealed
evidence.  Nothing in Langella alludes to any evasion based on
truthful testimony in the sense of Bronston.
Thus flat denials of memory or flat denials of knowledge in a
responsive answer foreclose the examiner’s ability to probe for the
truth.  There is nothing to cross-examine.  These flat denials of
knowledge or memory are distinct from the “evasive,” truthful non-
responsive answers considered in Bronston, where the very non-re-
sponsiveness signals the alert questioner to probe for more.  If fur-
ther questioning elicits a false, responsive denial of memory,
knowledge, or alleged substantive fact, then the sanction is appro-
priately either perjury, because it is false and material, or obstruc-
tion, because it is false and forecloses further inquiry.  If the answer
is non-responsive, false and material, then perjury is the sanction.
If the answer is non-responsive, false, and forecloses further inquiry,
then obstruction is the sanction.  But, as in Bonds, if the answer is
non-responsive and true, then the responsibility of the examiner is
to probe the more.
Further incidental descriptions of testimony as evasive do not
challenge Griffin’s usage of the word.  In one appeal from convic-
tions for obstruction, witness tampering, and conspiracy, it was the
225. See id. at 1079-80.
226. Id. at 1081 (citing United States v. Cohn, 452 F.2d 881, 883-84 (2d Cir.
1971).
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defendants-appellants rather than the court who described the testi-
mony of the prosecution’s witness as “evasive.”227  This characteriza-
tion appears to relate to refusals to answer, false denials of memory,
and other falsehoods rather than any truthful statements. Signifi-
cantly, the Seventh Circuit attached no significance to the defend-
ants’ allegations of evasiveness.
The defendants also claim that Oliveros gave evasive an-
swers to questions and was shown to have lied repeatedly
on the stand, such that their convictions rest upon
“tainted” testimony. . . .  As to the instances where Oliveros
refused to answer questions, when defense counsel pro-
tested at trial that Oliveros’ testimony and cross-examina-
tion was evasive the judge and the prosecutor both
instructed the witness to answer without hesitation.  De-
fense counsel cites several instances where Oliveros
claimed that he could not remember certain facts. How-
ever, most of these situations involved collateral matters,
and in those instances that may have had a bearing on the
charges alleged in the indictment, defense counsel was
not restrained from arguing Oliveros’ credibility to the
jury.228
A defendant acting pro se in a trial for attempting to escape was
convicted of criminal contempt for his refusal to cooperate with the
court at any stage of court proceedings.
From the very beginning of the proceedings, the defen-
dant determined upon a policy of obstructionism in order
to delay his trial. His strategy was not to engage in violent
or outrageous conduct but to employ a type of passive re-
sistance through noncooperation.229
This included refusing to answer questions as a trial participant
(as distinct from sworn testimony as a witness) and causing the
judge to repeat portions of the voir dire process by claiming he had
not been listening to the jurors.230  The Third Circuit characterized
his statements during voir dire as well as his tactics as a whole as
“evasive,”231 and described an answer to the judge as “mislead-
227. See United States v. Rovetuso, 768 F.2d 809, 818 (7th Cir. 1985).
228. Id. (footnote omitted) (citing Trial Transcript at 1231–33, 1243–44).
229. United States v. Proffitt, 498 F.2d 1124, 1125 (3d Cir. 1974).
230. See id. at 1126-27.
231. Id. at 1126.
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ing.”232  There was no sworn testimony during this process, true,
false, evasive or otherwise.  Thus, the obstruction from the “evasive”
and “misleading” statements arose from Proffitt’s role as a pro se
advocate, rather than as a witness under oath.233
There are yet more tenuous references to “evasive” testimony
on a few occasions.  The U.S. District Court for Connecticut alluded
to the “false and evasive” testimony in Bufalino without further ex-
planation or description in United States v. Cohen.234  In one Section
1503 case, “The Government’s proof in the instant case demon-
strated that these statements were false and evasive and designed to
obstruct the grand jury’s investigation.”235  The Second Circuit did
not further describe or specify the testimony.  The Second and
Fifth Circuits have supported a trial court’s ability to admonish a
witness for “evasive” testimony, without further defining what that
testimony had been.236
Finally, outside Section 1503, the Ninth Circuit characterized a
defendant’s testimony at a suppression hearing to be “evasive” in
that he tried to claim that the word “they” in his recorded tele-
phone calls from a detention center referred to his attorneys rather
than the authorities.237  His purpose was to leave a “false impres-
sion” that he lacked of notice that his calls were monitored, his own
recorded statements notwithstanding, so as to challenge the en-
hancement of his sentence for kidnapping.  Whatever his tone or
attempted subterfuge at the suppression hearing, the trial court
found the testimony to be false, which the Ninth Circuit upheld.238
As “evasive” here refers to testimony found false by the trial judge,
the settled meaning of “evasive” under Section 1503 is left undis-
turbed by a tangential description in a kidnapping case.
In summary, “evasive” testimony has been identified in two
senses. Bronston, speaking to all sworn testimony by witnesses,
makes truthful non-responsive answers the occasion for further
232. Id. at 1127.
233. See generally Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1 (1933) (describing con-
tempt charge for knowingly misleading statements, as well as false statements,
rooted in contemnor’s role as prospective juror in voir dire, rather than as sworn
witness in trial.)
234. See United States v. Cohen, 202 F. Supp. 587, 589 (D. Conn. 1962) (citing
United States v. Bufalino, 285 F.2d 408 (2d Cir. 1960)).
235. United States v. Kanovsky, 618 F.2d 229, 230 (2d Cir. 1980).
236. See United States v. Minkoff, 137 F.2d 402, 405 (2d Cir. 1943); United
States v. Boyle, No. 95-20532, 1996 WL 512091, at *6 (5th Cir. Aug. 28, 1996) (per
curiam).
237. See United States v. Sherwood, 98 F.3d 402, 415 (9th Cir. 1996).
238. See id.
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probing, not prosecution, even if misleading by implication.  The
non-responsiveness is the signal to the alert examiner to press the
inquiry.
On the other hand, evasive false denials of knowledge or recall
foreclose any such further inquiry and are subject to prosecution
both as perjury, because they are false, or as obstruction, because
they block further examination.  This pattern of usage for “evasive”
testimony manifests the federal courts’ observance of Bronston’s in-
struction until Bonds.  In Justice Scalia’s terms, the indeterminacy of
“evasive” and “misleading” without a statutory definition is reme-
died by forty years of narrowing context to settle their legal mean-
ings with regard to evasion by truthful non-responsive answers
under Bronston and to evasion by feigned denial of memory or
knowledge tantamount to a refusal to testify in obstruction and con-
tempt cases.239
In Bonds, neither the District Court nor Ninth Circuit panel
examined the foundations of the quotations used to support the
application of the Omnibus Clause to truthful unresponsive testi-
mony.  Citations, then, to Griffin’s equation of evasive testimony
with false testimony under Section 1503, as well as to Caron’s corol-
lary that evasive testimony is the more obstructive, must be made
with reference to their contexts, rather than as superficial
soundbites in the vernacular, heedless of the underlying principles,
narrowing contexts, and settled legal meaning.
VIII. BONDS AT TRIAL AND BEFORE THE NINTH CIRCUIT
A. Bronston in Perjury Cases in the Ninth Circuit
Judge Ely of the Ninth Circuit anticipated the principles of
Bronston in a dissent in United States v. Cook immediately before Bron-
ston was decided.240  The Ninth Circuit later revisited Cook and re-
versed the conviction, adopting Bronston: “Fairly interpreted,
Bronston stands for the precept that a perjury conviction cannot be
based on answers which are literally true, even though false infor-
mation is conveyed by implication.”241
The development of the Bronston doctrine in Ninth Circuit per-
jury cases is fairly set forth in United States v. Sainz, where an INS
officer testified before a grand jury about two border crossing inci-
239. See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
240. See United States v. Cook, 497 F.2d 753 (1972) (Ely, J., dissenting).
241. United States v. Cook, 489 F.2d 286, 287 (9th Cir. 1973).
63
Kazee: United States v. Barry Bonds v. Bronston: Can Section 1503 Handle
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2015
36774-vls_22-2 Sheet No. 65 Side B      07/27/2015   11:45:39
36774-vls_22-2 Sheet No. 65 Side B      07/27/2015   11:45:39
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLS\22-2\VLS203.txt unknown Seq: 64  7-JUL-15 13:45
466 JEFFREY S. MOORAD SPORTS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 22: p. 403
dents at Nogales, Arizona.242  The Ninth Circuit reproved the pros-
ecutor for asking only general questions of the witness about
undefined “procedures” at the border, while yet claiming that the
witness had committed perjury by lying about particular questions
that were never asked.243  The Ninth Circuit endorsed Bronston’s
premise that “the measures taken against the offense must not be so
severe as to discourage witnesses from appearing or testifying.”244
The court invoked Bronston to describe the perjury statute precisely
as the obstruction statute should be described:
The perjury statute and its goal of truth in our system of
justice is served by fostering truthful answers to precise
questions, not by penalizing unresponsive answers to un-
clear questions. Moreover, “[i]t is no answer to say that
here the jury found that [the defendant] intended to mis-
lead his examiner.  A jury should not be permitted to en-
gage in conjecture whether an unresponsive answer, true
and complete on its face, was intended to mislead or di-
vert the examiner.”245
The Sainz court concluded that “literally truthful but appar-
ently unresponsive” answers narrowed by “further questioning” are
not examples of “the corruption of our system of justice through
perjury,” but rather show “our system working properly.”246
B. Testimonial Obstruction in the Ninth Circuit
The Ninth Circuit’s foundation case for Section 1503 was Haili
v. United States, which had used the doctrine of ejusdem generis to
exclude meetings between two convicted felons in violation of pro-
bation terms from the scope of conduct prohibited by the Omnibus
Clause.247 Haili’s view of ejusdem generis, in turn, was relied upon in
Essex to exclude false testimony from the Omnibus Clause.248  This
rationale was rejected by the Second Circuit in United States v. Alo249
and United States v. Cohn,250 which included false testimonial ob-
242. See United States v. Sainz, 772 F.2d 559, 562-64 (9th Cir. 1985).
243. Id. at 562.
244. Id. (quoting Bronston v. United States, 409 U.S. 352, 359 (1973)).
245. Id. at 564 (alterations in original) (quoting Bronston, 409 U.S. at 359).
246. Id.
247. See Haili v. United States, 260 F.2d 274774 (9th Cir. 1958).
248. See United States v. Essex, 407 F.2d 214 (9th Cir. 1969).
249. See United States v. Alo, 439 F.2d 751 (2d Cir. 1971).
250. See United States v. Cohn, 452 F.2d 881 (2d Cir. 1972)), cert. denied, 405
U.S. 975 (1972).
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struction, specifically “evasive” false denial of memory, within the
Omnibus Clause.  Subsequent courts followed Alo and Cohn rather
than Haili and Essex.251
The Ninth Circuit re-examined Haili and ejusdem generis and
took Griffin as a model for Section 1503 in United States v. Rasheed,252
wherein the co-defendant Phillips was convicted of obstruction for
destroying records.  Phillips claimed that the Ninth Circuit had
adopted ejusdem generis in Haili to limit the reach of the Omnibus
Clause to conduct within the enumerated prohibitions in the first
part of Section 1503.  The Rasheed court resolved the conflict be-
tween ejusdem generis and a broad reading of the Omnibus Clause by
interpreting the word “corruptly” as having the “purpose of obstruc-
tion justice.”253
Using this definition of “corruptly,” the destruction or
concealment of documents can fall within the prohibition
of the statute. This holding does no violence to our rule
that the catch-all provision of section 1503 is limited by
the prior specific prohibitions of the statute. The act of
destroying or concealing subpoenaed documents is “simi-
lar in nature,” . . . to the enumerated acts. The destruction
or concealment of subpoenaed documents results in the
improper suppression of evidence, and thus the influenc-
ing, obstructing and impeding of judicial proceedings, just
as much as does the intimidation of a witness. . . . That
one act suppresses testimonial evidence, while the other
act suppresses real evidence is of no importance.254
The Rasheed court thus anchored the place of document de-
struction within the Omnibus Clause to the precedent of testimo-
nial obstruction in the Second and Fifth Circuits.  Paradoxically,
the Second and Fifth Circuits had anchored testimonial obstruction
within the Omnibus Clause by analogy to the document destruction
cases.
Contemporaneous with the Bonds prosecution, another
BALCO case was before the same court involving Olympic and pro-
251. See, e.g., United States v. Griffin, 589 F.2d 200 (5th Cir. 1979).
252. 663 F.2d 843 (9th Cir. 1981).
253. Id. at 852.
254. Id. (internal citations omitted) (citing Griffin, 589 F.2d 200; Cohn, 452
F.2d at 883-84; United States v. Solow, 138 F. Supp. 812, 815 (S.D.N.Y. 1956);
United States v. Faudman, 640 F.2d 20, 23 (6th Cir. 1981) (alteration and destruc-
tion of corporate records)).
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fessional cyclist Tammy Thomas.255  Evidence from the BALCO in-
vestigation showed that Thomas had received norbolethone, an
anabolic steroid, from Patrick Arnold, the same source from whom
BALCO had received “the clear.”  When asked if Arnold had given
her anything other than the legal supplement 1-AD, Thomas “de-
nied ever getting any other ‘products’ from Arnold, ever ‘tak[ing]
anything that Arnold gave [her],’ and ‘ever tak[ing] anabolic ster-
oids.’”256  Thomas’ answers were responsive to the question and
false, and thus outside the ambit of Bronston.  As the jury by special
verdict found the false testimony to have obstructed justice, Thomas
is the most recent example of applying the Omnibus Clause to false
testimony.257
However, the very first testimonial obstruction case within the
Ninth Circuit, United States v.  Spalliero,258 had reservations about fol-
lowing Griffin to bring testimony within the Omnibus Clause.259
Spalliero was indicted for multiple counts of perjury and one count
of obstruction based on his grand jury testimony.  The Spalliero
court criticized the questioning and, in fact, dismissed one perjury
count:
The witness who gives a responsive but ambiguous answer
may find himself the defendant in a perjury case because
the examiner failed to follow-up on his initial questions.
The law requires the witness to tell the truth; it does not
shoulder the witness with the burden of aiding a sloppy
questioner.260
As for the count of testimonial obstruction, the Spalliero court
was compelled to follow Rasheed as Ninth Circuit authority, but
found that reasoning troubling in light of the Supreme Court’s in-
struction for testimony in Bronston.  Spalliero gave grand jury testi-
mony regarding a loan from Vito Spillone, who was suspected of
loansharking:
In his testimony, defendant declared that he did not give
Mr. Spillone a note or I.O.U. Defendant testified that he
showed Spillone the vehicle ownership certificate or “pink
slip” for the tow truck and left the pink slip on a table at
255. See generally United States v. Thomas, 612 F.3d 1107 (9th Cir. 2010).
256. Id. at 1111 (alterations in original).
257. See id. at 1129.
258. 602 F. Supp. 417 (C.D. Cal. 1984).
259. See id. at 425.
260. Id. at 422.
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the place where he met with Spillone. Defendant declared
that he forgot to pick up the pink slip. Count VI of the
indictment charges that defendant intentionally left the
pink slip with Spillone to act as collateral for the loan or
loans made by Spillone.261
The obstruction count of Spalliero’s indictment described his
testimony as “intentionally evasive, false and misleading and de-
signed to conceal defendant’s true knowledge of the facts from the
Grand Jury.”262  Spalliero argued the ejusdem generis limitation on
the Omnibus Clause derived from Haili.  Though the District Court
followed Rasheed’s invocation of Griffin and Cohn, Judge Rymer
voiced strong doubts, given the instruction from Bronston:
I hesitate to permit the government to go forward on
Count VI for several reasons. First, to the extent that the
count charges the defendant with making false statements,
I do not understand why the government should not be
made to proceed under the perjury statutes and estab-
lished judicial interpretations of 18 U.S.C. § 1623. Second,
to the extent that defendant’s testimony is not perjurious
but rather evasive, or misleading, I think that interpreting
§ 1503 to obtain a result unobtainable under the perjury
statute is ill-advised. The dangers and problems of prose-
cuting persons for evasive testimony were discussed by the
United States Supreme Court in Bronston v. United States.263
The District Court observed that Bronston was not confined to
cases brought under Section 1621 or 1623, but applied more gener-
ally across testimonial statutes to protect witnesses:
That case did not simply overturn a perjury conviction on
the ground that a false implication does not literally fall
under the language of the perjury statute which confines
an offense to the witness who “willfully . . . states . . . any
material matter which he does not believe to be true.” In-
stead, the Court looked to limitations dictated by the important
policy that “the measures taken against the offense must not be so
severe as to discourage witnesses from appearing or testifying.” . . .
Although a conviction under § 1503 may require proof of
intention to impede justice thereby excluding the mislead-
261. Id. at 425.
262. Id.
263. Id. at 426.
67
Kazee: United States v. Barry Bonds v. Bronston: Can Section 1503 Handle
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2015
36774-vls_22-2 Sheet No. 67 Side B      07/27/2015   11:45:39
36774-vls_22-2 Sheet No. 67 Side B      07/27/2015   11:45:39
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLS\22-2\VLS203.txt unknown Seq: 68  7-JUL-15 13:45
470 JEFFREY S. MOORAD SPORTS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 22: p. 403
ing or non-responsive statement, innocently made, the fear
of possible prosecution for evasive or misleading testimony under
§ 1503 will burden every witness before a grand jury—even those
who are in no position to gauge the effect of their statements on a
grand jury investigation about which they have little or no
information.264
The better remedy, as Bronston had emphasized, was better
questioning:
In United States v. Cohn, 452 F.2d 881 (2d Cir.1971), a
grand jury witness was charged with violation of § 1503 for
testifying repeatedly that he could not recall certain facts [em-
phasis added].  At trial his statements were proved to be
false and evasive. [Emphasis added.]  By contrast, in this
case the government is pursuing a witness who answered
the question. If the witness’ answers are false then the gov-
ernment could charge perjury. If the answers are incom-
plete or give a misleading impression, then the
government could have remedied the situation at the time
of the investigation by asking additional questions [emphasis
added] to pin down the defendant about whether or not
he intentionally [emphasis in original] left the pink slip on
the table or intended the pink slip to be collateral for a
loan. In the Cohn case, the government’s questions were
met with “I don’t recall.” Additional questions by the ex-
aminer could not remedy the situation.265
The Spalliero court was thus aware of the contexts of the two
types of “evasive” testimony.  The evasive testimony of denied recall,
as in Cohn, leaves the questioner without a remedy for discovering
the truth.  Otherwise, “the government could have remedied the
situation at the time of the investigation by asking additional ques-
tions,”266 as in Bronston, thus mitigating the witness’s fear of hair-
trigger penalties that themselves hinder the search for truth.
Having expressed these reservations, I am nevertheless
constrained to acknowledge that the Ninth Circuit ap-
pears to embrace the reasoning in United States v. Griffin
264. Id. (first and second alterations in original) (emphases added) (quoting
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and United States v. Cohn. . . .  Accordingly, defendant’s mo-
tion to dismiss Count VI of the indictment is denied.267
Thus with the precedent of Rasheed purporting to follow Grif-
fin, with the Ninth Circuit having applied Section 1503 to false testi-
mony, yet with the expressed doubts of Judge Rymer toward
applying Section 1503 to testimony squarely within Bronston, the
Bonds courts took up whether truthful, non-responsive, albeit mis-
leading testimony is chargeable under the Omnibus Clause of Sec-
tion 1503.
C. Bonds v. Bronston
During the trial and through the appeal, both the government
and Bonds took alternate, contingent, and necessarily inconsistent
positions characterizing Statement C as responsive or non-respon-
sive, relevant or not relevant, true or false, “evasive” or “rambling.”
The impetus to cover all the bases on both sides arose from the
anomalous posture of a witness being prosecuted for making true
statements under oath.
To be sure, whether Bonds told the truth in Statement C is a
bone of frantic contention, and it is hardly the purpose of this arti-
cle to make a claim either way.  Nonetheless, a confluence of factors
places the applicability of Section 1503 to a witness’s true, but alleg-
edly misleading statements at the core of the case.  Salient among
them is the government’s concession cited in Bonds’ Reply Brief in
Support of Motions for Judgment of Acquittal and/or a New Trial
on Count Five:
In summing up its argument for submitting all of the let-
tered statements to the jury, the government declared:
“[W]e would have charged him as a 1623 count if we were
saying these are all false.  These are in the evasive and/or
misleading category.”
. . . .
. . . The government neither suggested to the Court that
Statement C was false nor cited to the facts supporting the
proposition the statement was false rather than merely
evasive.  Nor did it [the government] argue to the jury in
closing that any portion of Statement C was false, much
less that Mr. Bonds had lied when he said “That’s what
keeps our friendship.”  Rather, to the direct contrary,
267. Id. (citing United States v. Rasheed, 663 F.2d 843, 852 (9th Cir. 1981)).
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AUSA Nedrow stated as to Count Five that Mr. Bonds “ob-
structed justice . . . by citing his friendship with Greg
Anderson and by providing not outright false
testimony . . . .”268
Judge Illston’s Order Denying Bonds’ Motions to Acquit and
for a New Trial rejected his argument that “the jury’s guilty verdict
cannot stand because section 1503 does not proscribe obstructing
justice by means of truthful but evasive answers.”269  Yet Judge Ill-
ston also rejected the government’s argument that Statement C was
false, in part because “there are other ways to understand defen-
dant’s testimony” so that Statement C was not “necessarily” false,
and in part because “the government did not argue this reading to
the jury.”270
The government’s brief to the Ninth Circuit three-judge panel
renewed the argument that Statement C was false,271 but argued in
the alternative: “Even if Bonds actually considered his relationship
with Anderson to be a friendship, and truly did not generally ‘get
into other people’s business’ as a result of growing up with a fa-
mous father, these stitches of truth were used to construct a lie.”272
The Ninth Circuit panel held that “[t]he cases interpreting
§ 1503 support our conclusion that  misleading or evasive testimony
that is factually true can obstruct justice.”273  In so holding, the
Ninth Circuit panel creates a paradox between the illimitable scope
of the Omnibus Clause of 18 U.S.C. § 1503 and the carefully drawn
limits upon prosecuting testimony under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1621 and
1623 under the Bronston doctrine.274
The unanimous Bronston Court observed that 18 U.S.C § 1621
proscribed only material statements that the witness “does not be-
lieve to be true.”275  The redress for non-responsive but true state-
ments that may conceal other truths or imply falsehoods rests in the
adversarial process.  Non-responsive answers should place alert
counsel on notice of possible deceit, discoverable upon probing,
268. Defendant’s Reply in Support of Motions for Judgment of Acquittal
and/or a New Trial, supra note 5, at 8 (first alteration in original)(emphasis
added).
269. Order Denying Motion to Acquit and for a New Trial, supra note 6, at 11-
12.
270. Id. at 12 n. 5.
271. See Brief for United States as Appellee, supra note 7, at 26-29.
272. Id. at 29-30.
273. United States v. Bonds, 730 F.3d 890, 895 (9th Cir. 2013).
274. See Bronston v. United States, 409 U.S. 352 (1973).
275. Id. at 357.
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precise questioning.  The quality of counsel in adversarial question-
ing serves justice better than draconian penalties, which chill the
witness’s willingness to venture anything, let alone the whole
truth.276
It is the responsibility of the lawyer to probe; testimonial
interrogation and cross-examination in particular, is a
probing, prying, pressing form of inquiry.  If a witness
evades, it is the lawyer’s responsibility to recognize the eva-
sion and to bring the witness back to the mark, to flush
out the whole truth with the tools of adversary
examination.277
Thus, literally true non-responsive statements have been held
beyond the scope of either of the federal perjury statutes, 18 U.S.C.
§ 1621 and 18 U.S.C. § 1623.278  Until Bonds, no true statement by a
witness, responsive or otherwise, had been held to incur culpability
under the federal obstruction statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1503.  While false
testimony has been held to violate Section 1503,279 Bonds represents
the first time that Section 1503 has been used to evade the Bronston
doctrine.  The anomaly of prosecuting literally true, non-responsive
statements accounts for the inconsistent arguments in the parties’
briefs.  The prosecution first concedes that Statement C is true, and
then claims it is false.  Bonds claims Statement C is responsive, and
then claims it is merely rambling.  These inconsistencies betray
searches for a standard for culpability where there is none to be
found.  This lack of a clear standard creates the conditions for arbi-
trary application of the statutes at the heart of protecting the adver-
sary process.
Though couched in terms of Section 1503, the Ninth Circuit
panel’s opinion in Bonds sets a collision course with the Bronston
doctrine under Sections 1621 and 1623 and, if affirmed, threatens
Bronston’s continued viability and undermines the intent of Con-
gress in enacting the perjury statutes.  The Ninth Circuit panel ex-
pressly predicates its Section 1503 analysis upon a premise rejected
by Bronston as to Section 1621.
Bonds claims that he could not have been convicted of
obstructing the grand jury’s investigation with an answer
276. See id. at 358-59.
277. Id.
278. See, e.g., id. at 362; United States v. Earp, 812 F.2d 917, 919-20 (4th Cir.
1987).
279. See, e.g., United States v. Cohen, 202 F. Supp. 587, 589 (D. Conn. 1962).
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that was misleading or evasive, no matter how far removed
that answer was from the question asked, unless the an-
swer was false.  According to Bonds, because his response
in Statement C was that he was a “celebrity child” was fac-
tually true, his conviction should be reversed.  The prob-
lem is that while Bonds was a celebrity child, that fact was
unrelated to the question, which asked whether Anderson
provided Bonds with any self-injectable substances.  When
factually true statements are misleading or evasive, they
can prevent the grand jury from obtaining truthful and
responsive answers.  They may therefore obstruct and im-
pede the administration of justice within the meaning of
the federal criminal statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1503. . . .280
By contrast, the Bronston Court concluded:
It may well be that petitioner’s answers were not guileless
but were shrewdly calculated to evade.  Nevertheless, we
are constrained to agree with Judge Lumbard, who dis-
sented from the judgment of the Court of Appeals, that
any special problems arising from the literally true but un-
responsive answer are to be remedied through the “ques-
tioner’s acuity” and not by a federal perjury
prosecution.281
Thus any “non-responsive” true testimony excluded from cul-
pability for perjury under Bronston is now made criminal as an ob-
struction under the Omnibus Clause of Section 1503.  As the Bonds
panel illustrates:
We can easily think of examples of responses that are true
but nevertheless obstructive.  Consider a situation where a
prosecutor asks a grand jury witness if the witness drove
the getaway car in a robbery.  The witness truthfully re-
sponds, “I do not have a driver’s license.”  This response
would be factually true, but it could also imply that he did
not drive the getaway car.  If the witness did in fact drive
the getaway car, his answer, although not in itself false,
would nevertheless be misleading, because it would imply
that he did not drive the getaway car.  It could also be
deemed evasive since it did not answer the question.282
280. United States v. Bonds, 730 F.3d 890, 894-95 (9th Cir. 2013). .
281. Bronston, 409 U.S. at 362.
282. Bonds, 730 F.3d at 895.
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A more precise analogy to Bronston’s testimony cannot be
articulated:
Q. Do you have any bank accounts in Swiss banks, Mr.
Bronston?
A. No, sir.
Q. Have you ever?
A. The company had an account there for about six
months, in Zurich.283
To paraphrase the Ninth Circuit panel:
This response would be factually true, but it could also im-
ply that he did not [have a personal Swiss account].  If the
witness did in fact [have a personal Swiss account], his an-
swer, although not in itself false, would nevertheless . . . .
be deemed evasive since it did not answer the question.284
Post-Bonds, the witness who explains, who muses, who rambles
from habit, who verbally searches her own recollection as she grap-
ples with what the question requires is at peril of criminal culpabil-
ity under Section 1503.  Among the alarming consequences of
Bonds is that the witness who in her mind attempts to give context
in which the truth as she believes it may be understood is chilled by
the threat of prosecution.  Bonds’ own alleged obstruction in State-
ment C is described by the government in its Opposition to Defen-
dant’s Motion for Judgment of Acquittal and/or a New Trial on
Count Five:
AUSA Nedrow asked if Anderson ever gave the defendant
anything requiring a syringe to inject himself with. Exh. 37
at 42.  This was a “yes or no” question.  But instead of giv-
ing a “yes or no” answer, the defendant evaded the ques-
tion by talking about how only his personal doctor
touched him, and launched into a distracting explanation
of how a person (i.e., Anderson) could only be friends
with him because “we don’t get into each others’ personal
lives,” “he knows . . . don’t come to my house talking base-
ball,” and “I don’t talk about his business.” Id.  And the
defendant had learned this approach to friendships be-
cause he had grown up with a famous father. Id. The diver-
sion tactic succeeded to some degree, as the prosecutor
283. Bronston, 409 U.S. at 354.
284. See Bonds, 730 F.3d at 895.
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responded, “Right.” Id. AUSA Nedrow was ready to move
on to other areas of questioning without having ever re-
ceived an answer to the injection question. Exh. 37 at
43. . . . The defendant only answered the injection ques-
tion when AUSA Nadel interceded and refocused the dis-
cussion on injections. Exh. 37 at 43-44.285
The government claims that the obstruction arose from the ne-
cessity of undertaking the very burden imposed by Bronston: When
AUSA Nedrow had been lulled into an acquiescent “Right,” the
alert AUSA Nadel was obliged to pursue the question that the dis-
tracted AUSA Nedrow had abandoned.  Were that the case, Bron-
ston teaches that this would have been AUSA Nadel’s duty in the
face of a witness proffering illusions of candor, even if AUSA
Nedrow’s vigilance had failed:
The cases support petitioner’s position that the perjury
statute is not to be loosely construed, nor the statute in-
voked simply because a wily witness succeeds in derailing
the question—so long as the witness speaks the literal
truth.  The burden is on the questioner to pin the witness
down to the specific object of the questioner’s inquiry. . . .
. . . .
. . . Though perhaps a plausible argument can be made
that unresponsive answers are especially likely to mislead,
any such argument must, we think, be predicated upon
the questioner’s being aware of the unresponsiveness of
the relevant answer.  Yet, if the questioner is aware of the
unresponsiveness of the answer, with equal force it can be
argued that the very unresponsiveness of the answer
should alert counsel to press on for the information he
desires.  It does not matter that the unresponsive answer is
stated in the affirmative, thereby implying the negative of
the question actually posed; for again, by hypothesis, the
examiner’s awareness of the unresponsiveness should lead
him to press another question or reframe his initial ques-
tion with greater precision.  Precise questioning is impera-
tive as a predicate for the offense of perjury.286
285. United States’ Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Judgment of Ac-
quittal and/or a New Trial on Count Five, supra note 21, at 14 (second alteration
in original) (footnote omitted) (quoting Bonds Testimony, supra note 14, at 42-
44).
286. Bronston, 409 U.S. at 360-62 (footnote omitted) (citations omitted).
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Testimony before a grand jury is ex ante neither a Section 1623
nor a Section 1503 case.  Yet, post-Bonds, every witness faces a para-
dox between Section 1503 and the perjury statutes. The govern-
ment’s contention in Bonds is that the Omnibus Clause of Section
1503 turns Bronston on its head.  The burden on the questioner co-
rollary to the perjury statutes is the very obstruction which imposes
culpability on the same witness under the Omnibus Clause.  Clearly,
such a reading of Section 1503 cannot stand alongside the Bronston
reading of 1621 and 1623.
But the more fundamental import of the government’s
description of the obstruction in the trial brief is revealed by the
actual course of questioning.  Falsehood as an element of perjury or
obstruction may be tough to prosecute, but it is tangible to the de-
fendant and tractable for the jury.  Proving truthful testimony to be
delaying, distracting, and obstructive is as confusing to the govern-
ment as it is to the witness, let alone the jury.
For example, AUSA Nadel’s purported intervention to rescue a
derailed AUSA Nedrow never happened.  A review of the relevant
transcript given in Part II (42:5-45:5),287 reveals six related ques-
tions, two by AUSA Nedrow (42:5-6 and 43:9-12),288 three by AUSA
Nadel (43:19-23, 44:4-6, and 44:14-16),289 and a resumption by
AUSA Nedrow (44:18-21).290  The first question by AUSA Nedrow
inquired as to whether Greg Anderson had given Bonds a substance
that required self-injection: “Did Greg ever give you anything that
required a syringe to inject yourself with?” (42:5-6)291
Bonds responded that only his own doctor “touched” him, that
he and Anderson did not get into each other’s “business” (42:7-16),
and then asked AUSA Nedrow, “You know what I mean?”
(42:16).292 AUSA Nedrow responded “Right,” (42:17)293 affirming
that Nedrow did know what Bonds meant.  The “Right” could not
under the circumstances reasonably lead anyone to imagine that
Nedrow had come to Bonds’ point of view, but that Nedrow, as an
alert prosecutor ought, understood what Bonds meant.  AUSA
Nedrow’s “Right” affirms his own alertness to Bonds’ statement
287. Bonds Testimony, supra note 14, at 42:5-45:5.
288. Id. at 42:5-6, 43:9-12.
289. Id. at 43:19-23, 44:4-6, 44:14-16.
290. Id. at 44:18-21.  Unless otherwise indicated, all references to the Bonds’
grand jury testimony by page and line are from Bonds Testimony, supra note
14,Bonds at 42:5-45:5.
291. Id. at 42:5-6.
292. Id. at 42:7-16.
293. Id. at 42:17.
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rather than any “diversion tactic [which] succeeded to some
degree.”294
Bonds continued about Anderson’s friendship, along with two
examples of not getting into one another’s business.  The first was
his own history as a “celebrity child.” (Statement  C) (42:18-23).295
The second example concerned his wife’s privacy, then a second
reference to his father, concluding, “Just leave it alone.  You want to
keep your friendship, keep your friendship.”(42:24-43:8).296
Bonds’ entire response to AUSA Nedrow’s self-injectable substance
question, (42:5-6)297 including AUSA Nedrow’s interjection of
“Right,” requires between 100 and 120 seconds to read aloud and
deliberately. (42:7-43:8).298  But the government alleged that this
interval was enough to derail AUSA Nedrow:
AUSA Nedrow was ready to move on to other areas of
questioning without having ever received an answer to the
injection question. Exh. 37 at 43. The defendant only an-
swered the injection question when AUSA Nadel inter-
ceded and refocused the discussion on injections.  Exh. 37
at 43-44.299
But lines 43:9-22 reveal otherwise.  AUSA Nedrow was neither
diverted, forgetful, nor ready to move on.  AUSA Nedrow was on
top of his game because he did “know what [Bonds] mean[t].”
(42:16)300  As Bonds’ Reply Brief in Support of Motions of Acquittal
and New Trial observed:
To begin, the government baldly misrepresents the re-
cord.  Immediately after Mr. Bonds completed his “State-
ment C” answer, it was AUSA Nedrow, not Nadel, who
repeated the self-injection question, which Mr. Bonds an-
swered directly and unequivocally ([Bonds Grand Jury
Testimony], at 43). “Q: Did either Mr. Anderson or Mr.
Conte ever give you a liquid that they told you to inject
into yourself to help you with this recovery type stuff, did
294. See United States’ Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Judgment of
Acquittal and/or a New Trial on Count Five, supra note 21, at 14.
295. Bonds Testimony, supra note 14, at 42:18-23.
296. Id. at 42:24-43:8.
297. Id. at 42:5-6.
298. See id. at 42:7-43:8.
299. United States’ Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Judgment of Ac-
quittal and/or a New Trial on Count Five, supra note 21, at 14 (citing Bonds Testi-
mony, supra note 14, at 43-44).
300. Bonds Testimony, supra note 14, at 42:16.
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that ever happen?  A.  No.”)  Only then did AUSA Nadel
interject a question about whether anyone other than his
doctor had injected Mr. Bonds.(Id.)301
AUSA Nedrow did precisely what Bronston requires when faced
with a non-responsive answer: “[B]y hypothesis, the examiner’s
awareness of the unresponsiveness should lead him to press an-
other question or reframe his initial question with greater preci-
sion.  Precise questioning is imperative as a predicate for the
offense of perjury.”302 Alert to Bonds’ unresponsiveness, AUSA
Nedrow reframed his initial question (43:9-12),303 identical in con-
tent with his first about Bonds’shaving received a self-injectable sub-
stance (42:5-6),304 except that the reframed question identified the
substance more precisely and included Conte as a potential sup-
plier (43:9-12).305  AUSA Nedrow got a direct answer:
“No.”(43:13)306
Only upon eliciting Bonds’ direct answer was AUSA Nedrow
ready to move on: “Okay.  At his time, Mr. Bonds, the grand jury
has–. . . .”(43:14-15).307  At this point, AUSA Nadel intervened, not
to rescue AUSA Nedrow, who had persevered with precision, but to
ask a separate line of questions, not about what self-injectable sub-
stance Bonds had received, but about who had ever personally intra-
venously injected or drawn from Bonds any substance, be it drug or
blood. (43:23, 44:4-6, 44:14-16).308  AUSA Nadel took his cue for his
questions from the very answer that Bonds had given about having
only his own physician touch him. (42:7).309  It is difficult to charac-
terize AUSA Nadel’s intervention as “refocusing” AUSA Nedrow to
further pursue whether Bonds received a self-injectable substance,
since that question had been asked and answered di-
rectly.(43:13).310  Bonds’ answer did not distract AUSA Nedrow to
any degree from his purpose, but rather inspired AUSA Nadel to
launch his own distinct line of inquiry:
301. Defendant’s Reply in Support of Motions for Judgment of Acquittal
and/or a New Trial, supra note 5, at 4 (citing Bonds Testimony, supra note 14, at
43).
302. See Bronston, 409 U.S. at 362.
303. See Bonds Testimony, supra note 14, at 43:9-12.
304. See id. at 42:5-6.
305. See id. at 43:9-12.
306. Id. at 43:13.
307. Id. at 43:14-15.
308. See id. at 43:22-23, 44:4-6, 44:14-16.
309. See id. at 42:7.
310. See id. at 43:13.
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AUSA Nadel: If I could just go back to Mr. Nedrow’s ques-
tion a few moments ago. (43:16-17)
AUSA Nedrow: Okay. (43:18)
Questioning By AUSA Nadel:
Q: I wasn’t sure if I heard the answer to the question.
Other than your own personal doctor that you re-
ferred to–(43:19-23)
A: Well, the team – you know, you have to have a
physical.  I’m sorry. Forget about the team. You have
to have a physical, they take blood from you then.
But I wouldn’t let no one, no.  That’s why my per-
sonal doctor drew the blood for BALCO to begin
with. (43:24-44:3)
Q: So no one else other than perhaps the team doc-
tor and your personal physician has ever injected any-
thing in to you or taken anything out? (44:4-6)
A: Well, there’s other doctors from surgeries.  I can
answer that question, if you’re getting technical like
that.  Sure there are other people that have stuck
needles in me and have drawn out – I’ve had a bunch
of surgeries, yes. (44:7-11)
Q: So–(44:12)
A: So sorry. (44:13)
Q: – the team physician, when you’ve had surgery,
and your own personal physician.  But no other indi-
viduals like Mr. Anderson or any associates of
his?(44:14-16)
A: No, no  [Count Two]. (44:17)311
AUSA Nadel’s line of questioning drew from Bonds a direct
answer, “No, no,”(44:17)312 as to who had injected or drawn from
him intravenously, and the grand jury indicted Bonds for perjury
for that answer.  But “No, no” (44:17)answers questions as to identi-
ties of other injectors, wholly  distinct from AUSA Nedrow’s question
as to whether Anderson provided a self-injectable substance.  AUSA
Nedrow already had his answer when AUSA Nadel intervened.
At the close of AUSA Nadel’s questions, AUSA Nedrow re-
prised his question about self-injection by Bonds:
311. Id. at 43:16-44:17.
312. Id. at 44:17.
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Q: Just to follow-up before I go on to my other thing, have
you ever yourself injected yourself with anything that Greg
Anderson gave you? (44:18-21)
A: I’m not that talented, no.(44:22)313
AUSA Nedrow’s designation of  Question 44:18-21 as a “follow-
up” signifies that it is AUSA Nedrow who is refocusing the question-
ing upon self-injection, and that if anything diverted AUSA Nedrow
from the self-injection question and its presentation to the Grand
Jury, it was AUSA Nadel’s intervention about others injecting or
drawing from Bonds.  AUSA Nadel’s interruption required the
ever-alert AUSA Nedrow to reprise the self-injection question to in-
sure that the Grand Jury understood the thrust of his own inquiry.
Only then, after refocusing the Grand Jury’s attention upon
self-injection, did AUSA Nedrow “move on”:
Q: Okay.  We have a packet that I would like to identify as
Exhibit 503.
And I have distributed copies of it.
And Mr. Bonds, this is the first page. So, we’re going to
refer to page one of that packet.  And I’d like to give you a
moment, Mr. Bonds, to look at it. And I want to ask you a
couple of questions about it.(44:23-45:5)314
In short, AUSA Nedrow asked two questions about self-injec-
tion (42:5-6, 43:9-12), the latter of which was answered directly
(43:13); AUSA Nadel asked three questions about others who had
injected or drawn from Bonds (43:19-23, 44:4-6, 44:14-16), the last
of which was answered directly (44:17), and then AUSA Nedrow
reprised the self-injection question (44:18-21), which was answered
directly (44:22).  AUSA Nedrow then moved on to a series of ques-
tions about Exhibit 503 concerning, at least initially, taking blood
samples from Bonds(44:23-47:11).315  AUSA Nadel then intervened
again, referring to Exhibit 503 and asking about the substance “G,”
(47:12-48:15)316 whereupon AUSA Nedrow returned to inquiring
about self-injectable substances, this time specifying human growth
hormone (48:16-49:25),317 eliciting the same answers .(48:25-49:2
and 49:5).318  In fact the transcript shows that AUSA Nadel and
313. Id. at 44:18-44:22.
314. Id. at 44:23-45:45.
315. See id. at 44:23-47:11.
316. See id. at 47:12-48:15.
317. See id. at 48:16-49:25.
318. See id. at 48:25-49:2, 49:5.
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AUSA Nedrow routinely traded questioning duties (55:8, 56:2,
62:15, 63:9, 66:13, 66:22, 72:7, 72:11, 81:4),319 before the Grand
Jury required a break (82:2-14).320  Sometimes the attorneys
changed the line of questioning, continued a line of questioning,
followed up on an answer, or reprised a line of questions.
While the Grand Jury was well able to weigh the evidence and
bring indictments for perjury, such as Count Two at 44:17 (“No,
no.”), as well as to find something to that point unspecified in
Bonds’ testimony as obstructive for Count Five, it is very difficult to
see the manifestation of any obstruction in the routine sharing of
questioning duties between two experienced attorneys alertly work-
ing in tandem.  This matters, because the Special Verdict form only
indicates that the trial jury found obstruction in Statement C,
among the seven passages suggested to them in the Jury Instruc-
tions (Counts One, Two, and Three for perjury, and Statements A,
B, C, and D).321  As the Special Verdict form did not specify or ex-
plain why the trial jury unanimously agreed that Statement C was
obstructive, any explanation of Statement C’s obstruction must
come from the government’s Opposition Brief to Bonds’ Motion
for Acquittal and/or a New Trial on Count Five.322 Taking the Op-
position Brief at its word, the prosecution struggles to identify the
obstructiveness of Statement C:
1. Statement C is false: As it is incontestable that Bonds was a
“celebrity child,” the Government’s Opposition Brief focuses on
“That’s what keeps our friendship,” claiming that what keeps that
friendship is not staying out of each other’s business, but is
uniquely the steroid business.  Judge Illston rejected that rationale
for denying Bonds’ motions in that the statements were subject to
any number of interpretations, none of which had been argued to
the jury by the government.  Crucially, the government had already
conceded that Statement C was “not outright false, “ and that had it
been false, it would have been charged under Section 1623, along
with Counts One, Two, and Three.323  The government at trial then
either did not view Statement C as false or could not convince
Judge Illston that it was.  While false testimony can certainly be a
basis for obstruction under Section 1503, arguing that it is false
319. See id. at 55:8, 56:2, 62:15, 63:9, 66:13, 66:22, 72:7, 72:11, 81:4.
320. See id. at 82:2-14.
321. Verdict, supra note 33, at 2.
322. See United States’ Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Judgment of
Acquittal and/or a New Trial on Count Five, supra note 21.
323. See Defendant’s Reply in Support of Motions for Judgment of Acquittal
and/or a New Trial, supra note 5, at 8.
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seems to be wholly post hoc, and the government’s serial contradic-
tory stances, as well as the effort to have it both ways at once (“not
outright false”), evince a confusion about obstruction to which a
standard of truth or falsity is not susceptible.
2. Statement C led AUSA Nedrow astray, and he nearly abandoned
his self-injection question until “refocused” by AUSA Nadel: This is de-
monstrably untrue.  This article cannot in the least endorse Bonds’
Reply Brief’s assertion that, “To begin, the government baldly mis-
represents the record,”324 but recordatio ipsa loquitur.  Rather, the
government is most evidently confused about what the obstructive
impact upon the questioning might be.  AUSA Nedrow was not dis-
tracted from his self-injection question, AUSA Nadel did not
refocus AUSA Nedrow, and the three lines of inquiry about self-
injectable substances, the identities of any injectors, and whether
Bonds had injected himself were directly answered in turn.  It can-
not be that experienced attorneys performing just as Bronston di-
rects manifest any obstruction, as no testimony is ex ante either 1503
or 1623.  It cannot be that the experienced attorneys’ routine shar-
ing of questioning duties and alert taking of cues from one another
are any more remarkable after Statement C than the turn-taking
that pervades the Record and is indeed the professional norm.
3. Statement C is non-responsive: Rather than consider the gov-
ernment’s argument that Statement C was false, Judge Illston relied
upon the non-responsiveness of Bonds’ answer and the effect of
that non-responsiveness upon the government’s attorneys.
Here, defendant repeatedly provided nonresponsive an-
swers to questions about whether Anderson had ever pro-
vided him with injectables, resulting in the prosecuting
attorneys asking clarifying question after clarifying ques-
tion, and even once resulting in one prosecutor interrupt-
ing another who was about to move on to a new topic in
order to clarify defendant’s mixed responses.  An evasive
answer about an issue material to the grand jury is not nec-
essarily rendered immaterial by the later provision of a di-
rect answer, even if that answer is true.325
Judge Illston’s observation is noteworthy in two respects.  First,
obstruction is manifest by the “prosecuting attorneys asking clarify-
ing question after clarifying question,” the very duty to which they
are called by Bronston, and for which purpose the grand jury is
324. Id. at 4.
325. Order Denying Motion to Acquit and for a New Trial, supra note 6, at 14.
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called.  No case, no testimony, no exchange is ex ante 1503 or 1623,
but centers, rather, upon a citizen called to the witness stand under
oath to whom a consistent divide between obligation and liberty is
owed.  The criminality of Statement C, in Judge Illston’s view, is not
intrinsic in the statement itself, as in perjury, but may be contingent
upon the questioner understanding that which is clear to the wit-
ness, or upon the strategic choice of the questioner to elicit re-
peated answers to the same question for emphasis to the jury, or
upon a strategic choice to switch back and forth among lines of
questions to test the consistency of the witness, all of which may be
refashioned in hindsight, just as AUSA Nadel’s interposition of the
inquiry as to injections by others326 was recast as AUSA Nedrow’s puta-
tive rescue from “moving on” from the self-injection inquiry.327
This criminality in hindsight places the actus reus not in the
testimony itself, as in perjury, but into the government’s choices,
both at the time of testimony and years later, from among the sev-
eral reactions or potential reactions to that testimony.  It is
Heisenberg Culpability, where Schro¨dinger’s defendant makes a
non-responsive true statement in the witness box, and the witness is
both and neither guiltless nor dead to rights until the government
chooses to view the testimony as 1621/1623 or 1503.  In other
words, the attachment of criminality is not in the witness’s control,
but the government’s.  It was for this reason that the Bronston Court
distinguished half truths, even if deceptive, on the stand from other
occasions for prosecuting, say, fraud:
Petitioner’s answer is not to be measured by the same stan-
dards applicable to criminally fraudulent or extortionate
statements.  In that context, the law goes “rather far in
punishing intentional creation of false impressions by a se-
lection of literally true representations, because the actor
himself generally selects and arranges the representa-
tions.”  In contrast, “under our system of adversary ques-
tioning and cross-examination the scope of disclosure is
largely in the hands of counsel and presiding officer.”328
It is singular to rest felony culpability upon an Ineffective Assis-
tance of Government Counsel theory, conceding that “our system
of adversary questioning and cross-examination” had slipped from
326. See Bonds Testimony, supra note 14, at 43:16-44:17.
327. See United States’ Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Judgment of
Acquittal and/or a New Trial on Count Five, supra note 21, at 14.
328. Bronston v. United States, 409 U.S. 352, 358 n.4 (1973) (quoting A.L.I.
Model Penal Code § 208.20, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1957, p. 124)).
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“the hands of counsel,” palsied by the spell of a celebrity child.  It is
remarkable to find in the record that the purportedly ineffective
counsel were in fact performing their duties precisely as Bronston
requires, i.e., persisting until their questions reveal the truth or
elicit an “outright” falsehood that can be prosecuted as perjury.
But it passes all understanding to find the obstruction statute used
to relieve the government of the duties imposed by the perjury stat-
utes and to eviscerate the Supreme Court’s preeminent teaching
thereon.  Whatever the witness’s protections under the perjury stat-
utes, they are a nullity if the government may proceed with the Om-
nibus Clause instead, playing God and playing dice with uncertain
principles.
Second, Judge Illston’s observation is noteworthy to the degree
that the government’s confusion regarding AUSA Nadel’s pur-
ported rescue of AUSA Nedrow informs the trial court’s rationale.
The trial court’s prime example of obstruction cited “one prosecu-
tor interrupting another who was about to move on to a new topic
in order to clarify defendant’s mixed responses.”329  It is evident
that the trial court relied upon the government’s re-characteriza-
tion of the Nedrow-Nadel exchange,330 rather than the record it-
self.  For both the government and the trial court  lines 43:9-13, in
which AUSA Nedrow followed Statement C with the “single addi-
tional question”331 about self-injectable substances, never existed:
AUSA Nedrow: Did either Mr. Anderson or Mr. Conte
ever give you a liquid that they told you to inject into your-
self to help you with this recovery type stuff, did that ever
happen? (43:9-12)
A [Bonds]: No. (43:13)332
For both the government and the court, AUSA Nadel’s ques-
tions (who injected?) are the same as AUSA Nedrow’s questions
(self-injectable).  To illustrate, the two attorneys’ questions are set
forth in sequence below, with AUSA Nedrow’s topics in italics and
AUSA Nadel’s topics underlined:
AUSA Nedrow: Did Greg ever give you anything that re-
quired a syringe to inject yourself with?(42:5-6)333
329. Order Denying Motion to Acquit and for a New Trial, supra note 6, at 14.
330. See United States’ Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Judgment of
Acquittal and/or a New Trial on Count Five, supra note 21, at 14.
331. Bronston, 409 U.S. at 358.
332. Bonds Testimony, supra note 14, at 43:9-13.
333. Id. at 42:5-6 (distinct emphasis added).
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AUSA Nedrow: Did either Mr. Anderson or Mr. Conte
ever give you a liquid that they told you to inject into yourself to
help you with this recovery type stuff, did that ever hap-
pen?(43:9-12)334
AUSA Nadel: If I could just go back to Mr. Nedrow’s ques-
tion a few moments ago.(43:16-17)335
AUSA Nedrow: Okay. (43:18)336
AUSA Nadel: I wasn’t sure if I heard the answer to the
question. Other than your own personal doctor that you
referred to–(43:19-23)337
AUSA Nadel: So no one else other than perhaps the team
doctor and your personal physician has ever injected any-
thing in to you or taken anything out?(44:4-6)338
AUSA Nadel: –the team physician, when you’ve had sur-
gery, and your own personal physician.  But no other indi-
viduals like Mr. Anderson or any associates of his?(44:14-
16)339
AUSA Nedrow: Just to follow-up before I go on to my other
thing, have you ever yourself injected yourself with anything
that Greg Anderson gave you? (44:18-21)340
Yet, aligning the questions of  both attorneys in order makes
clear (1) that AUSA Nedrow consistently asked about self-injectable
substances, (2) that AUSA Nadel by contrast consistently asked the
identities of any other persons who had injected substances into or
withdrawn substances from Bonds, (3) that Nedrow’s “single addi-
tional question”341 at 43: 9-12 following Statement C elicited the
direct answer “No” from Bonds at 43:13, (4) that Nadel’s subse-
quent interposition of questions as to who had injected or with-
drawn substances from Bonds was the only plausible distraction
from Nedrow’s line of questioning, (5) that it was Nedrow who
refocused (“Just to follow-up”) the witness and the grand jury on
self-injectables following Nadel’s excursion into injections and with-
drawals by others and, finally, (6) that Nadel refocused no one on
anything, but pursued his own new line of inquiry.
334. Id. at 43:9-12 (distinct emphasis added).
335. Id. at 43:16-17 (distinct emphasis added).
336. Id. at 43:18 (distinct emphasis added).
337. Id. at 43:19-23 (distinct emphasis added).
338. Id. at 44:4-6 (distinct emphasis added).
339. Id. at 44:14-16 (distinct emphasis added).
340. Id. at 44:18-21 (distinct emphasis added).
341. Bronston v. United States, 409 U.S. 352, 358 (1973).
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The trial court’s mistaken reliance on the government’s con-
fused recharacterization of these questions and answers is impor-
tant because the court considered AUSA Nadel’s purported rescue
of AUSA Nedrow important.  Having declined to endorse the al-
leged falsity of Statement C, the trial court relied upon the alleged
actual and potential impact of Statement C upon the prosecution
and the grand jury.  The trial court centered the actual impact
upon the prosecutors’ repeated questions, which Bronston makes
their responsibility in any event, and upon AUSA Nadel’s pur-
ported rescue of AUSA Nedrow, which never happened.  Without
an actual impact, there remains but amorphous speculation as to
the obstructive potential as to any truthful answer, yes, no, or other-
wise: “It is no answer to say that here the jury found that petitioner
intended to mislead his examiner. A jury should not be permitted
to engage in conjecture whether an unresponsive answer, true and
complete on its face, was intended to mislead or divert the
examiner . . . .”342
To make unresponsiveness the test for obstruction makes haz-
ardous any witness’s proffer of context, qualification, mitigation, or
perception lest it be taken as a stalling tactic, the effect of which
lasts but seconds.  The very effort to give “the whole truth” would
risk breaking the oath that requires exactly that.
4. The answer is too long: The government’s core complaint is
that Bonds did not either capitulate or commit perjury with an im-
mediate Yes or No answer:
AUSA Nedrow asked if Anderson ever gave the defendant
anything requiring a syringe to inject himself with. . . .
This was a “yes or no” question.  But instead of giving a
“yes or no” answer, the defendant evaded the question by
talking about how only his personal doctor touched him,
and launched into a distracting explanation of how a per-
son (i.e. Anderson) could only be friends with him be-
cause “we don’t get into each other’s personal lives,” “he
know . . . don’t come to my house talking baseball,” and “I
don’t talk about his business.” . . . And the defendant had
learned his approach to friendships because he had grown
up with a famous father.343
342. Id. at 359.
343. United States’ Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Judgment of Ac-
quittal and/or a New Trial on Count Five, supra note 21, at 14 (second alteration
in original) (footnote omitted) (citations omitted).
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The government’s reading of Section 1503 is that any behavior
or testimony short of submission is “distracting” and warrants pun-
ishment.  Whatever the truth of the answer to the self-injection
question, it is not the case that the truthful answer to what a ques-
tioner perceives or wishes to be a yes or no question is in fact a yes
or no question, if only because the witness possesses knowledge and
context that the questioner lacks, particularly before an investiga-
tive grand jury.  No lawyer, no matter how skilled, can know before-
hand whether an explanation of length is required to tell “the
whole truth.”  In any event, “the requirement to answer a question
directly [is] accompanied by the privilege to explain the answer”344
The government attributes criminality to the occasion for its
having to do its job, i.e., the probing persistent questioning to bring
the truth to light.  All this took was a “single additional question,”345
which is the government’s obligation. Attributing criminality to an
answer longer than “yes or no” is the very type of charge that has
been characterized as a crime of “obstinacy,”
a strain of process crime prosecutions aimed at securing
convictions against simply defiant or insubordinate indi-
viduals—not because their action actually threatens the in-
tegrity of judicial processes or because they are otherwise
difficult to convict, but solely because their acts constitute
an affront to the formal dignity or authority of the state.
. . . .
. . . Whether substantively tacked onto the “core” of per-
version of government function or procedurally used as a
means of penalizing defendants solely for their contu-
macy, the obstinacy offense renders illicit more than ac-
tual frustration of government efforts—it sweeps in simple
noncooperation and nonacquiescence.  Obstinacy of-
fenses condemn behaviors just because they make it more
difficult for police to police, or prosecutors to prosecute,
or judges to judge . . . .  Simple noncooperation, not active
contravention, constitutes deviance.346
The Home Run King is tailor-made for just such a charge, and
the boundless Omnibus Clause of Section 1503 is tailor-made to
punish as non-cooperative a statement expressly beyond the writ of
344. United States v. Minkoff, 137 F.2d 402, 405 (2d Cir. 1943).
345. Bronston, 409 U.S. at 358 (emphasis added).
346. Erin Murphy, Manufacturing Crime: Process, Pretext, and Criminal Justice, 97
GEO. L.J. 1435, 1446, 1451 (2009).
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Congress, the ruling of a unanimous Supreme Court, and the rights
of free citizens even, and especially, in the witness box.
5. The testimony is evasive: The government’s position is that
Statement C is non-responsive to the question asked and stitches
together truths to imply a falsehood.  This is testimony squarely
within Bronston, making further questioning incumbent upon the
examiner.  As conceded by the trial court, “It is true that the parties
have pointed to no reported decisions reviewing such a conviction”
under Section 1503.347  The “narrow[ed] context, or settled legal
meanings”348 of “evasive” testimony under Section 1503 consists of
three types of false statements, which conceal information and ob-
struct further inquiry: (1) false denial of memory;349 (2) false denial
of knowledge;350 and, (3) other false accounts.351  Bonds’ State-
ment C is none of these things.  “Evasive” must be used with some
settled meaning if law has any chance of guiding the witness or the
jurors. If judicially evolved terms such as “evasive” are to be used as
criteria for culpability that must be proven beyond a reasonable
doubt, the jury needs the narrowing context of the usage under
Section 1503 following Bronston, lest the indeterminacy of the ver-
nacular violate due process.
Thus Bonds’ testimony is not criminal because Statement C
was false, or non-responsive, nor too long, nor incomplete, nor eva-
sive, nor falsely forgetful, nor especially because the government’s
attorneys had to do the job that the people pay them to do.  If State-
ment C is criminal, it must be because truthful non-responsive testi-
mony is obstructive.  It is thus necessary to examine the authority
for that proposition.
D. The Bonds Courts Handle the Truth
In Bonds, neither the District Court nor Ninth Circuit panel
examined the foundations of their cited support for bringing truth-
ful unresponsive testimony within the Omnibus Clause.  The Dis-
trict court quoted Cohn for the proposition that the Omnibus
Clause applies to “evasive” testimony:
347. Order Denying Motion to Acquit and for a New Trial, supra note 6, at 12.
348. See United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 306 (2008) (Scalia, J., major-
ity opinion).
349. See United States v. Alo, 439 F.2d 751 (2d Cir. 1971); United States v.
Cohn, 452 F.2d 881 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 975 (1972).
350. See United States v. Williams, 874 F.2d 968, 977 & n.26 (5th Cir. 1989).
351. See United States v. Brown, 459 F.3d 509, 530-31 (5th Cir. 2006); United
States v. Thomas, 612 F.3d 1107, 1129 (9th Cir. 2010).
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[The statute] deals with the deliberate frustrations
through the use of corrupt or false means of an agency’s
attempt to gather relevant evidence.  The blatantly evasive
witness achieves this effect as surely by erecting a screen of
feigned forgetfulness as one who burns files or induces a
potential witness to absent himself.352
In fact, the quoted language is from United States v. Alo,353
speaking in terms of Section 1505, hence the reference to an
“agency’s attempt to gather relevant evidence.” Cohn cited Alo with
reference to “evasive” testimony as false denials of memory, the
“screen of feigned forgetfulness,”354 rather than the broader sug-
gestion of “misleading” true non-responsive testimony governed by
Bronston.  The District Court ignored not only Bronston, but also the
very facts held within the Alo/Cohn quotation.  The skimming of
soundbites thus led the District Court to apply Cohn beyond its
holding.
The same is true of its citation to Griffin:
Reaching a similar conclusion, the Fifth Circuit has stated
that whether testimony is “described in the indictment as
‘evasive’ because [a person] deliberately concealed knowl-
edge or ‘false’ because he blocked the flow of truthful in-
formation is immaterial.” . . . In either event, it can
constitute obstruction of justice, as long as the govern-
ment charges and proves at trial “that the testimony had
the effect of impeding justice.”355
The Ninth Circuit panel similarly wrote of Griffin:
Several courts have noted the material similarity between
evasive or misleading testimony and false testimony.  In
United States v. Griffin, the Fifth Circuit observed that there
was no material difference between an evasive answer that
deliberately conceals information and a false answer, be-
cause both block the flow of truthful information.356
352. Order Denying Motion to Acquit and for a New Trial, supra note 6, at 12-
13 (quoting Cohn, 452 F.2d at 883-884).
353. See Alo, 439 F.2d at 754.
354. Cohn, 452 F.2d at 884 (quoting Alo,, 439 F.2d at 754).
355. Order Denying Motion to Acquit and for a New Trial, supra note 6, at 13
(first alteration in original) (citations omitted) (quoting United States v. Griffin,
589 F.2d 200, 204 (5th Cir. 1979)).
356. United States v. Bonds, 730 F.3d 890, 895 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing Griffin,
589 F.2d at 204).
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Each citation is perfectly sound except for the failure to note
that the “evasive” language from Griffin addresses the false denial of
recall in both Cohn and Griffin.  In the cited quotation, Griffin re-
solved a potential tension with Cohn, which had posited that the
false denials of memory in that case were obstruction because of the
concealment of evidence rather than the falsehood of the denial.
As Griffin’s testimony consisted of denial of knowledge as well as
denial of memory, the Griffin court found the testimony obstructive
whether viewed as concealment or falsehood.
The Bonds Ninth Circuit panel next cited Perkins without re-
gard to its context in the Griffin line or Perkins’ feigned failure of
recall:
The Eleventh Circuit in United States v. Perkins grouped
evasive and false statements together when it stated that “a
reasonable jury could have found that [the defendant’s]
answers were evasive or false in an effort to obstruct the
grand jury’s investigation.”357
The Perkins court, in fact, grouped Perkins’ ordinary false-
hoods with “evasive” false denial of recall: “No, I don’t think I did. I
might have, but I don’t recall right now, having done it.”358
The Bonds courts’ principal supports for including “evasive”
truthful non-responsive testimony within Section 1503 thus fail to
take into account the specific meaning of “evasive” in Alo, Cohn,
Griffin, and Perkins.  Nor do they take into account Bronston, the
case that does apply to misleading truthful non-responsive
testimony.
The Bonds courts’ other authority is yet less applicable.  Both
cite United States v. Remini.359  The District Court wrote:
Defendant argues that the jury’s guilty verdict cannot
stand because section 1503 does not proscribe obstructing
justice by means of truthful but evasive answers. It is true
that the parties have pointed to no reported decisions reviewing
such a conviction. [Emphasis added.] However, at least one
federal district court has concluded “that literally true but
evasive and misleading testimony” would support a convic-
tion under section 1503. See United States v. Remini, 967
F.2d 754, 755 (2d Cir. 1992) (describing a trial court rul-
357. Id. at 895 (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Perkins, 748
F.2d 1519, 1527-28 (11th Cir. 1984)).
358. Perkins, 748 F.2d at 1522 n.7.
359. 967 F.2d 754 (2d Cir. 1992).
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ing in United States v. Gambino (Thomas), 89-CR-431
(E.D.N.Y.) (Jack B. Weinstein, J.)).360
Likewise, the Ninth Circuit panel cited Remini: The Second Cir-
cuit quoted with approval the district court in United States v. Gam-
bino (Thomas), No. 89-CR-431 (E.D.N.Y.), in which Judge Jack
Weinstein said that “literally true but evasive and misleading testi-
mony would support prosecution of [the defendant] for obstruc-
tion of justice.”361
In fact, the Remini case was an obstruction case based upon the
defendant’s refusal to testify at all in the Gambino case, even after
Remini had been granted immunity.362 As indicated, Judge Wein-
stein’s position during the Gambino trial was not before the Remini
court, as Remini himself had said absolutely nothing in the Gambino
trial.  The Second Circuit’s entire treatment of the issue is in the
first paragraph giving the context of the Gambino trial.
Remini’s indictment and conviction resulted from his re-
fusal to testify in November 1989 at the trial of United States
v. Thomas Gambino, 89 Cr. 431, in the Eastern District of
New York, Jack B. Weinstein, J. The indictment in that
case charged Gambino with giving false, evasive and mis-
leading testimony to a grand jury, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1503. During the trial, Judge Weinstein ruled that liter-
ally true but evasive and misleading testimony would sup-
port prosecution of Gambino for obstruction of justice.363
Remini’s reaction is actually the textbook example of the effect
on witnesses of which Bronston had warned:
When the government called Remini to testify, Remini
moved to quash the trial subpoena, claiming that the gov-
ernment intended to ask him questions derived from ille-
gal electronic surveillance. He also claimed that his
immunity order was inadequate under the Fifth Amend-
ment because the government had maintained the posi-
tion in the Gambino trial that literally true but misleading
answers given under an immunity order would be subject
360. Order Denying Motion to Acquit and for a New Trial, supra note 6, at 11-
12 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted) (citing Remini, 967 F.2d at 755)
361. Bonds, 730 F.3d at 895-96 (citing Remini, 967 F.2d at 755).
362. See Remini, 967 F.2d at 755.
363. Id.
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to prosecution. Judge Weinstein denied Remini’s motion
to quash.364
As Bronston foretold:
To hold otherwise would be to inject a new and confusing
element into the adversary testimonial system we know.
Witnesses would be unsure of the extent of their responsi-
bility for the misunderstandings and inadequacies of ex-
aminers, and might well fear having that responsibility
tested by a jury under the vague rubric of “intent to mis-
lead” or “perjury by implication.” The seminal modern
treatment of the history of the offense concludes that one
consideration of policy overshadowed all others during
the years when perjury first emerged as a common-law of-
fense: “that the measures taken against the offense must
not be so severe as to discourage witnesses from appearing
or testifying.”365
Better than trying Remini for refusal to testify would have been
testimony from Remini without Judge Weinstein’s ruling.  This
bears upon the value of the Remini paragraph as authority in Bonds.
First, there was no testimony by Remini so we have no idea just
what potential testimony was pre-characterized as “literally true but
evasive and misleading.”  There is no hint as to whether the allusion
is to false denial of memory, or to responsive or non-responsive
answers.
Second, there is no indication as to whether or how Judge
Weinstein addressed Bronston.  The Gambino case could not have
been either 1621 or 1503 before testimony even occurred.
Third, there is no allusion in Remini as to what other testimony
in Gambino might have been related to Judge Weinstein’s ruling.
Fourth, nothing in the Second Circuit’s description of Judge
Weinstein’s ruling in the context of the Gambino case can be de-
scribed as “with approval.”  There are no words of approval.  There
is a serial recital of events at trial and nothing more.
The Bonds District Court referred to two other cases for
support:
364. Id.
365. Bronston v. United States, 409 U.S. 352, 359 (1973) (quoting Study of
Perjury, reprinted in Report of New York Law Revision Commission,
Legis.Doc.no.60, p. 249 (1935)).
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Additionally, with regard to 18 U.S.C. section 1505, which
uses nearly identical language to proscribe obstruction of
administrative proceedings and legislative inquiries and
investigation, the D.C. Circuit has explained that “literal
truth may not be a complete defense to obstruction,” be-
cause “[e]ven a literally true statement may be mislead-
ing.” See United States v.  Safavian, 528 F.3d 957, 968 (D.C.
Cir. 2008); see also United States v. Browning, 630 F.2d 694,
699 (10th Cir.  1980) (“Literal truth is not the test
here”).366
Neither Safavian nor Browning had to do with sworn testimony
under oath.  Safavian, a federal agency official, had written a letter
requesting ethics advice, had been interviewed by a federal agent
about his ethical conduct, and had written a letter to the Senate
subcommittee investigating the matter.367  Neither the interview
nor the letters are sworn testimony under oath in court subject to
the cross-examination process to which Bronston applies.
Safavian was convicted of five counts of false statements under
18 U.S.C. § 1001 and obstruction under Section 1505.  The D.C.
Circuit reversed all convictions in pertinent part because the trial
court excluded an expert witness who could testify as to the special-
ized technical meanings of Safavian’s words.368  The D.C. Circuit’s
observation on “literal truth” compared Safavian’s charges and de-
fenses under Section 1505 to those under Section 1001.369  The
charges under Section 1001 would have been subject to a literal
truth defense.370  The basis of comparison was the application of
the definitions of 18 U.S.C. § 1515(b) by its express terms to Sec-
tion 1505, as distinct from Section 1001.  Section 1515 provides:
“(b) As used in section 1505, the term ‘corruptly’ means acting with
an improper purpose, personally or by influencing another, includ-
ing making a false or misleading statement, or withholding, con-
366. Order Denying Motion to Acquit and for a New Trial, supra note 6, at 12
(alteration in original) (emphasis added) (in-text citations maintained).
367. See Safavian, 528 F.3d at 960-62.
368. See id. at 968.
369. See id. at 967-68.
370. See id.  (“With respect to Counts 2 and 5, which charged violations of
§ 1001(a) (1), literal truth would have been a complete defense. . . .  If Safavian
intended having business or working with GSA to have the meaning used by gov-
ernment contract professionals, then he did not knowingly and willfully make a
false statement to the GSA ethics officer (Count 2) or the Senate Committee
(Count 5).”). Id. (footnote omitted)  (citations omitted).
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cealing, altering, or destroying a document or other
information.”371
The D.C. Circuit noted that Congress had defined “corruptly”
for Section 1505 to include making a false or  “misleading” state-
ment.  This was not true of Section 1001, as Section 1515 applies by
its explicit terms exclusively to Section 1505.
One is guilty of obstruction if he “corruptly . . . influences,
obstructs, or impedes or endeavors to influence, obstruct,
or impede” an investigation. 18 U.S.C. § 1505.  Section
1515 defines “corruptly” as “acting with an improper pur-
pose . . . including making a false or misleading statement,
or withholding, [or] concealing” information. Even a liter-
ally true statement may be misleading and so, unlike
§ 1001(a)(1), literal truth may not be a complete defense
to obstruction.372
Had Congress wished to apply the same interpretation to testi-
monial obstruction under Section 1503, it could or would have
when it enacted Section 1515(b). Safavian does not therefore offer
support for the Bonds District Court.
Nor does United States v. Browning.373  John V. Browning was
president of Browning Arms Company, which imported certain
arms from France for sale in the United States.  As a price in excess
of $25.00 triggered a substantial import duty, Browning kept the
price just below $25.00 and compensated the French firm
(Fabrique Nationale or FN) for the differential with the real costs
with side payments.  When customs officials began to investigate the
practice, it required that the French firm disclose payments over
the invoice price.  Browning was convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 1505
of obstructing the due administration of the customs laws by sug-
gesting to the French that the cost differential be attributed to
“general overhead” rather than side payments, which would
amount to fraud.374
Browning sought to assert Bronston on appeal.  The Tenth Cir-
cuit correctly distinguished a perjury prosecution for false testi-
mony in court from impeding a customs investigation by urging
another to misrepresent the truth:
371. 18 U.S.C. § 1505(b) (2012).
372. United States v. Safavian, 528 F.3d 957, 967-68 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (citing
United States v. Browning, 630 F.2d 694, 699 (10th Cir. 1980)).
373. 630 F.2d 694 (10th Cir. 1980).
374. See id. at 696-98.
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The ultimate question in the case at bar is not whether the
defendant told the truth but whether the defendant ob-
structed or interfered with the process of truthfinding in
an investigation in the process of enforcing the law. In
other words, was the defendant, Mr. Browning, seeking to
counsel FN to answer the questions in a manner which
would interfere with the process of truthfinding?  Literal
truth is not the test here, and, in any event, Browning did
not counsel FN to tell the literal truth.375
Literal truth was indeed not the test in Browning because it had
to do with out of court business communications rather than any-
thing said in court.  Were it the test, Browning himself did not
counsel literal truth, but rather a mischaracterization of payments
in FN’s response to a U.S. Customs investigator.376
“Literal truth is not the test here”377 was perfectly applicable
under Section 1505 to out of court statements to investigators.  “Lit-
eral truth” is, however, the test for non-responsive answers under
oath in court whether the charge can be brought under Section
1621, 1623, or 1503.  Thus neither Safavian nor its reference to
Browning supports the Bonds courts upon examination of those
cases.
IX. ALTERNATIVE BASES FOR BONDS’ CULPABILITY
UNDER SECTION 1503
As there is little to no precedent plausibly supporting the inclu-
sion of truthful non-responsive testimony by a witness within Sec-
tion 1503, such an expansion would have to rest upon less specific
support.  The Omnibus Clause’s broad language condemns who-
ever corruptly shall “influence, obstruct, or impede the due admin-
istration of justice” or “endeavor” to do so.378  The government and
the Bonds courts have justified his conviction on two other bases.
First, the “all-embracing”379 scope of the Omnibus Clause justifies
developing new grounds on which to prosecute truthful non-re-
sponsive testimony as obstruction where there is no such develop-
ment to date.  Second, Statement C as of its uttering constituted an
“endeavor” to obstruct justice without regard to any such manifesta-
375. Id. at 699.
376. See id. at 697-700.
377. Order Denying Motion to Acquit and for a New Trial, supra note 6, at
1214 (quoting Browning, 630 F.2d at 699).
378. See 18 U.S.C. § 1503.
379. United States v. Solow, 138 F. Supp. 812, 814 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
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tion beyond the additional questions yet to be asked by the
attorneys.
A. “All-Embracing” Scope of the Omnibus Clause
As courts have encountered novel schemes to obstruct justice
through the development of the law in the Twentieth Century, the
broad language of the Omnibus Clause has been used to punish
those obstructions unspecified by the Congress in 1831.  This devel-
opment may be traced at least as far as Bosselman v. United States,
where the defendant was charged with corruptly persuading his em-
ployees to alter business records under subpoena to a grand jury
investigating the sale of obscene imported figures.380  Bosselman ar-
gued at his obstruction trial that he did not persuade the employees
“corruptly,” i.e., by means of a bribe.  The Second Circuit defined
“corruptly” more broadly: “[A]ny endeavor to impede and obstruct
the due administration of justice in the inquiries specified is
corrupt.”381
The same language was echoed in Samples v. United States, the
case most often cited for the expansiveness of the Omnibus Clause,
though it was not an Omnibus Clause case.382 Samples was charged
with witness tampering under the first part of the obstruction stat-
ute, but the Fifth Circuit spoke to the general scope of the obstruc-
tion statute: “The statute is broad enough to cover any act,
committed corruptly, in an endeavor to impede or obstruct the due
administration of justice.”383  The Samples court cited this language
from United States v. Russell,384 even though Justice McKenna was
distinguishing the concept of “endeavor” from the preparatory
steps toward  “attempt” in a jury tampering case rather than the
Omnibus Clause.385  The Samples court described the obstruction
statute as “designed to protect witnesses in Federal courts and also
to prevent a miscarriage of Justice by corrupt methods.”386 United
States v. Catrino,387 another witness tampering case, gave a rationale
for the Omnibus Clause: “The obstruction of justice statute is an
outgrowth of Congressional recognition of the variety of corrupt
380. See generally Bosselman v. United States, 239 F. 82 (2d Cir. 1917).
381. Id. at 86.
382. See Samples v. United States, 121 F.2d 263 (5th Cir. 1941).
383. Id. at 266.
384. See id. (citing United States v. Russell, 255 U.S. 138 (1921)).
385. See Russell, 255 U.S. at 143, cited with approval in Osborn v. United States,
385 U.S. 323, 333 (1967).
386. Samples, 121 F.2d at 265.
387. 176 F.2d 887 (9th Cir. 1949).
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methods by which the proper administration of justice may be im-
peded or thwarted, a variety limited only by the imagination of the
criminally inclined.”388
With Russell, Samples, and Catrino as the foundation, each suc-
cessive case brought new elaboration to the scope and purpose of
Section 1503 in general and to the Omnibus Clause in particular:
“This latter [omnibus] provision . . . is all-embracing and designed
to meet any corrupt conduct in an endeavor to obstruct or interfere
with the due administration of justice.”389  “The statute condemns
‘any effort or essay to do or accomplish the evil purpose that the
section was enacted to prevent.’”390  “This latter language of Sec-
tion 1503 is a broad ‘catch-all’ phrase in the statute.”391  “It em-
braces the widest variety of conduct that impedes the judicial
process.”392
Thus was the pervasive view of the scope of Section 1503 at the
time that Bronston was decided.  After Bronston, the Courts of Appeal
rejected the limits of ejusdem generis placed upon Section 1503 by
Haili and Essex.393  Ultimately, the Ninth Circuit harmonized the
ejusdem generis principle from its decision in Haili with the expansive
holdings of the other circuits in United States v. Rasheed: “The act of
destroying or concealing subpoenaed documents is ‘similar in na-
ture,’ . . . to the enumerated acts. . . .  That one act suppresses
388. Id. at 887.
389. United States v. Solow, 138 F. Supp. 812, 814 (S.D.N.Y. 1956) (referring
to destruction and removal of documents).
390. United States v. Siegel, 152 F. Supp. 370, 373 (S.D.N.Y. 1957) (quoting
Russell, 255 U.S. at 143; Broadbent v. United States, 149 F.2d 580, 581 (10th Cir.
1945)) (referring to destruction and false substitution of documents).
391. Falk v. United States, 370 F.2d 472, 476 (9th Cir. 1966) (suborning
perjury).
392. United States v. Rosner, 352 F. Supp. 915, 919 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (paying to
obtain copies of documents from U.S. Attorney’s office).
393. See United States v. Howard, 569 F.2d 1331, 1333 (5th Cir. 1978) (noting
sale of grand jury transcripts).  “We cannot agree with this reading of the statute
because it renders the omnibus clause superfluous . . . .” Id; see also United States v.
Faudman,, 640 F.2d 20, 23 (6th Cir. 1981) (describing defendant’s crime—alter-
ing corporate documents).  “Unless something more than the precise acts listed in
the earlier language was intended for inclusion, the ‘omnibus’ language of § 1503
would be surplusage.” Faudman, 640 F.2d at 23.  See also United States v. Partin,
552 F.2d 621, 631 (5th Cir. 1977) (suborning perjury).  “The means allegedly cho-
sen . . . may well have violated the more specific first clause of § 1503.  But we do
not think that would prevent the endeavor from violating the broader ‘due admin-
istration’ clause as well[.]” Partin, 552 F.2d at 631 (footnote omitted) (citations
omitted).  See also United States v. Cintolo, 818 F.2d 980, 992 (1st Cir. 1987) (ex-
plaining lawyer abused client relation to discover information for benefit of an-
other criminal and to coerce client not to testify against the criminal).  “[M]eans,
though lawful in themselves, can cross the line of illegality if . . . employed with a
corrupt motive . . . .” Cintolo, 818 F.2d at 992.
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testimonial evidence while the other act suppresses real evidence is
of no importance.”394
Each iteration of an Omnibus Clause case called forth another
formulation of its power so that the reach of the statute seems nigh
limitless.  The Supreme Court has acknowledged the breadth of
Section 1503 in United States v. Aguilar, where a federal district
judge was accused of lying to FBI agents investigating corruption in
the court: “[T]he ‘Omnibus Clause’ serves as a catchall, prohibiting
persons from endeavoring to influence, obstruct, or impede the
due administration of justice. The latter clause, it can be seen, is far
more general in scope than the earlier clauses of the statute.”395
Yet while the Omnibus Clause is “far more general in scope,” it
is not infinite in scope, as the Aguilar opinion demonstrated.  “Re-
cent decisions of Courts of Appeals have likewise tended to place
metes and bounds on the very broad language of the catchall provi-
sion.”396  In other words, the “catchall” provision does not literally
catch all.  For instance,
The action taken by the accused must be with an intent to
influence judicial or grand jury proceedings; it is not
enough that there be an intent to influence some ancillary
proceeding, such as an investigation independent of the
court’s or grand jury’s authority. . . . Some courts have
phrased this showing as a “nexus” requirement—that the
act must have a relationship in time, causation, or logic
with the judicial proceedings.397
Though the Circuit Courts of Appeal had a seventy year tradi-
tion of extending the Omnibus Clause to “embrace” (Solow) any
and all endeavors within “the imagination of the criminally in-
clined” (Catrino), and though it beggars the imagination to suppose
that Judge Aguilar did not endeavor to skew the reports of the
agents who had the duty to inform the very authorities with the
power to convene a grand jury, the Supreme Court drew limits on
the Omnibus Clause from its own precedent.398  No matter how
likely judicial proceedings might be, there had to be notice of the
394. United States v. Rasheed, 663 F.2d 843, 852 (9th Cir. 1981) (citing Haili
v. United States,, 260 F.2d 744, 746 (9th Cir. 1958)).).
395. United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593, 598 (1995).
396. Id. at 599.
397. Id. (citations omitted) (citing United States v. Brown, 688 F.2d 596, 598
(9th Cir. 1982)).
398. See Pettibone v. United States, 148 U.S. 197, 206-07 (1893).
97
Kazee: United States v. Barry Bonds v. Bronston: Can Section 1503 Handle
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2015
36774-vls_22-2 Sheet No. 82 Side B      07/27/2015   11:45:39
36774-vls_22-2 Sheet No. 82 Side B      07/27/2015   11:45:39
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLS\22-2\VLS203.txt unknown Seq: 98  7-JUL-15 13:45
500 JEFFREY S. MOORAD SPORTS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 22: p. 403
pendency of present proceedings before the defendant could form
the requisite intent to obstruct justice.399
Nor is Section 1503 alone in having all-embracing language
limited in scope by the Supreme Court. Bronston itself is a limita-
tion, at the very least, of both Sections 1621 and 1623 as to implied
falsehoods.  The Supreme Court has also limited broad language in
Section 1623.400 The text of Section 1623(c) is similarly expansive
as Section 1503 in that it prohibits irreconcilably contradictory dec-
larations under oath “in any proceedings before or ancillary to any
court or grand jury of the United States.”401 The Supreme Court
rejected the government’s contention that “any proceeding” in-
cluded an oral statement made under oath administered by a no-
tary public without counsel present in another inmate’s attorney’s
office.  The statement purportedly recanted prior grand jury testi-
mony implicating the fellow inmate.  The government argued for
an expansive reading of “any proceeding before or ancillary to” a
United States court based upon the Congress’s purpose in enacting
Section 1623 “to facilitate perjury prosecutions and thereby en-
hance the reliability of testimony before federal courts and grand
juries. “402
Even in view of the Congress’s express purpose to facilitate per-
jury prosecutions, a unanimous Court rejected this all-embracing
scope of the statute by comparison to 18 U.S.C. § 6002 pertaining
to grants of immunity to witnesses in proceedings ancillary to a
court.  As Section 6002 applied to no proceeding less formal than a
pre-trial deposition, consistency with the related statute required
commensurate reading of “any proceeding,” even where the Con-
gressional purpose in enacting both provisions was to facilitate the
prosecution of false statements under oath.  Equally important, the
narrow reading was required so that:
no individual be forced to speculate, at peril of indict-
ment, whether his conduct is prohibited. . . . Thus to en-
sure that a legislature speaks with special clarity when
marking the boundaries of criminal conduct, courts must
decline to impose punishment for actions that are not
“plainly and unmistakably” proscribed.403
399. See Aguilar, 515 U.S. at 599-601.
400. See generally Dunn v. United States, 442 U.S. 100 (1979).
401. See 18 U.S.C. § 1623(a) (2012) (emphasis added).
402. See Dunn, 442 U.S. at 107 (citing S. Rep. No. 91-617, at 58-59 (1969)).
403. Id. at 112-13 (citations omitted).
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The Ninth Circuit itself, in a post-Rasheed case which antici-
pated Aguilar, limited the scope of the Omnibus Clause of Section
1503 to yield to the coverage of 18 U.S.C. § 2232 as to interfering
with executions of search warrants outside the ambit of a pending
judicial proceeding: “It is . . . important to read [Section] 1503 in
the context of other statues relating to obstruction of justice.”404
Yet more recently, the Ninth Circuit read into the Omnibus Clause
a requirement of materiality for testimonial obstruction on the ba-
sis of Rasheed.405
The lesson of Aguilar, Dunn, Brown, and Thomas is that, despite
the consistent background of expansive interpretations of the Om-
nibus Clause, that scope is not illimitable and has in fact been lim-
ited by the Supreme Court.  There is no reason to suppose that
Aguilar’s limitations on the Omnibus Clause Section 1503 are alone,
especially where Congress has spoken specifically as to sworn testi-
mony and the Supreme Court has so expressly interpreted Congres-
sional intent as to truthful non-responsive testimony in court.  The
tradition of expansive interpretations of the Omnibus Clause is not
absolute.  In line with the Ninth Circuit in Brown, that tradition
must be applied in light of other statutes applying to testimonial
obstruction. Bronston is such a limitation on non-responsive truth-
ful answers, regardless of their possible calculated intent.  Perhaps
the most important limitation on the Omnibus Clause, fundamen-
tal to all others, is articulated in Aguilar, requiring that “a fair warn-
ing be given to the world in language that the common world will
understand, of what the law intends to do if a certain line is
passed.”406 Applying Bronston would be the clearest manifestation of
a certain line and a fair warning.
B. Endeavor
The Omnibus Clause proscribes any “endeavor” to “influence,
obstruct, or impede the due administration of justice.”407  The Su-
preme Court defined the term in United States v. Russell, where the
defendant argued that his conversations with a prospective juror’s
wife did not sufficiently approach jury tampering to constitute “at-
tempt.”408  Justice McKenna distinguished the statute’s wording of
404. United States v. Brown, 688 F.2d 596, 598 (9th Cir. 1982)).
405. See United States v. Thomas, 612 F.3d 1107, 1129 (9th Cir. 2010). .
406. See Aguilar, 515 U.S. at 600 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25, 27 (1931)).
407. 18 U.S.C. § 1503(a) (2012).
408. See United States v. Russell, 255 U.S. 138, 140-43 (1921).
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“endeavor” from the nearness to success attendant upon the com-
mon law of “attempt.”  Rather “endeavor” means “any effort or es-
say to do or accomplish the evil purpose . . . .”409
That effort or essay, however, must be made manifest lest crim-
inality attach merely to a wholly inchoate state of mind.  That mani-
festation may be comparable to the “overt act” required under
common law conspiracy, which may be de minimis but needs to be
observable to signify the underlying agreement.  Such an overt act
detectably manifests the endeavor where, as in Russell, the defen-
dant approaches the juror’s wife rather than the juror, or where a
bribe is offered but not accepted, or where documents are altered,
or where a demonstrable falsehood is sworn to on the stand, regard-
less of whether justice is actually delayed or denied.
The difficulty in applying the “endeavor” element to a non-re-
sponsive true statement is that such a statement does not in and of
itself manifest an essay to accomplish the evil purpose.410  A non-
responsive true statement may indeed be too clever by half, stitch-
ing a false impression from truthful statements, or it may be pur-
posed to provide context or excuse without which a naked yes or no
leaves an impression equally false.  It may be the witness’s effort to
parse aloud a poorly framed question, or to discern if there is a
variance in the time frame vis-a-vis a prior question.411  While the
falsity of perjurious testimony makes manifest an endeavor to ob-
struct justice, the very lack of falsity invites only speculation as to
whether a non-responsive true answer is a contextual explanation
or a calculated endeavor.
Although inferences may be drawn from an evasive reply,
the witness generally does not intend to communicate
those inferences. As a result, the inferences that might be
drawn are not “statements” by the witness. Furthermore,
drawing inferences from evasion or silence is an imperfect
art at best. Imposing criminal sanctions on the basis of
what is often a speculative venture seems to provide court
and jury with virtually unbridled discretion that could well
be abused. It is in the area of evasive responses that the
Court’s arguments hit their target and justify the rule that
409. Id. at 143.
410. Cf. Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696, 703-04 (2005)
(persuading another to withhold testimony or documents from court is not inher-
ently malign, e.g., a mother urging a son to invoke Fifth Amendment or one spouse
urging the other not to disclose privileged marital confidences).
411. See United States v. Landau, 737 F. Supp. 778, 781-84 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
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the law of perjury is too blunt an instrument to deal with
the problem of literally true but evasive answers.412
If perjury is too blunt an instrument, then the ever-malleable
Omnibus Clause is yet more liable to an abuse of unbridled discre-
tion.  It is for this reason that Bronston forbids such speculation lest
the rush to punish an assumed endeavor obscure the truth to be
seined from pressing forward with questioning.  It is for this reason
that Bronston spoke comprehensively to the statutory instruments of
policing testimony well established or incipient at the time.
After trial, the government argued that were Statement C true,
it would still constitute an endeavor, quoting Griffin as to “delaying
the punishment of the guilty.”413  The trial court elaborated that
Statement C was an endeavor because Bonds “repeatedly provided
nonresponsive answers to questions about whether Anderson had
ever provided him with injectables, resulting in the prosecuting at-
torneys asking clarifying question after clarifying question.”414
Likewise the Ninth Circuit panel found an endeavor to have oc-
curred once Statement C was non-responsive to the question: “This
evidence at trial showed that Bonds’ statement to the grand jury was
misleading. It is irrelevant that Bonds eventually provided a direct
response to the question about self-injectable substances.  Section
1503 punishes any ‘endeavor’ to obstruct. Obstruction occurred
when Bonds made Statement C.”415
For the Bonds courts, Statement C would constitute a culpable
“endeavor” once its non-responsiveness obligates the attorneys to
press on with questions to get an answer “delayed” by moments.
Yet, Bronston precludes this view of “endeavor.”  First, while it is true
that Section 1503 does not refer to truth or falsity as elements, the
whole purpose of questioning the witness is to elicit the truth, so
that an endeavor to obstruct must necessarily be manifest by the
relation of the answer to the truth.  False or perjurious answers thus
can be readily identified as predicates for obstruction, provided
that the Aguilar nexus is proven as well.  It is in this context that the
government’s quotation from Griffin416 must be understood, for the
412. Peter Meijes Tiersma,, The Language of Perjury: “Literal Truth,” Ambiguity,
and the False Statement Requirement, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 373, 386-87 (1990).
413. United States’ Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Judgment of Ac-
quittal and/or a New Trial on Count Five, supra note 21, at 1714 (emphasis omit-
ted) (quoting United States v. Griffin, 589 F.2d 200, 204 (5th Cir. 1979).
414. Order Denying Motion to Acquit and for a New Trial, supra note 6, at 14.
415. United States v. Bonds, 730 F.3d 890, 896 (9th Cir. 2013), reh’g en banc
granted, 757 F.3d 994 (9th Cir. 2014).
416. See Griffin, 589 F.2d at 204.
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Fifth Circuit referred expressly in that paragraph to false denials of
knowledge or memory: “No; I don’t know; Not that I can recall.”417
These false denials delayed the due administration of justice as if
the witness had refused to testify at all, as the denial foreclosed the
opportunity for further questioning.  This is distinct from Bronston’s
recognition of the inherent guesswork in gauging the import of the
truthful non-responsive answer:
Whether an answer is true must be determined with refer-
ence to the question it purports to answer, not in isola-
tion.  An unresponsive answer is unique in this respect
because its unresponsiveness by definition prevents its
truthfulness from being tested in the context of the ques-
tion—unless there is to be speculation as to what the unre-
sponsive answer ‘implies.’418
The non-responsive truthful answer cannot be tested vis-a-vis
the truth sought by the question.  It is not intrinsically blameworthy
conduct any more than urging the witness to invoke the Fifth or the
marital privilege.  It is one thing to proscribe an endeavor the evil
intent of which is “foiled”419 shy of fruition; it is another to
criminalize an unresponsive truthful answer, the inchoate intent of
which can only be speculative, because the questioner is obliged to
undertake the very duty of questioning imposed by Bronston.  The
Supreme Court weighed the risk that such an answer may be mis-
leading and chose to require the attorney to do more, lest the jury
be called upon to speculate. Bronston has thus defined the “due
administration of justice” and thereby ruled the truthful
nonresponsive answer outside the scope of culpable “endeavor”
under Section 1503.
In short, the very manifestations of a culpable endeavor
presented by the government and the Bonds courts are the very obli-
gations placed on all attorneys by Bronston.  To regard Statement C
as a culpable endeavor is to overturn Bronston and place a hair trig-
ger on every wayward sentence a witness utters.  To paraphrase
Bronston, one can “perceive no reason why Congress would intend
the drastic sanction of a [Section 1503] prosecution to cure a testi-
monial mishap that could readily have been reached with a single
417. Id.
418. Bronston v. United States, 409 U.S. 352, 355 n.3 (1973).
419. See United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593, 601 (1995).
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additional question by counsel alert—as every examiner ought to
be—to the incongruity of petitioner’s unresponsive answer.”420
Rolling back Bronston for the sake of a speculative “endeavor” is
a drastic means of reconciling the Omnibus Clause with Sections
1621 and 1623.  Applying Bronston to all perjury and obstruction
statutes applying to the sworn testimony of witnesses preserves the
will of Congress and follows the unanimous teaching of the Su-
preme Court.
X. SECTION 1503 IN THE CONTEXT OF BRONSTON
Applying Bronston to Section 1503 does not exempt all literally
true statements from culpability for obstruction any more than it
exempts all literally true statements from culpability for perjury.
Beyond the bounds set forth in Bronston for truthful unresponsive
sworn testimony by a witness, culpability for obstruction could well
attach to certain parties on the basis of true statements under cer-
tain circumstances.
A. Applying Section 1503 to Witnesses
Bronston applies by its reasoning and terms solely to truthful
non-responsive answers by witnesses in court.  Many defendants
have sought to apply, and some courts have extended, the rationale
of Bronston to other types of answers, often literally true responsive
answers to ambiguous questions.421  As the Supreme Court has not
spoken to such an application, this article imputes no application of
Bronston to Section 1503 any broader than that defined by the Su-
preme Court in 1973: non-responsive and truthful testimony by a
sworn witness in court.
If Bronston is applied to truthful non-responsive answers under
Section 1503, two questions arise.  First, can a non-responsive false
answer be subject to the Omnibus Clause?  Second, does a truthful
responsive answer immunize the witness from an obstruction
charge regardless of how restricted, incomplete, or misleading that
truth?  The following cases are instructive.
First, a false non-responsive answer does carry the requisite
manifestation of corrupt motive in its very falsity.  For purposes of
perjury, the falsehood need not be responsive so long as it is mate-
rial.  Volunteered falsehoods injected into the questioning are thus
either false statements under Section 1623, or statements the wit-
420. See Bronston, 409 U.S. at 358 (emphasis added).
421. See, e.g., United States v. Tonelli, 577 F.2d 194 (3d Cir. 1978).
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ness does not believe to be true under Section 1621.  There is no
Bronston shelter for volunteered falsehoods under those statutes.
The crime [of perjury] is based on the explicit statement
rather than on an unstated implication. Thus, the falsity is
not conjectural and the proof of falsity is not premised on
inferences attempted to be extracted from the fact of un-
responsiveness. Furthermore, calling the witness’ atten-
tion to the unanswered question to cure the
unresponsiveness will in no way cure the prior falsehoods
which the witness has put on the record in his unrespon-
sive answer. Regardless of how or whether the witness re-
sponds to the question which he has yet to answer, the
record remains tainted by the false testimony which he has
already volunteered during his initial nonresponse.422
Provided the Aguilar nexus is met, the non-responsive or volun-
teered falsehood can be subject to Section 1503 as well, as its cor-
ruption is not speculative but intrinsic to falsehood.
Second, while the non-responsive falsehood is subject to Sec-
tion 1503, the responsive but incomplete truth may or may not be
within the Omnibus Clause, depending upon the circumstance.
As a baseline, one first must consider what is expected of the
witness under interrogation.  The Supreme Court of California in-
voked Bronston in considering a truthful, responsive, but incom-
plete answer.  While Bronston itself applied to truthful non-responsive
answers, the California court taught in a habeas corpus case that
the witness is to answer the question as asked and is not to volun-
teer testimony that conceivably paints a more complete picture for
the examiner.423  No culpability should thus attach where the wit-
ness answers what is asked without elaboration.
The petitioner Rosoto, having been convicted and sentenced
to death for multiple felonies, brought a habeas corpus petition,
which was denied, and then a second, alleging perjury at his trial
and also during the hearing on the first petition.  Rosoto alleged
that Frank Oxandaboure, the chief investigator for the district at-
torney’s office, had lied at the first hearing when he denied any
discussions or assurances of immunity and freedom from arrest to a
key prosecution trial witness, Rosoto’s brother Michael.  Michael, in
turn, was accused of having lied at the trial.424
422. United States v. Corr, 543 F.2d 1042, 1049 (2d Cir. 1976).
423. See In re Rosoto, 519 P.2d 1065 (Cal. 1974) (en banc).
424. See id. at 1066-67.
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Oxandaboure’s testimony in the first hearing did not reveal
the full extent of understandings he had with authorities with re-
gard to the witness Michael Rosoto.  Nonetheless, even when a wit-
ness is giving a responsive truthful answer, the California Supreme
Court admonished the witness against completing information be-
yond the scope of the question:
The testimony of a witness is ordinarily elicited either by
general questions seeking a narration of events or a series
of specific questions calling for specific answers as to each
fact. . . . When counsel uses the latter method the witness
should respond to the question. He should not evade or
volunteer matters not specifically asked for; the
nonresponsive answer may be stricken on motion of the
questioner who is entitled to elicit testimony in his own
way and to confine the scope of the examination as he
sees fit.425
This is consistent with the standard advice that counsel give
witnesses.  The District of Columbia Circuit so observed in the con-
text of Section 1001:
Attorneys commonly advise their clients to answer ques-
tions truthfully but not to volunteer information. Are we
to suppose that once the client starts answering a govern-
ment agent’s questions, in a deposition or during an inves-
tigation, the client must disregard his attorney’s advice or
risk prosecution under § 1001(a)(1)? The government es-
sentially asks us to hold that once an individual starts talk-
ing, he cannot stop. We do not think § 1001 demands that
individuals choose between saying everything and saying
nothing. No case stands for that proposition.426
The California Supreme Court went on to give the rationale in
Rosoto:
The reason for this rule is dramatically illustrated by the
defense counsel’s testimony that he chose not to present
evidence at trial of Oxandaboure’s guarantee that Michael
would not be prosecuted because the guarantee had been
conditioned on Michael telling the truth, and the jury’s
knowledge of the condition might be harmful.  Counsel’s
425. Id. at 1071 (citations omitted); accord State v. Olson, 594 P.2d 1337, 1340
(Wash. 1979) (en banc).
426. United States v. Safavian, 528 F.3d 957, 965 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
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trial strategy would have been defeated if Oxandaboure or
Michael, although not asked about a guarantee of immu-
nity, had nevertheless been permitted to volunteer it.427
The California Supreme Court, following Bronston, placed the
onus on the questioner to dispel any misimpression created by a
truthful responsive answer.
It is thus apparent that when, as here, a witness’ answers
are literally true he may not be faulted for failing to volun-
teer more explicit information. Although such testimony
may cause a misleading impression due to the failure of
counsel to ask more specific questions, the witness’ failure
to volunteer testimony to avoid the misleading impression
does not constitute perjury because the crucial element of
falsity is not present in his testimony.428
This principle is equally applicable to obstruction as it is to per-
jury.  If the witness has no requirement, then he has no require-
ment, absent a question to elicit the specific information that he is
then obliged to give:
Oxandaboure was not required to volunteer testimony as
to a guarantee other than the one of which he was asked,
and although his answers to the questions asked may have
left a misleading impression that not even a conditional
guarantee was made, he was never asked whether a condi-
tional guarantee of any kind was made.429
A witness giving responsive answers need not go beyond the
scope of the question, even where the witness might speculate as to
what more the questioner intends.  The witness should not have to
speculate what the questioner intends at all.  A witness giving re-
sponsive truthful incomplete information within the question’s
bounds should bear no culpability where it is the question, rather
than the answer, which conceals.
On the other hand, a responsive, truthful, incomplete answer
may be perjurious where either the question elicits or the answer
purports to give complete information.  Provided that the Aguilar
nexus is proven as well, such an answer would be subject to the
Omnibus Clause.
427. In re Rosoto, 519 P.2d at 1071.
428. Id.; accord Chein v. Shumsky, 373 F.3d 978, 980, 985 (9th Cir. 2004).
429. In re Rosoto, 510 P.2d at 1071-72.
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For example, a Kentucky legislator was convicted under Sec-
tion 1001 for false statements to the FBI.430 The agent asked about
cash payments or any other gratuity that the legislator received on a
trip out of state:
Q: So in answer to that question, the only thing that comes
to mind is a is a type of gratuity which would have been a
day at the races or something to that effect.
A: No no sir uh . . . I went out on a boat ride that Friday.
Uh . . . and uh . . . I understood Mr. Richardson had . . .
owned the boat or or had a friend that had the boat.
Uh . . . but I didn’t pay any money, buy any gasoline for
the boat.
Q: Okay.
A: I don’t uh . . . uh . . . there they had uh beverages and
food on on board you know, I and I accepted that.431
LeMaster’s list purported in its detail to be complete in its re-
sponse to the question about the “only thing” received being “a day
at the races.”  His omission of the cash he had received rendered
the true list false, not in that the list was false, but in that the gratui-
ties recited were not the “only thing”:
Although LeMaster’s listing of the gratuities which he did
receive is not false in and of itself, the response may none-
theless serve as a “false statement” for purposes of § 1001.
True responses can constitute a false statement if they re-
present an attempt to conceal additional information re-
quired to provide a complete, accurate, and truthful
response.432
Were the colloquy under oath in court and if the Aguilar nexus
were shown, this statement consisting of an incomplete list purport-
ing to be complete would be both perjury and obstruction because
it is, in fact, false.
True incomplete responsive testimony could also be obstruc-
tive where it is true only in an isolated sense rather than in the
context of the course of questioning.  In a bankruptcy hearing, the
petitioner Schafrick sought to conceal from his creditors and es-
tranged wife his receipt and expenditure of some $16,000.  He testi-
430. United States v. LeMaster, 54 F.3d 1224 (6th Cir. 1995).
431. Id. at 1227 (emphasis added).
432. Id. at 1230 (citing United States v. Duranseau, 19 F.3d 1117, 1119 (6th
Cir. 1994)).
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fied that he had “signed it over” to his mother in payment of a debt,
when in fact his mother placed it in an account over which he had
access and control.  He later admitted that “most of the money I
blew.”433  The court noted that Schafrick’s responsive answers were
not subject to Bronston and found that while “sign[ing] it over”
might be accurate in isolation, the context showed that Schafrick
had falsely claimed to have placed the money in his mother’s own-
ership, rather than in her safekeeping on his behalf.
The questions as well as the answers, and the answers un-
derstood as a whole, are crucial to the determination of
whether Schafrick’s statements were perjury, and in con-
text there is no doubt that Schafrick meant that he paid
his mother for a debt, relinquishing all claims to the
funds, when he said that he signed over the check. There
was no indication in Schafrick’s answer that the two re-
sponses, “My mom” and “I owed her . . .” were indepen-
dent, unrelated thoughts. Although separately they might
have meant something else, as a unit they communicated
that Schafrick paid the money to his mother in satisfaction
of a debt.434
The Second Circuit more recently placed Schafrick in the con-
text of Bronston in a Section 1623 case growing out of labor
corruption.
The “literally true” defense, or the “Bronston Defense,”
does not provide the defendant relief in this case. . . . “The
purpose of the Bronston rule is to place the burden on the
examiner to probe for details during the examination.
The rule prevents an examiner from resolving ambiguities
in the elicited testimony with a perjury prosecution after
the fact.” . . . This Circuit, however, examines not only
“the literal truth or falsity of defendant’s words, but
also . . . the context in which these words were spo-
ken.” . . . The statements that Hamilton claims are literally
true are only literally true in isolation. A reasonable jury
could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that these
statements were materially untrue in the context of the
433. See United States v. Schafrick, 871 F.2d 300, 301-02 (2d Cir. 1989).
434. Id. at 304 (alteration in original).
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questions asked of Hamilton. The perjury conviction must
therefore stand.435
Were the Aguilar nexus proven, testimony true in isolation but
false in context could support a charge under Section 1503.
None of these applications are novel under the perjury laws,
nor are they affected by Bronston.  Were any such cases to satisfy the
requirements of Section 1503 as well, nothing in the application of
Bronston would alter the application of the obstruction statute.
Finally, true responsive testimony might also constitute ob-
struction where the witness additionally manipulates the judicial
process to cast doubt on the very truth the witness intends to give
on the stand.  Such a scheme may be found not only in Agatha
Christie’s Witness for the Prosecution, but also in Alabama.436
Barfield was a confidential informant for the DEA who both
aided Donald Flores in cultivating marijuana and provided the evi-
dence upon which Flores’s indictment was based.437  Barfield then
contacted Flores’ attorney, denied he had ever witnessed or helped
Flores grow marijuana, and provided documents, forged and genu-
ine, with which the government’s case might be attacked and his
own true prospective testimony impeached.  When the government
realized Barfield’s manipulations, it was therefore unable to call
him as a witness against Flores and had to drop certain charges pre-
mised on Barfield’s prospective testimony.  Barfield was convicted
under Section 1503.438
Had Barfield been called and had he given true testimony
thereby impeached, as in Christie’s Witness, the truth of his presum-
ably responsive testimony in the context of his manipulations would
surely have been no bar to culpability under the Omnibus Clause.
This would be consistent with a jury instruction in a Section 1001
case where incomplete statements were made to the FBI in the con-
text of other manipulations by the defendant:
To falsify means to make an untrue statement which is un-
true at the time made is known to be untrue at the time
made.  However a statement that is literally true can con-
stitute a false statement if the defendants, through a
435. United States v. Hamilton, 3 F. App’x 7, 11-12 (2d Cir. 2001) (citing
Schafrick 871 F.2d at 303-04).
436. See United States v. Barfield, 999 F.2d 1520 (11th Cir. 1993).
437. See id. at 1521.
438. See id.
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scheme, trick or device, are actively trying to mislead the
government.439
If truthful responsive testimony concealed information in con-
junction with a “scheme, trick, or device,” to borrow a concept from
18 U.S.C. Section 1001(a)(1), that testimony could block the due
administration of justice just as did Dwyer’s statements to the FBI.
The trick, scheme, or device might also be employed during
the course of testimony to induce the examiner to ask an inaccurate
question to which a trivially true denial may be responsively an-
swered.440  In a bankruptcy hearing, the witness Robbins corrected
a corporation’s name in the examiner’s question from the “11th
and Meridian” corporation to the “11th and MacArthur” corpora-
tion, and then denied that it held any assets.  On appeal, Robbins
claimed his denial was literally true, since the corporation was in
fact the “MacArthur and 11th” corporation, which did have assets,
and there was no “11th and MacArthur” at all.441  His denials were
found perjurious since:
The answers to this line of questioning are not unrespon-
sive. They contain “nothing to alert the questioner that he
may be sidetracked.” . . .
. . . [Robbins] is not entitled to the protection of Bronston
because his answers were not “literally true.” They were
false. Robbins cannot escape a false oath charge by mis-
leading the questioner with false testimony and then sup-
ply literally true answers to a questions based on his false
testimony.442
Provided the Aguilar nexus were proven, these would be
grounds for an obstruction charge, not only because the answer is
responsive, but because it is true by trick, squarely of one substance
with the proffering of falsified documents.
B. Applying Section 1503 to Elements of the Court
The application of Bronston to the Omnibus Clause would leave
undisturbed the criminality of responsive incomplete truthful an-
swers by elements of the court, such as lawyers, jurors, and prospec-
tive jurors, or talesmen, under Section 1503.  These are distinct
439. United States v. Dwyer, 238 Fed. App’x 631, 652 (1st Cir. 2007).
440. See United States v. Robbins, 997 F.2d 390 (8th Cir. 1993).
441. See id. at 394-95.
442. Id. at 395 (citations omitted) (quoting Bronston v. United States, 409
U.S. 352, 355 (1973)).
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from witnesses giving testimony in a case in that their questioning
during the formation of the court is in general not subject to the
same probing adversarial cross-examination which is the sine qua
non of the Bronston doctrine.  Rather, the integrity of the voir dire
rests upon the frequently unexamined honesty of the prospective
juror.  Incomplete truths on voir dire, therefore, do not necessarily
signal the need for further examination as would non-responsive
answers by witnesses in court.
Justice Cardozo wrote in Clark v. United States how incomplete
truth on the part of officers of the court, rather than witnesses, con-
stitutes contempt of court.443 When asked on voir dire about her
employment history, Clark answered truthfully, but omitted her
brief employment with the defendant’s company.444  The true but
truncated employment answers, however, were distinct from Bron-
ston and Bonds in that they were responsive, rather than non-respon-
sive.  Clark also answered that she could serve free from bias and
could decide the case on the evidence and law presented in
court.445  In fact, she introduced extraneous information into the
deliberation, announced that no one could convince her of the de-
fendant’s guilt, held her hands over her ears when others spoke,
and after a week’s deliberation was the lone vote against guilt on a
hung jury.446
In a show cause hearing for contempt, the District Court found
the employment answers to have concealed information and the
bias answer to be false, with the purpose of obstructing the trial.447
In confirming Clark’s conviction for contempt, Justice Cardozo ob-
served that the role of the juror is at the heart of the court, as dis-
tinct from the witness whom the court is to gauge:
There is a distinction not to be ignored between deceit by
a witness and deceit by a talesman. A talesman when ac-
cepted as a juror becomes a part or member of the
court. . . . The judge who examines on the voir dire is
engaged in the process of organizing the court. If the an-
swers to the questions are willfully evasive or knowingly un-
true, the talesman, when accepted, is a juror in name only.
443. See generally Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1 (1933).
444. See id. at 7-8.
445. See id. at 8.
446. See id. at 8-9.
447. See id. at 9.
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His relation to the court and to the parties is tainted in its
origin; it is a mere pretense and sham.448
Distinct remedies apply to distinct roles with relation to the
court:
Perjury by a witness has been thought to be not enough
where the obstruction to judicial power is only that inher-
ent in the wrong of testifying falsely. . . . For offenses of
that order the remedy by indictment is appropriate and
adequate. On the other hand, obstruction to judicial
power will not lose the quality of contempt though one of
its aggravations be the commission of perjury. . . . We must
give heed to all the circumstances, and of these not the
least important is the relation to the court of the one
charged as a contemnor.  Deceit by an attorney may be
punished as a contempt if the deceit is an abuse of the
functions of his office . . . , and that apart from its punisha-
ble quality if it had been the act of some one else.  A tales-
man, sworn as a juror, becomes, like an attorney, an
officer of the court, and must submit to like restraints.449
Applying Bronston to the Omnibus Clause would not affect the
application of Section 1503 to concealments such as Clark’s. Bron-
ston applies on its terms only to non-responsive witnesses, ordinarily
subject to adversary questioning in court.  A more recent case ech-
oes Clark.  Ashqar, defending himself pro se, was convicted of con-
tempt for having, inter alia, refused to answer the judge or otherwise
participate during voir dire and other pre-trial procedures.450  His
refusal to answer was in his role as pro se attorney rather than wit-
ness,451 though refusing to answer as a witness can also constitute
contempt as well as obstruction. Neither instance’s being subject to
Section 1503 is affected by the application of Bronston, as a refusal
to answer is distinct from an answer, which is non-responsive, but
truthful.
The application of Bronston to truthful non-responsive testi-
mony by witnesses in court in testimonial obstruction cases under
Section 1503 will apply only to such cases, as in Bonds, and will leave
undisturbed the perjury and derivative obstruction cases as are al-
ready unlawful under those statutes.  The application of Bronston in
448. Id. at 11 (citations omitted).
449. Id. at 11-12 (citations omitted).
450. United States v. Ashqar, 582 F.3d 819 (7th Cir. 2009).
451. See United States v. Proffitt, 498 F.2d 1124, 1127 (3d Cir. 1974).
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testimonial obstruction cases will, however, induce a number of
beneficial effects upon the due administration of justice.
XI. THE DUE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE
Barry Bonds’ conviction represents a threat to the due adminis-
tration of justice as set forth in Bronston.  It is a perfectly legitimate
and laudable goal for prosecutors to seek every tool to induce truth
in the witness chair, but that motivation must be and has been
checked by the courts’ admonition that the cure not be worse than
the disease. Section 1503 itself was “designed to protect
witnesses.”452
Bronston teaches that “the measures taken against the offense
must not be so severe as to discourage witnesses from appearing or
testifying,” and that “the obligation of protecting witnesses from op-
pression, or annoyance, by charges, or threats of charges, of having
borne false testimony, is far paramount to that of giving even per-
jury its deserts.”453 If such policy applies to outright lies, how much
more ought it apply to an obstruction which is not “even perjury,”
especially where “drawing inferences from evasion or silence is an
imperfect art at best” and “[i]mposing criminal sanctions on the
basis of what is often a speculative venture seems to provide court
and jury with virtually unbridled discretion that could well be
abused”?454  Rather, “ ‘a fair warning should be given to the world
in language that the common world will understand, of what the
law intends to do if a certain line is passed.’”455
So much has been acknowledged by Judge Rymer in Spalliero:
“[T]he fear of possible prosecution for evasive or misleading testi-
mony under Section 1503 will burden every witness before a grand
jury—even those who are in no position to gauge the effect of their
statements on a grand jury investigation about which they have little
or no information.”456  And the Ninth Circuit has acknowledged
the place of the non-responsive truthful answer as part of the dia-
logue that focuses facts in the service of the grand jury:
The perjury statute and its goal of truth in our system of
justice is served by fostering truthful answers to precise
452. See Samples v. United States, 121 F.2d 263, 265 (5th Cir. 1941).
453. See Bronston v. United States, 409 U.S. 352, 359 (1973).
454. Tiersma, supra note 413, at 387.
455. See United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593, 600 (1995) (quoting McBoyle
v. United States, 283 U.S. 25, 27 (1931)).
456. United States v. Spalliero, 602 F. Supp. 417, 426 (C.D. Cal. 1984).
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questions, not by penalizing unresponsive answers to un-
clear questions. . . .
. . . .
In this case, the defendant’s response was literally truthful
but apparently unresponsive to the questioning prosecu-
tor’s intended meaning. Once the question’s ambiguity
was narrowed somewhat by further questioning, the defen-
dant gave a literally true and responsive answer consistent
with the prosecutor’s intended meaning. Rather than con-
stituting an example of the corruption of our system of
justice through perjury, this sequence of events shows our
system working properly.457
The Ninth Circuit in Sainz describes a nonresponsive truthful
answer, not as a criminal aberration, but as part of a process of
focusing the minds of both parties so as to elicit the truth.  Where
the answer is unresponsive, it may be truthful in the sense of the
witness’s perception of a question that is perfectly clear to the attor-
ney but ambiguous or out of context to the witness.  Were the unre-
sponsive truthful answer criminal upon utterance, provably corrupt
only upon a jury’s impermissible conjecture458 and speculation,459
the process of narrowing and responding would halt, and the
search for truth along with it.  But when the unresponsiveness sig-
nals the alert questioner to press on, the process of focusing upon
the truth through dialogue “shows our system working properly.”460
Yet, the examiner’s very “responsibility to recognize the eva-
sion and to bring the witness back to the mark, to flush out the
whole truth with the tools of adversary examination,”461 is refash-
ioned by Bonds as the very impediment that will jail the witness.
Bonds is the government’s escape hatch for the examination that
goes awry.  At some point in any course of questioning, any witness
cannot help but either give too much context or answer too literally
to trip the wires of the Omnibus Clause.  The “all-embracing” scope
of “endeavors” places the criminality of the testimony not intrinsi-
cally in the voice of the witness, but rather, in the post hoc choice of
the prosecutor to recast her obligation to “press on”462 as an
obstruction.
457. United States v. Sainz, 772 F.2d 559, 564 (9th Cir. 1985).
458. See Bronston, 409 U.S. at 359.
459. See id. at 355 n.3.
460. Sainz, 772 F.2d at 564.
461. Bronston, 409 U.S. at 358-59.
462. Id. at 362.
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That is not the law. Bronston spoke to all statutes governing the
testimony of witnesses in courts at the very incipiency of “testimo-
nial obstruction” under Section 1503. Bronston was brought under
Section 1621, perhaps because the only appellate court opinion on
“testimonial obstruction” as of the indictment was Essex, but the Su-
preme Court recognized the case as the obstruction case it was, if
only because there was no falsity to place it under either Section
1621 or 1623, without “go[ing] beyond”463 the law as only recently
articulated by Congress. Bronston’s exclusion from the scope of per-
jury was predicate to the Court’s recognition of the merit of seeking
the truth over punishing the wily in light of the chilling effect upon
witnesses from jury speculation on “vague rubrics” apart from the
lodestars of truth and falsity.  From page 358 forward, the Court
speaks specifically  to testimonial obstruction with full awareness of
Alo and Cohn and their contexts. When the answer is non-responsive
but truthful, the examiner is to redouble the effort to “pin the wit-
ness down,”464 rather than rely on prosecuting the witness as the
“sole, or even the primary, safeguard against errant testimony.”465
Bonds has the potential to make Section 1503 the primary strat-
egy.  As Judge Rymer foresaw, “to the extent that defendant’s testi-
mony is not perjurious but rather evasive, or misleading, I think
that interpreting Section 1503 to obtain a result unobtainable
under the perjury statute is ill-advised.”466  Rather than place the
burden of probing questioning upon the examiner, Bonds will shift
upon the contextual or garrulous witness the burden of proving
he’s not stalling, or misdirecting the inquiry if the truth is nuanced
or fraught with tensions or paradox.  It may be used to punish un-
cooperative or non-acquiescent attitudes rather than a corrupt en-
deavor.467  The “intent to mislead” with non-responsive truths has
already been held to be too vague for speculation where the statute
provided the tangible standards of truth and falsity,468 and is less
tractable yet where the Omnibus Clause offers no tangible guide.
Under Bonds, the perjury statutes with their limitations may be
avoided altogether where not only lies, but frustrating answers con-
taining no lies may be gathered into an indictment so general, as in
Count Five, that one must await the trial jury instructions to know
the charge specifically.  While testimonial obstruction charges have
463. Id. at 358.
464. Id. at 360.
465. Id.
466. United States v. Spalliero, 602 F. Supp. 417, 426 (C.D. Cal. 1984).
467. See Murphy, supra note 364, at 1451.
468. See Bronston, 409 U.S. at 359.
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heretofore been concomitant with and derived from particular alle-
gations of perjury,469 there would be, following Bonds’ precedent,
no need to charge or prove an associated falsehood at all.
The potential for abuse is evident in a perjury case wherein
testimony, upon which two successive Assistant U.S. Attorneys had
declined to bring charges at all, was the basis of an indictment
brought by a third just as the statute of limitations was to expire.470
The District Court dismissed the indictment pursuant to Bronston,
as Landau’s grand jury testimony was literally true for the time
frame about which he had been questioned, even though it may
have been false in terms of a later time frame about which he was
not questioned.471 Bronston afforded the Landau court the tractable
standard of literal truth by which to examine the testimony after
five years to discover the mismatch between the actual question and
the purported falsity alleged in the belated indictment.
If Bonds were to dislodge Bronston from applying to testimonial
obstruction, a last minute pony-in-there-somewhere shell indict-
ment such as Count Five would permit a prosecutor to avoid any
specific allegation of falsehood from the indicting jury or before a
trial judge.  The prosecutor in the jury instruction phase could tar-
get any contextual statement, any throwaway comment, any hint of
non-acquiescence to the gist of the inquiry which might burden the
attorney with a “single additional question.”472  The trial jury would
be tasked with the standardless, and therefore lawless, conjecture
about the corruption and multiplicity of motives for uniquely un-
testable nonresponsive statements.473  In such circumstances, the
motivations for such a statement might fade in time even for the
witness, so that even she must reconstruct what might have been for
her own defense.
If witnesses bear responsibility for more than the truth, or any-
thing other than the truth, they “might well fear having that respon-
sibility tested by a jury under the vague rubric of ‘intent to mislead’
or ‘perjury by implication.’”474 Bronston will be nullified by stealth
if prosecutors give in to the temptation of least resistance and bring
a nigh illimitable grab-bag of testimonial crimes under the Omni-
bus Clause rather than under the perjury statutes designed to the
469. See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 459 F.3d 509, 531 (5th Cir. 2006).
470. See United States v. Landau, 737 F. Supp. 778, 779-81 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
471. See id. at 781-84.
472. Bronston, 409 U.S. at 358.
473. See id. at 355 n.3.
474. Id. at 359.
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purpose by Congress and given practical application in Bronston.
Then may every witness fear.
Lost in the glare of Barry Bonds’ celebrity is what is at stake for
the American adversary system.  At stake is whether the Bronston
doctrine, and indeed the federal perjury statutes themselves, will
survive the limitless expansion of the reach of Section 1503.  At
stake is the quality of federal prosecution of substantive crimes
where there is too ready a fix for substandard questioning by resort
to an obstruction statute eminently malleable to suit any purpose
the government may choose.  At stake is the liberty of witnesses
who, without counsel, Miranda warnings, or Fifth Amendment pro-
tection, must tread the line between saying too little, on pain of an
allegation of concealing evidence, and saying too much, lest sixty
seconds of unsatisfactory explanation be held to obstruct the pace
of questioning.
Bonds and Bronston cannot co-exist, for the witness on the stand
is not predestined as 1621 or 1503 as she testifies, and she cannot
know if she is assured of Bronston’s protections until the prosecutor
chooses to proceed under Bonds or not.  If her non-responsive
truthful answer is to be privileged as to perjury, it must also be privi-
leged as to all statutes in pari materia, else it is not privileged at all.
If the questioner is obligated to press forward under Bronston, he is
relieved of that responsibility if he has Section 1503 as a backstop
for casual questioning.  Applied to Section 1503, Bronston will con-
tinue as a prophylactic for alertness and acumen in questioning by
the people’s lawyers.  The people deserve no less assurance of the
quality of their representation, and certainly do not deserve the ex-
pense of even a single additional trial that can be avoided with a
“single additional question.”475
Due process requires that the witness face a law which clearly
outlines the bounds of her duties and liberties. One can only ex-
pect that the law will cease to be divided.  It will be all one thing or
all the other.  Unless Bronston is applied to Section 1503, one would
only expect that the perjury statutes with their protections for the
witness will fall into disuse as prosecutors choose the far more
amorphous and malleable Omnibus Clause.  Yet Bronston itself has
defined the “due administration of justice,” so that a truthful non-
responsive answer can be no endeavor, and the mere duty to press
on can prove no obstruction.
475. See id. at 358.
117
Kazee: United States v. Barry Bonds v. Bronston: Can Section 1503 Handle
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2015
36774-vls_22-2 Sheet No. 92 Side B      07/27/2015   11:45:39
36774-vls_22-2 Sheet No. 92 Side B      07/27/2015   11:45:39
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLS\22-2\VLS203.txt unknown Seq: 118  7-JUL-15 13:45
520 JEFFREY S. MOORAD SPORTS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 22: p. 403
XII. EXTRA INNINGS: THE NINTH CIRCUIT
REVERSES BONDS’ CONVICTION
On April 22, 2015, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, reversed Barry Bonds’ conviction for
obstruction of justice which had been originally affirmed by a three-
judge panel of the Court of Appeals.476  The eleven-member court
issued a terse per curiam opinion that there was insufficient evidence
that Statement C was material.477  Four concurring opinions by
Judge Kozinski, Judge N. R. Smith, Judge Reinhardt and Judge W.
Fletcher, and one dissent by Judge Rawlinson were filed.  No con-
curring opinion commanded a majority of the court.  The concur-
rences articulated widely disparate reasons for the per curiam
opinion, as well as conflicting views on competing rationales for re-
versing Bonds’ conviction.  Such an explosion of ideas will begin a
vigorous debate on the scope and application of 18 U.S.C. 1503 to
courtroom testimony.  It is hoped that the above article may serve
as both context and critique for the competing approaches.
The per curiam opinion’s rationale for reversal is particular to
the Ninth Circuit.  It would be novel to find an obstruction convic-
tion reversed elsewhere for want of materiality.  Unlike Sections
1001, 1621, and 1623, the text of Section 1503 “carries no material-
ity element.”478  Dual convictions for both obstruction and perjury
have been held not to violate the Blockburger v. United States479 re-
quirement that each offense require proof of an element that the
other does not.480  “To show perjury, the government must demon-
strate the falsity and materiality of a witness’ statements.  18 U.S.C.
§ 1623.  Neither element is needed to prove obstruction of justice
under 18 U.S.C. § 1503.”481
The Ninth Circuit, however, has expressly required materiality
in both documentary and testimonial obstruction cases as a limita-
tion on the scope of Section 1503.  In United States v. Ryan,482 the
Department of Justice prevailed upon an AUSA in Los Angeles to
issue subpoenas duces tecum in the name of an arbitrarily chosen
grand jury without its knowledge and have the documents delivered
476. United States v. Bonds, 784 F.3d 582 (9th Cir. 2015) (en banc) (per
curiam).
477. Id. at 582 (per curiam).
478. United States v. Ruggiero, 934 F.2d 440, 446 (2d Cir. 1991).
479. 284 U.S. 299 (1932).
480. Id. at 304.
481. United States v. Langella, 776 F.2d 1078, 1082 (2d Cir. 1985).
482. 455 F.2d 728 (9th Cir. 1971).
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to IRS agents.483  The IRS was thus enabled to obtain by ruse the
documents it could not otherwise obtain.  Though the documents
were altered prior to delivery to the IRS, the Ninth Circuit reversed
the obstruction conviction as there was no relation between the
documents sought by the IRS and subject of the grand jury investi-
gation.  In passing, the Ryan court noted that the documents were
“wholly immaterial” even to Ryan’s income tax liability.484  When
Rasheed established documentary obstruction under Section 1503 in
the Ninth Circuit, the court distinguished Rasheed’s conviction
from Ryan’s reversal “because the subpoenaed documents [in
Ryan] were immaterial to the grand jury proceedings.”485  In 2010,
the Ninth Circuit announced in the Tammy Thomas BALCO case:
“In light of Ryan and Rasheed, we conclude that although not ex-
pressly included in the text of § 1503, materiality is a requisite ele-
ment of a conviction under that statute.”486
Thus only in the Ninth Circuit could Bonds’ reversal have been
grounded upon insufficient evidence of materiality for Statement
C.  But the opinions in the Bonds en banc decision reveal an instabil-
ity in the application of materiality to testimonial obstruction cases.
Judge Kozinski, with four judges joining his concurrence, premises
the materiality requirement upon the dangers of Section 1503’s
“sweeping coverage” that “does not meaningfully cabin the kind of
conduct that is subject to prosecution.”487
Making everyone who participates in our justice system a
potential criminal defendant for conduct that is nothing
more than the ordinary tug and pull of litigation risks chil-
ling zealous advocacy.  It also gives prosecutors the im-
mense and unreviewable power to reward friends and
punish enemies by prosecuting the latter and giving the
former a pass.488
For that reason, reading a materiality requirement into Section
1503 “screens out many of the statute’s troubling applications by
limiting convictions to those situations where an act ‘has a natural
tendency to influence, or was capable of influencing, the decision
483. Id. at 730-32.
484. Id. at 734-35 (citation omitted).
485. United States v. Rasheed, 663 F.2d 843, 851 (9th Cir. 1981) (citation
omitted).
486. United States v. Thomas, 612 F.3d 1107, 1129 (9th Cir. 2010).
487. Bonds, 784 F.3d at 584 (Kozinski, J., concurring).
488. Id. at 584-85 (Kozinski, J., concurring).
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of the decisionmaking body.’”489  Judge Kozinski here quoted the
definition of materiality used in Thomas, taken from the Ninth Cir-
cuit’s model jury instructions for materiality, and ultimately derived
from Justice Scalia’s opinion in Kungys v. United States.490  Applying
the Kungys/Thomas test, Judge Kozinski found that Statement C
“says absolutely nothing pertinent to the subject of the grand jury’s
investigation.”491
Judge N. R. Smith, joined by three other judges (including
Judge Callahan who had also joined Judge Kozinski), equates the
materiality requirement with the “nexus” requirement of Aguilar,
which is in turn rooted in the text of Section 1503: “The endeavor
must have the natural and probable effect of interfering with the
due administration of justice.”492  For “evasive or misleading”493
statements, Judge N. R. Smith refines the test and confines culpabil-
ity to statements which “completely thwart[ ] the investigative na-
ture of the tribunal,”494 amounting to “a flat refusal to testify,”495 or
“feigned forgetfulness”496 which “‘close[s] off entirely the avenue of
inquiry being pursued by’ the grand jury.”497  Thus, “[n]o rational
juror could have found that Statement C amounted to a refusal to
testify, such that Bonds’s testimony thwarted the grand jury’s inves-
tigative function.”498
Judge Reinhardt’s concurrence supports Judge N. R. Smith’s
definition of materiality rather than Judge Kozinski’s definition, but
declines to endorse Judge N. R. Smith’s refined rule for evasive
non-responsive answers, or accept that even refusals to testify are
subject to Section 1503.499  Rather, “I would simply hold that
Bonds’ answer in no way constitutes a violation of § 1503 because it
is non-responsive and thus nonmaterial, and that his prosecution
for the charged offense was therefore wholly unwarranted under
489. Id. at 585 (Kozinski, J., concurring) (citing Thomas, 612 F.3d at 1124 (ad-
ditional citations omitted)).
490. See Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759, 770 (1988).
491. Bonds, 784 F.3d at 585 (Kozinski, J., concurring).
492. Id. at 587 (N. R. Smith, J., concurring) (quoting United States v. Aguilar,
515 U.S. 593, 599 (1995)).
493. Id. at 589 (N. R. Smith, J., concurring).
494. Id. (N. R. Smith, J., concurring)
495. Id.,(N. R. Smith, J., concurring) (quoting United States v. Griffin, 589
F.2d 200, 204 (5th Cir. 1979)).
496. Id. (N. R. Smith, J., concurring) (quoting United States v. Cohn, 452
F.2d 881, 884 (2d Cir. 1971)).
497. Id. (N. R. Smith, J, concurring) (quoting United States v. Brown, 459
F.3d 509, 531 (5th Cir. 2006)).
498. Id. (N. R. Smith, J., concurring).
499. See id. at 590-94 (Reinhardt, J., concurring).
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the law.”500  Judge Reinhardt’s preferred disposition of the case is
to rule testimonial obstruction out of the scope of Section 1503 al-
together based upon its statutory history and proper
interpretation.501
Like Judge Reinhardt, Judge Fletcher would radically restrict
the scope of Section 1503 based upon its text, history, and princi-
ples of statutory interpretation.502  In Judge Fletcher’s view, the def-
initions of materiality advanced by Judges Kozinski and N. R. Smith
admit of so many exceptions that the “terrifyingly clear”503 results
of the government’s reading of Section 1503 cannot be thwarted by
reading materiality into the statute.504
An attorney who provides a truthful but evasive answer to
an interrogatory in civil litigation often does so in the
hope that his answer will ‘influence the decisionmaking
person’ who receives it.  If there is a reasonable chance
that the hope will be realized, the attorney is a criminal.
An appellate attorney who answers during oral argument,
‘I was not the trial attorney,’ sometimes knows what hap-
pened at trial but gives that answer in the hope that the
judge will not pursue the matter.  This attorney, too, may
be a criminal.505
Judge Rawlinson’s dissent rejects any failure of proof that State-
ment C was material.  The jury had Agent Novitzsky’s testimony that
the inconsistencies between Bonds’ testimony and other
evidence before the grand jury regarding the relationship
between the athletes and the steroid distributors, includ-
ing the evasions, required the investigators to conduct ad-
ditional inquiries that would not have been necessary had
Bonds given non-evasive testimony. . . . Indeed, drawing all
inferences in favor of the government, a reasonable juror
could reasonably conclude that Bonds’ evasive testimony
diverted the investigation, thereby impeding the adminis-
tration of justice. . . .Sufficient evidence supports the jury’s
500. Id. at 591-92 (Reinhardt, J., concurring).
501. See id. at 590-94 (Reinhardt, J., concurring).
502. Id. at 594-98 (Fletcher, J., concurring).
503. Id. at 594 (Fletcher, J., concurring).
504. Id. at 595 (Fletcher, J., concurring).
505. Id. (quoting Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759, 770 (1988)).
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considered verdict, and the verdict warrants deference
rather than second-guessing.506
Despite the near unanimity of result, the opinions reveal fault
lines on materiality that will make the Bonds reversal difficult to ap-
ply in the next vexing testimonial obstruction case in any circuit.
There is no consensus on what materiality means.  Each opinion
draws a different line between lawful and unlawful conduct.  Judge
Reinhardt chooses Judge N. R. Smith’s definition, but rejects its co-
rollary.  Judge Fletcher rejects both definitions and Judge Rawlin-
son finds insufficient deference to the jury under any definition.
With the principal rationale for decision this unstable, the applica-
tion of Bronston to Section 1503 takes on added significance.  The
concurring and dissenting opinions’ views of Bronston draw lines for
that debate.
Judge Kozinski quoted Bronston in passing that “it is not un-
common for the most earnest witnesses to give answers that are not
entirely responsive.”507  But it is clear that Judge Kozinski rejects
Bronston as he hypothesized a culpable alternative answer to State-
ment C: “Had the answer been ‘I’m afraid of needles,’ it would have
been plausible to infer an unspoken denial, with the actual words
serving as an explanation or elaboration.”508  Judge Kozinski’s alter-
native is no different from the Bonds three-judge panel’s  “I don’t
have a driver’s license” example.509  This culpability by negative im-
plication is exactly what Bronston forbids.  Rather, Judge Kozinski
would find immaterial, and thus non-culpable,
[a]n irrelevant or wholly non-responsive answer [that] says
nothing germane to the subject of the investigation,
whether it’s true or false.  For example, if a witness is
asked, ‘Do you own a gun?’ it makes no difference
whether he answers ‘The sky is blue’ or ‘The sky is green.’
That the second statement is false makes it no more likely
to impede the investigation than the first.510
Ironically, Judge Kozinski compounds and confounds the cate-
gories of answers subject or not subject to Section 1503.  “Wholly
506. Id. at 603 (Rawlinson, J., dissenting).
507. Id. at 584 (Kozinski, J., concurring) (quoting Bronston v. United States,
409 U.S. 352, 358 (1973)).
508. Id. at 585 (Kozinski, J., concurring).
509. United States v. Bonds, 730 F.3d 890, 895 (9th Cir. 2013), rev’d, 784 F.3d
582 (2015) (en banc).
510. Id. at 586 (Kozinski, J., concurring).
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non-responsive” answers, such as the color of the sky, are not “ger-
mane” to the “investigation” of gun ownership and are immate-
rial.511  On the other hand, partially [?] non-responsive answers, e.g.,
“I’m afraid of needles,”512 or “I don’t have a driver’s license,”513 or
“[The company had an account there for about six months, in Zu-
rich,”514 presumably are material and thus subject to Section 1503.
Judge Kozinski apparently equates “non-responsive” to “not ger-
mane” rather than whether the answer is addressing the question
asked.  Paradoxically, Judge Kozinski’s “needles” and “sky” exam-
ples criminalize the very “not entirely responsive” answers of “the
most earnest witnesses” on whose behalf he invokes materiality.515
The lines of culpability lie athwart Bronston and hardly meet “the
constitutional requirement that individuals have fair notice as to
what conduct may be criminal.”516
Judge N. R. Smith invokes that “fair warning” rooted in Agui-
lar517 as his primary argument that “Congress could not have in-
tended § 1503 to be so broadly applied as to reach a single truthful
but evasive statement such as Statement C.”518  This is precisely the
Bronston principle.  Judge N. R. Smith notes that while Bronston was
a perjury case, “[e]xtending § 1503’s reach to transient evasive or
misleading statements would obviate the prosecutor’s duty to thor-
oughly examine the witness.”519  As the natural and probable effect
of such an answer “is merely to prompt follow-up questions,”520
“Statement C did not have the natural or probable effect of inter-
fering with the due administration of justice, because the Govern-
ment had a duty to clarify any single misleading or evasive
statement Bonds made.”521  Judge Reinhardt added:
The problems created by the misuse of § 1503 by overe-
ager prosecutors to punish witnesses for what they say in
court are all too evident from the facts of this case.  It is
time for them to cease using that section as a substitute for
511. Id. (Kozinski, J., concurring).
512. Id. at 585 (Kozinski, J., concurring).
513. Bonds, 730 F.3d at 895 (three judge panel).
514. Bronston v. United States, 409 U.S. 352, 354 (1973).
515. Bonds, 784 F.3d at 585-86 (en banc) (Kozinski, J., concurring) (quoting
Bronston, 409 U.S. at 358).
516. Id. at 585 (Kozinski, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
517. See United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593, 600 (1995).
518. Bonds, 784 F.3d at 587-88 (N. R. Smith, J., concurring).
519. Id. at 588 (Kozinski, J., concurring) (quoting Bronston, 409 U.S. at 358).
520. Id. (Kozinski, J., concurring); see id.  at 590-91 (Reinhardt, J.,
concurring).
521. Id. at 588 (Kozinski, J., concurring).
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vigorous cross-examination or for the criminal statutes
that properly apply to in-court testimony.522
As part of Judge Fletcher’s reasons for substantially confining
the reach of Section 1503, he compares the disparity between the
penalty for obstruction, up to ten years, with the penalty for per-
jury, only up to five years.523  Under the government’s view, truthful
evasive testimony is subject to twice the penalty for lying under
oath.  Noting the parallels between the testimony of Bronston and
Bonds, Judge Fletcher invokes the Bronston Court’s doubt that the
Congress could have intended drastic sanctions “to cure a testimo-
nial mishap that could readily have been reached with a single addi-
tional question by counsel.”524  Judge Fletcher adopts Bronston’s
requirement that the questioner flush out the whole truth from
even the shrewdly evasive witness so as not to subject juries to con-
jecture or witnesses to confusion and fear:525
The government and the principal concurrence both
brush Bronston aside.  That is not so easily done, for the
Court’s reasoning is as applicable to this case as to Bron-
ston’s.  In either case, “[a] jury should not be permitted to
engage in conjecture whether an unresponsive answer,
true and complete on its face, was intended to mislead or
divert the examiner.”  “To hold otherwise would be to in-
ject a new and confusing element into the adversary testi-
monial system we know.”  Further, and perhaps more
important, if the concurrence is right about the meaning
of “corruptly” in § 1503(a), the Court’s careful parsing of
the perjury statute in Bronston was wasted effort.  If the
concurrence is right, a prosecutor seeking to convict
someone who may or may not have testified truthfully will
never need to pursue a perjury conviction.  The prosecu-
tor can get an obstruction of justice conviction, carrying
twice the penalty, for half the effort.526
Judge Rawlinson’s dissent rejects Bronston as being confined to
perjury cases, as being inapplicable to grand jury proceedings
(though Bronston applies to Section 1623), and as inconsistent with
522. Id. at 593 (Reinhardt, J., concurring).
523. See id. at 598-99 (Fletcher, J., concurring).
524. Id. at 599 (Fletcher, J., concurring) (quoting Bronston, 409 U.S. at 358).
525. Id. (Fletcher, J., concurring) (citing Bronston, 409 U.S. at 358-59).
526. Id. at 599-600 (Fletcher, J., concurring) (internal citations omitted)
(quoting Bronston, 409 U.S. at 358, 362).
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the text of Section 1503 which makes no distinction between truth
and falsity.527
Thus the danger to the Bronston doctrine posed by a Bonds-like
prosecution remains despite the reversal of Bonds’ conviction.  A
reversal for insufficient evidence is vulnerable to further review,528
especially where the standard for sufficiency is fractured among the
disparate views of materiality.  Given the improbability that Judge
Reinhardt’s and Judge Fletcher’s tightly reasoned statutory argu-
ments could gain traction nearly fifty years after Alo and Cohn, this
writer believes that only Judge Fletcher’s adoption of Bronston’s rea-
soning for Section 1503 can guard against the government’s “terri-
fyingly clear”529 vision of Section 1503 as its route to a conviction
for a procedural crime if one cannot be gained for a substantive
crime.  After all, Bronston was written to apply to Section 1503 from
the beginning.  For all of these reasons, it is hoped that the above
offering may be of some use as the debate on the Bonds case goes
yard.
527. See id. at 607-10 (Rawlinson, J., dissenting).
528. See Coleman v. Johnson, 132 S. Ct. 2060 (2012).
529. Bonds, 784 F.3d at 594 (Fletcher, J., concurring).
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